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This paper examines the key risks and risk management strategies associated 
with devolving the purchase of publicly funded health care to non-governmental 
organisations, where the aim is to maintain at least the current level of equity of 
access.  The key risk is greater ‘cream-skimming’ or risk selection, particularly 
with competitive purchase models based on patient choice of purchaser.  The 
paper also examines the risks of poor purchaser performance and cost shifting.  
Minimising these risks would require considerable government regulation. 
 
This paper was commissioned and carried out to inform Treasury’s thinking in 
helping develop health policy under the National Party Government that was in 
power from August 1998 to November 1999.  It is a background paper and does 
not provide policy advice, nor does it propose any particular course of action.  
The Treasury has chosen to make it publicly available in order to encourage 
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This paper was commissioned by The Treasury to provide an overview of the key risks 
associated with devolved purchasing arrangements and purchaser competition in 
health care in New Zealand. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, devolved purchasing is defined as any purchasing 
strategy or policy which allocates responsibility for purchasing groups of services (for 
a particular population) to non-government organisations other than the 
Health  Funding Authority (HFA).  Organisations other than the HFA then become 
responsible for negotiating contracts with other providers and for funding such 
services from budgets allocated to them.  In some cases, the range of services for 
which purchasing is devolved may be rather limited (e.g., to primary care services) or 
it may be comprehensive (e.g., cover all health care services).  Examples of 
organisations which might take on this devolved purchasing role include general 
practitioners (GPs), independent practitioner associations (IPAs), hospital and health 
services (HHSs), or Iwi organisations, community providers or health insurers. 
 
Purchaser competition occurs where people can choose which of a number of 
devolved purchasing organisations (DPO) has the responsibility to arrange for some 
or all of their care. 
 
The paper does not discuss in depth the overall merits and demerits of moves to 
devolve purchasing in New Zealand.  The paper also does not discuss in detail the 
potential benefits of purchaser competition, the transaction costs that might arise with 
such competition, nor the transition issues in establishing purchaser competition.   
Rather, the author was asked to focus on the following key risks: 
 
·  cream-skimming – which occurs when health providers or DPOs – either 
deliberately or by chance – enrol a favourable mix of members, i.e. those with good 
health and hence a lower chance of making a claim or needing care than the 
average person; 
·  poor purchaser performance – which occurs when DPOs as agents fail to meet 
the objectives of principals (e.g., the HFA, the government, taxpayers or 
communities.); and 
·  cost-shifting – which occurs when costs are charged against a budget that differs 
from that intended, or from that traditionally charged. 
 
Cream-skimming 
In the current financing environment, successful cream-skimming in New Zealand 
could lead to: increased overall expenditure; pressure for additional expenditure; 
inequitable access to services and quality care; limited incentives for technical 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness; and high levels of profits for some DPOs while 
others struggle. 
 
Cream-skimming has the potential to be a serious problem in New Zealand if we move 
to payment systems which place providers at greater financial risk and which maintain 
or further encourage competition between providers or devolved purchasers.  The 
likely extent of cream-skimming cannot be judged at present.  One gauge of the 
significance of the issue, however, is the attention that is being given to regulatory vi 
reforms in the United States to reduce its prevalence: this suggests that if cream-
skimming were to become widespread, each of the risks mentioned above is likely to 
be significant, both in a financial and political sense. 
 
Poor purchaser performance 
The risks associated with poor purchaser performance – relative to good performance 
– are potentially many.  These include: higher overall expenditure for a given level of 
care or a lower level of care for a given level of expenditure; lower access to services 
and reduced quality of care; reduced equity of access; increased private financial 
responsibility for care; limited improvements in health status; and higher overall 
expenditure as expenditure is shifted to the private sector, which may be less able 
than the public sector to contain overall costs. 
 
The likelihood of such risks is difficult to judge.  Any losses from poor performance in 
delivering value-for-money are difficult to estimate – from all perspectives.  The size of 
the health care market means that systematically poor purchaser performance will 
lead to significantly lower levels of health or higher expenditures than necessary.   
This, however, may be balanced by having multiple agencies involved in the delivery 
of health care: failure on the part of a purchaser to perform may not necessarily be 
reflected in poor service delivery. 
 
Cost-shifting 
The key risks associated with cost-shifting are also potentially numerous.  They 
include: increased government expenditure on votes other than Vote: Health; 
increased expenditure for publicly-owned purchaser and provider organisations were 
costs and patients to be shifted to publicly-owned purchasers and providers; increased 
private expenditure and resource use were purchasing authorities to make decisions 
which shift responsibility for financing onto private budgets; increased shunting of 
patients; higher overall expenditure, if claims in the private sector increase with more 
care provided privately at higher cost; reduced equity of access if those who cannot 
obtain publicly-funded care are unable to afford private care; difficulties in planning 
and budgeting in areas where costs are shifted to; and inappropriate market signals 
which might arise as a result of cross-subsidies. 
 
As far as the author is aware, there is no New Zealand research evidence on the 
extent of deliberate cost-shifting or its impact.  However, cost-shifting is widely 
believed to take place here. 
 
Recommendations 
Future analysis and research 
There are a number of areas where further analysis would enable a better judgement 
to be made about the benefits of further reform in New Zealand health care.   
Regarding devolved purchasing and purchaser competition, it is recommended that: 
 
·  the Treasury undertake further analysis of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of moves towards integrated care and devolved purchasing in 
New Zealand.  This analysis should compare current purchasing arrangements with 
devolved purchasing in relation to: purchasing expertise; local responsiveness (of vii 
providers to DPOs and of DPOs to communities); the removal of the purchaser-
provider split which is proposed with devolved purchasing; accountability and 
governance; conflicts of interest; and levels of transaction costs.  Further analysis 
should involve a) a detailed literature review of United Kingdom and United States 
experiences with devolved purchasing; and b) formal evaluations of integrated care 
pilots in New Zealand: these evaluations should draw on key issues noted in this 
report. 
 
·  the Treasury complete a more detailed literature review and give more critical 
thought to the advantages and disadvantages of purchaser competition in 
New  Zealand.  This analysis should draw on previous work undertaken for the 
Health Services Taskforce as well as more recent evidence.  Careful attention 
should be paid to: 
i  the design features of purchaser competition.  This should include careful 
analysis of the implications for equity, efficiency and other goals of: 
allowing individuals to top-up their government contribution with private 
financing; ensuring a minimum standard of care; alternative regulatory 
structures, including the number of standard packages of care; 
ii  the implications for private medical insurance in New Zealand; and 
iii  the transition issues in shifting to purchaser competition. 
 
·  the Treasury encourage clearer signals to be given about the future direction of 
New Zealand’s health services, in particular, whether purchaser competition is to be 
encouraged and what the regulatory arrangements might be with such competition.  
This will allow providers and emerging DPOs to plan with full knowledge of the 
future regulatory environment. 
 
Cream-skimming 
It is recommended that if devolved purchasing is thought to be appropriate to develop 
into competition between providers or competition between DPOs: 
 
·  the services specified in the HFA’s Service Coverage Document should continue to 
be incorporated into contracts with providers.  This promotes accountability and 
ensures that provider groupings which compete with each other are required to 
make available the same set of services1; 
 
·  current work on specifying services (and eligible patients) continues, adding detail 
(e.g., condition/treatment pairs; practice guidelines; clinical assessment priority 
criteria) in relation to services where rationing is most common2.  In a competitive 
purchasing environment, this will promote accountability; promote equity of access; 
and reduce local service specification and service delivery choices as sources of 
                                            
1  Some consideration will need to be given to the advantages and disadvantages of standardising 
user charges (Enthoven 1988, p. 104), to prevent both cream-skimming and cost-shifting. 
 
2  This assumes that the funding of health care in New Zealand remains at present levels and that 
rationing of particular services (e.g., heart transplants, liver transplants) continues. 
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cream-skimming3.  It may be that with experience we gain a better understanding of 
which services need to be specified tightly and which can remain more loosely 
defined in order to encourage diversity; 
 
·  an explicit list of services that are not currently purchased by the HFA be developed 
– this will assist in clarifying boundaries between public and private financing.  Such 
services may need to be specified in some depth (e.g., condition/treatment pairs; 
practice guidelines; clinical assessment priority criteria).  The private insurance 
market is likely to welcome this development and some further assessment of its 
impact is essential.  This approach makes more explicit the fact that those unable to 
get or afford private health insurance may miss out on care they might benefit from; 
 
·  responsibility for technology assessment and national guideline development 
activities for particular services (e.g., high cost, high volume, experimental services) 
should be allocated to an existing or new agency.  The agency’s roles would be to 
facilitate guidelines to be used in conjunction with service specification and to 
implement such guidelines.  Again, the role of such guidelines would be to promote 
accountability and equity of access and to prevent local service specification and 
service delivery in ways that promote cream-skimming.  Possible agencies include: 
the National Health Committee (incorporating its Guidelines for Guidelines project); 
the HFA; or a new agency such as the United Kingdom National Health Service 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NHS Executive 1999); and 
 
·  funding be allocated to DPOs using a risk-rated capitation formula, where the level 
of funding is either: a) sufficient to cover a broadly defined range of services such 
that care is available to all those who are deemed likely to benefit, i.e. requiring 
additional resources in the health sector depending on an assessment of current 
levels of unmet need4; or b) sufficient to fund a set of services which are defined in 
detail.  The second approach is likely to be required in order to i) remain within 
current funding levels5; ii) promote equity of access around the country; iii) promote 
accountability and iv) prevent opportunities for under-servicing and cream-
skimming6. 
 
                                            
3  It will also reduce avenues for under-servicing. 
 
4  The recent experience in relation to booking systems for elective surgery gives an indication of 
how greater explicitness and the setting of an entitlement may lead to unmet need surfacing 
(e.g., in New Zealand where a large number of people are waiting to see specialists for 
assessment) (Kennedy 1998)).  See also Light (1998) who argues that the United Kingdom NHS 
is ‘doubly underfunded’ in that in addition to those already on waiting lists there are likely to be 
thousands of patients with similar needs who are being kept off waiting lists because their GPs 
thought the lists were too long (p. 7). 
 
5  This is partly because service specification in and of itself, accompanied by a move to the 
delivery of care by private agencies engaged in making profits or surpluses, may lead New 
Zealanders to view the services specified as an entitlement to care and to become more wary of 
not getting services in a timely way. 
 
6  Contracting with devolved purchasers in terms of volumes of service may not be sufficient to 
reduce incentives to cream-skim or under-service. ix 
Beyond service specification, it is recommended that: 
 
·  contracts with providers and DPOs signal the likely development of a regulatory 
regime which at the very least includes open enrolment, guaranteed renewal and 
ways of monitoring and publicising quality of care; 
 
·  further analytical work be undertaken to consider the costs, benefits and ability to 
interpret data on quality of care, disenrolments and consumer complaints and 
satisfaction; 
 
·  the risk profiles of providers or DPOs on capitated contracts be assessed and 
appropriate ways to risk-rate payments or to compensate those with a riskier 
population be further researched; and 
 
·  an independent agency is established to provide information to consumers to 
facilitate consumer choice of provider or plan and to market information on behalf of 
providers or plans. 
 
Poor purchaser performance 
It is recommended that: 
 
·  a set of purchaser and provider performance indicators be further developed, 
drawing on current and international approaches, with the information required to 
monitor indicators to be stipulated in contracts.  Such indicators might be used in 
developing rewards and sanctions; benchmarking performance; or in providing 
information to facilitate competition between purchasers.  Care needs to be taken, 
however, that information requirements do not impose significant, additional costs 
on the sector and that indicators can be adjusted by health status in ways which 
are generally acceptable to all stakeholders; 
 
·  further analytical work be undertaken to identify the service areas where practice 
guidelines or audit might more appropriately be used to monitor performance (e.g., 
hospital standards; acute admission audits).  This should include a literature review 
on approaches to audit and attention should be paid to the literature on optimal 
practice guideline development and implementation; and 
 
·  a review be undertaken of New Zealand’s experience with rewards and sanctions 
and the problems and potential of such tools for improving performance, 




It is recommended that in designing devolved purchasing contracts, consideration be 
given to budget boundaries, including whether contract and referral guidelines can be 
used as means by which cost-shifting can be prevented.  1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the key risks associated with 
devolved purchasing arrangements in health care in New Zealand.  Devolved 
purchasing is defined as any purchasing strategy or policy which allocates 
responsibility for purchasing groups of services (for a particular population) to non-
government organisations other than the Health Funding Authority (HFA).   
Organisations other than the HFA then become responsible for negotiating contracts 
with other providers and fund such services from budgets allocated to them.  In some 
cases, the range of services for which purchasing is devolved may be rather limited 
(e.g., to primary care services) or it may be comprehensive (e.g., cover all health care 
services).  Examples of organisations which might take on this devolved purchasing 
role include general practitioners (GPs), independent practitioner associations (IPAs), 
hospital and health services (HHSs), or iwi organisations, community providers or 
health insurers7.  The paper also considers risks associated with devolved purchasing 
where there is purchaser competition – a further policy step which may be taken in 
New Zealand.  Purchaser competition occurs where people can choose which of a 
number of devolved purchasing organisations (DPO) has the responsibility to arrange 
for some or all of their care. 
 
The paper provides a high level summary of the key risks associated with devolved 
purchasing and purchaser competition.  Key risks are: cream-skimming, poor 
purchaser performance, and cost-shifting.  The report provides an overview of the 
policy approaches that might most effectively manage these risks, and an outline of 
the advantages and disadvantages of each policy approach.  The nature of theory and 
empirical evidence on these topics is such, however, that much of the analysis is 
based on a priori theory and only partial empirical evidence, often from other 
countries.  This suggests that if, based on a further assessment it is believed that 
further change is desirable, New Zealand should adopt approaches which allow 
‘learning by doing’, evaluation of key changes, and policy adjustments over time as 
evidence on performance becomes available. 
 
The paper does not discuss in depth the overall merits for New Zealand of moves to 
devolve purchasing or introduce purchaser competition, nor the additional transaction 
costs and transition issues we would face in implementing such policies.  Rather, the 
author was asked to focus on the key risks of cream-skimming, poor purchaser 
performance and cost-shifting which might be associated with such policies.  Further 
analysis of the benefits of these policies is required to weigh up against the risks set 
out here. 
 
Following this introduction, the paper is divided into the following sections: 
 
·  Section 2, discusses devolved purchasing in more detail, focusing on the forms of 
devolved purchasing which are currently emerging in New Zealand; 
 
                                            
7  Devolved purchasing is related to integrated care, but goes further than some integrated care 
models by allocating responsibility for the purchasing of services from a devolved budget to 
organisations other than the HFA. 2 
·  Section 3, discusses three key risks associated with devolved purchasing: cream-
skimming, poor purchaser performance and cost-shifting; 
 
·  Section 4, analyses the main approaches for managing each risk; and 
 
·  Section 5, summarises the discussion and provides some concluding comments. 
 
References to the report are set out in Section 6. 
 
  Nine appendices are attached to this report.  Appendix A provides a glossary of 
terms and abbreviations used in the report.  Appendix B details the techniques and 
organisational forms of integrated care, some of which are relevant for devolved 
purchasing.  Appendix C describes proposals for purchaser competition.  Appendix D 
notes particular issues associated with further moves towards purchaser competition 
in New Zealand.  Appendix E notes reasons why purchaser competition proposals 
include a standard package of benefits, beyond reducing the ability to cream-skim.  
Appendices F-H provide examples of service specification in European and United 
States legislation.  Appendix I sets out the requirements of the Health Employer Data 




The project has involved a detailed review and analysis of the international literatures 
on health policy reform, particularly the material on integrated care and managed 
competition.  Much of this material is focused on the United States health system, and 
a key task has been to assess the relevance of United States experience for 
New Zealand.  A number of other countries, for example the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, have also developed proposals in recent years which are relevant to 
integrated care and managed competition in New Zealand and their proposals and 
experiences have also been considered in this paper. 
 
Discussions with Julie Signoff, Kaiser Permanente, have proved useful in providing 
further detail on United States experiences and regulations, particularly those in 
California.  A number of background papers provided by the Treasury were reviewed: 
this included a number of papers written for the Health Reforms Directorate and the 
National Interim Provider Board in 1992/93 (when the New Zealand 1993 health 
reforms were being implemented) and recent papers on service coverage and 
devolved purchasing (Clayton and Scott 1998; Minister of Health 1998). 3 
2  DEVOLVED PURCHASING IN NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand’s health care sector has undergone significant change since 1993. Key 
reforms have included the splitting of purchasing and provision functions, the 
establishment of hospitals along business lines, the introduction of competition in 
provision and the increased use of contracts in relationships between purchasers and 
providers.  As a result of these reforms, general practitioners (GPs) have increasingly 
grouped together in horizontally integrated Independent Practitioner Associations 
(IPAs), and a number of other organisations and networks have also developed (e.g., 
Health Care Aotearoa, (see Crampton 1999); Mâori purchasing organisations (see 
Crengle 1999); MATPRO – a Wellington-based vertically integrated consortium of 
midwives, GPs and specialists involved in maternity care). 
 
Until 1997, the purchaser-provider split in New Zealand allocated responsibility for 
purchasing to four regional health authorities (RHAs).  RHAs were responsible for 
purchasing a comprehensive range of services for each of their populations.  Such 
services have been purchased from a number of providers, ranging from independent 
GPs and small voluntary organisations through IPAs and hospitals (formerly crown 
health enterprises or CHEs).  In early 1998, the four RHAs were combined into a 
national organisation, the Health Funding Authority (HFA), which is now responsible 
for such purchasing. 
 
2.1  Integrated care 
As a result of the reforms, some New Zealand providers – and the HFA (Health 
Funding Authority 1998) – are aiming to further promote integrated care, sometimes 
called managed care.  Integrated care has many definitions.  In New Zealand, 
integrated care has been argued to span ‘a spectrum ranging from integration within a 
group of related services using shared clinical protocols and information systems 
within current contracting arrangements with the funder to large scale integration 
across all primary and secondary services under a capitation payment’ (McKenzie 
Webster 1997, p.5).  In a recent review of managed care arrangements in California, 
the following definition was used: ‘any system of health service payment or delivery 
arrangement where the health plan attempts to control or coordinate use of health 
services by its enrolled members in order to contain health expenditures, improve 
quality or both’ (Physician Payment Review Commission 1996, cited in Managed 
Health Care Improvement Task Force, 1998). 
 
  These definitions encompass both techniques for integrated care and 
organisational forms which promote integrated care. 
 
 Key techniques for integrating care include: 
 
·  financial incentives at an organisational or provider level, usually involving 
capitation, some form of risk sharing or budget integration; 
 
·  techniques for managing clinical activity – utilisation review, medical or practice 
profiling, disease management, clinical guidelines; and 
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·  patient-focused techniques – gatekeeping8, case management, queuing and 
watchful waiting, primary prevention, encouraging self-care (Robinson and Steiner 
1998). 
 
 Key  organisational forms of integrated care include: 
 
·  health maintenance organisations (HMOs) – staff model, pre-paid group practice, 
network model, IPA and mixed model versions have been separately identified in 
the literature; 
 
·  preferred provider organisations (PPOs); 
 
·  point of service plans (POSs); 
 
·  primary care case management (PCCM); 
 
 
·  social health maintenance organisations (SHMOs); and 
 
·  programme for all-inclusive care of the elderly (PACE) (Robinson and Steiner 
1998). 
 
  These key techniques and organisational forms of integrated care are discussed in 
further detail in Appendix B. 
 
2.2  Integrated care and devolved purchasing in New Zealand  
New Zealand’s health care system already features a number of the techniques for 
integrated care (e.g., case management, GPs acting as gatekeepers to specialist 
services).  Integrated care developments in New Zealand are occurring in relation to 
financial incentives (e.g., capitation and budget holding in primary care), techniques 
for managing clinical activity (e.g., developing guidelines across non-integrated 
providers) and limited forms of HMOs (e.g., the development of devolved purchasing 
organisations or DPOs).  DPOs in the New Zealand context are groupings of insurer 
and/or provider organisations, aiming to take responsibility for the care of particular 
populations, and having a budget devolved to them from the HFA to fulfil such 
obligations.  Examples include: arrangements proposed in 1998 by PrimeHealth in 
Tauranga (PrimeHealth Ltd 1998); MATPRO; the Marlborough Health Trust (Hyndman 
1998) and emerging Mâori Integrated Care Organisations (Crengle 1999). 
 
Moves towards capitation (including the general medical services benefit as well as 
other subsidy payments such as practice nurse, pharmaceutical and laboratory 
subsidy payments and potentially, community and secondary care services), budget-
holding (for referred services) and DPOs are likely to involve some devolution of the 
purchasing role, i.e. providers or other agents taking responsibility for allocating 
resources not only to consumers/patients but also across services.  The move in 1998 
to a single national funder is also likely to encourage such devolution: the HFA may 
                                            
8  For example, in New Zealand GPs act as gatekeepers to secondary care services.  This 
contrasts with more direct access to specialist care in other countries. 5 
find that it is too remote from consumers/patients to purchase services which best 
meet consumer/patient needs – one way of improving local responsiveness might be 
to devolve some of its purchasing responsibilities9. 
 
2.3  Integrated care and purchaser competition 
Moves towards devolved purchasing in turn increase the potential for a move towards 
competition at the purchaser level, i.e. for a number of DPOs each to take on 
responsibility for arranging the care of populations registered with them and to 
compete with each other for individual members.  It is difficult to judge how imminent 
such changes may be10, but it is important to consider, at a policy level, the 
implications of such a development.  For the purposes of this paper, this further step is 
labelled ‘purchaser competition’.  Details of potential approaches to purchaser 
competition are set out in Appendix C. 
 
2.4  Devolved purchasing arrangements in New Zealand  
The main devolved purchasing arrangements likely to emerge in New Zealand are set 
out below11.  In all cases the financing of the New Zealand health care system is 
assumed to remain as is (i.e. a largely tax-based system with taxes collected and 
distributed by the government, with user charges for some services, particularly 
primary care12), with crown ownership of the HFA and some providers or DPOs in all 
arrangements.  DPOs can take any of the integrated care organisational forms 
discussed above (page 5 above, and see Appendix B).  Throughout this paper, it is 
assumed that current levels of spending are maintained and that any efficiency gains 
                                            
9  For example, the HFA noted in its document ‘The Next Five Years in General Practice’ that 
primary health service organisations ‘need to be able to relate to their local communities and be 
flexible in their response to local problems’ (Health Funding Authority 1998, p. 7). 
 
10  Many of the current proposals would fit within a model where the HFA continues to have overall 
responsibility for purchasing a comprehensive set of services for New Zealand as a whole, with 
specific contracts with DPOs devolving a purchasing role for particular disease categories or 
regions (McKenzie Webster 1997).  Furthermore, many IPAs have become quite large and have 
developed around geographical areas so that, in theory, they could become regional monopsony 
DPOs. 
 
11  This paper does not assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of each approach.  An 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages would include identifying the extent to which 
each approach facilitates: the assessing of needs; obtaining information on services; influencing 
providers; promoting patient choice; and the ability to undertake priority setting, including an 
assessment of effectiveness and values.  In addition, the likely extent of transaction costs 
associated with each model requires further analysis. See Mays and Dixon (1996) for further 
discussion. 
 
12  It is assumed throughout this paper that competition would occur in relation to the government’s 
share of health care funding in the form of a voucher which would not be able to be topped up 
with private funding.  However, key policy issues for further consideration are a) whether to allow 
individuals to top-up the government’s contribution for care beyond the specified core and b) 
what the equity, efficiency, and cost-shifting implications of this are likely to be. See also Plank 
(n.d). 
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from devolved purchasing come in the form of improved processes of care for 
patients, more services and financial savings13. 
 
The devolved purchasing arrangements considered in this paper are: 
 
Monopoly HFA – This model represents the status quo.  A monopoly purchaser – the 
HFA – is responsible for the purchasing of a broadly defined range of services for the 
entire New Zealand population.  The HFA contracts with a range of providers to 
ensure such services are delivered.  The HFA uses a mix of contracting 
arrangements, including contracts with integrated providers, who are paid largely on a 
capitation basis, and contracts with non-integrated providers who are paid on a fee-
for-service basis or who are paid according to price-volume contracts with budget 
caps. 
 
Monopoly HFA with specialist purchasing of particular services14 – Where the 
HFA devolves responsibility for some specific services to particular DPOs, who then 
become responsible for purchasing those services.  Examples might include care for 
consumers with disabilities.  Carved-out services are assumed to be paid for on a 
capitation basis15.  The HFA retains responsibility for purchasing all other services. 
 
Regional monopoly integrated purchasers – Where a number of regional monopoly 
purchasers are responsible for the purchasing of a broadly defined range of services 
for their regional or sub-regional populations.  These purchasers are largely integrated 
with a few external contracts.  It is assumed that such purchasers would be funded on 
a capitation basis16. 
 
Choice of partially integrated DPO – Where individuals make their own choices for 
coverage, choosing between a wide range of competing DPOs.  DPOs arrange for 
some care only (e.g., primary care or primary care with some secondary care 
services), and are either publicly- or privately-owned.  The HFA contracts for other 
services (e.g., tertiary services) on behalf of the entire New Zealand population.  The 
DPO market is managed by one or more agencies, through which government funding 
is channelled.  These agencies register DPOs, monitor DPO performance and provide 
                                            
13  Further work is required to determine whether or not these assumptions would hold with devolved 
purchasing. 
 
14  Known as ‘carve-outs’ in the United States literature. 
 
15  In some United States examples, carve-out purchasers are often paid an administration fee 
(based on capitation), and are not subject to financial risk – providers are often paid on a fee-for-
service basis.  The carve-outs appear to involve very close management of care, e.g. ongoing 
concurrent review (Goldman, McCulloch et al. 1998; Ma and McGuire 1998).  The two papers 
cited here refer to mental health benefits in employment contracts, ie. for the general population.  
Whether or not the same arrangements are applicable for those with ongoing serious mental 
health needs is not clear. 
16  An example of this arrangement might be the Marlborough Health Trust model (Hyndman 1998). 
 7 
consumers with information on DPO performance.  Agencies might include the HFA, 
employers or regional purchasing co-operatives17. 
 
Choice of fully integrated DPO - Agency approach – Where individuals choose 
between competing DPOs – however, their choices are framed by an agency, through 
which government funding is channelled.  Agencies make the first cut of choices 
between a range of competing DPOs (e.g., they may seek tenders or choose a narrow 
range of DPOs), and they monitor, and provide consumers with information on, DPO 
performance.  Agencies might include the HFA, employers or regional purchasing co-
operatives.  DPOs arrange for comprehensive care, are fully integrated, and are either 
publicly- or privately-owned. 
 
Choice of fully integrated DPO - Individual approach – Where individuals make 
their own choices for coverage, choosing between a wide range of competing DPOs.  
Government funding is allocated to DPOs on the basis of consumer choice. DPOs 
arrange for comprehensive care and are fully integrated, and are either publicly- or 
privately-owned.  The DPO market is managed by one or more agencies, through 
which government funding is channelled.  These agencies register DPOs, monitor 
DPO performance and provide consumers with information on DPO performance. 
Agencies might include the HFA, employers or regional purchasing co-operatives. 
 
2.5  Devolved purchasing and policy risks 
Many of the techniques for devolving purchasing pose little risk on their own.  Key 
uncertainties, however, include: whether any additional transaction costs from 
devolved purchasing18 are offset by improvements in care or cost-effectiveness; and 
whether integrated care techniques lead to overall higher costs because of 
improvements in quality of care, e.g. where clinical guidelines lead to more service 
and better quality of care.  These risks are not discussed here. 
 
Devolved purchasing does however raise two important issues: how to provide 
incentives for purchasers to perform; and how to reduce the potential for cost-shifting 
where financing/budgets for different types of care remain separate19. 
 
                                            
17  Regional purchasing co-operatives are agencies which purchase health care on behalf of 
employer or other organisations.  The concept appears to be a United States one, designed to 
reduce the costs of purchasing for small and medium sized firms and to enhance purchaser 
power over providers. 
 
18  For example, the savings on transaction costs were one reason given for the move from four 
purchasing authorities to one purchasing authority in New Zealand.  The one purchasing 
authority should be cheaper to run than four, while provider groups which operate in more than 
one region should also find their transaction costs reduced as they need only deal with one 
agency rather than four. 
 
19  For example, the Marlborough model included private insurance in its financing arrangements.  
How will it be made clear what is paid for by government funding vs private insurance financing?  
What will happen with user charges if further services – beyond those currently paid for by the 
general medical services subsidy – are delivered by general practitioners? 8 
Additional risks are also likely with the moves towards placing providers and devolved 
purchasers at increasing levels of financial risk.  The most important of these are in 
relation to under-servicing and cream-skimming.  The former is dealt with in this paper 
under the issue of purchaser performance; the latter is considered as a stand-alone 
risk. 9 
3  RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH DEVOLVED PURCHASING 
3.1  Cream-skimming (risk-selection)20 
Cream-skimming occurs when health providers or DPOs – either deliberately or by 
chance – enrol a favourable mix of members, i.e. those with a lower risk of making a 
claim or needing care than the average person21.  It is a particular problem where 
there are capitated payments made to providers and plans, where there is competition 
between providers and plans to serve particular markets, and where – because 
premiums for an individual’s care do not necessarily equate with ex ante or ex post 
financial risk – there is an opportunity for the provider or DPO to make 
profits/surpluses from selecting patients. 
 
In New Zealand, cream-skimming is a risk where a) contracts with providers are on a 
capitation or budget-holding basis and b) there is competition between providers or 
DPOs.  Although New Zealand has some limited experience with capitation and 
budget-holding, the extent of cream-skimming in New Zealand is not known. 
 
Cream-skimming has been found to offer opportunities for large profits in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom (Newhouse, Manning et al. 1989; van Vliet and 
van de Ven 1992; Matsaganis and Glennerster 1994; van de Ven, van Vliet et al. 
1994)22.  Risk-selection can therefore be a very profitable undertaking.  It is, however, 
very difficult to prove that it is occurring.  There is anecdotal and research evidence 
that cream-skimming occurs frequently in the United States, but little more than 
anecdotal evidence of its occurrence in the United Kingdom23,24. 
                                            
20  In this paper, cream-skimming is distinguished from under-servicing, ie. providing fewer services 
than appropriate.  Although under-servicing may be used as a means of cream-skimming, 
incentives on purchasers and providers to under-service also arise where fee-for-service 
payments are averaged across a category of care (as in the Diagnostic Related Group payment 
system).  The problem of under-servicing is considered in the section on purchaser incentives. 
 
21  Strictly speaking, compared with the average person within any broad risk pool, e.g., within any 
particular age-gender pool. 
 
22  In the United States, for example, the Alpha Center notes that insurance statistics consistently 
show that 35 per cent of people purchasing health insurance will not file a claim in the following 
five years, while 5 per cent account for more than 50 per cent of health expenditures in the same 
period (Alpha Center 1997).  Similarly, in the United Kingdom Glennerster et al found in their 
study of one GP fund-holder that the entire fund was expended on 27 per cent of the patients, 
with the most expensive five patients taking 68 per cent of the expenditure (Glennerster, 
Matsaganis et al. 1994). 
23  The United Kingdom experience in relation to fundholding is in part explained by researchers as 
a result of: generous budgets; GPs not being at personal financial risk; stop-loss provisions (Le 
Grand, Mays et al. 1997); the use of historical budgets rather than pure capitation rates to set 
budgets (Audit Commission 1996); while further explanations could include cultural factors 
specific to the United Kingdom and not found in the United States. 
 
24  Recent research has found evidence of an increase in the proportion of patients removed from 
GP fundholders’ registers in Northern Ireland at general practitioners’ requests.  Comparisons 
were made with removals prior to fundholding and with non-fundholders.  This may be a means 
of cream-skimming; equally it may be related to the additional workload and pressures of 
fundholding (O'Reilly, Steele et al. 1998). 10 
 
The key ways in which competing providers and DPOs can cream-skim include:  
 
·  specifying benefit packages in particular ways (e.g., including comprehensive 
maternity care to encourage young couples to enrol; excluding mental health 
benefits to discourage the enrolment of people likely to suffer from such problems; 
excluding pre-existing conditions from coverage to discourage those with health 
problems from enrolling); 
 
·  refusing coverage altogether to particular individuals or to people employed in 
certain industries or occupations; or offering coverage at prohibitively expensive 
premiums; 
 
·  contracting with providers in particular ways (e.g., not contracting with specialists 
known to specialise in high-risk conditions; recruiting new specialists with limited 
patient following); or contracting with providers in particular locations but avoiding 
others who practice in higher-risk localities (e.g., inner-city areas); 
 
·  marketing DPOs in particular locations or to particular groups to attract people in 
good health (e.g., in gyms); and 
 
·  offering poor quality care, under-servicing, making patients wait for care or 
developing more stringent protocols for referring patients to specialists for some 
types of conditions, in order to drive consumers to another DPO. 
 
(See: Enthoven and Kronick 1989; Ellwood, Enthoven et al. 1992; Congressional 
Budget Office 1993; Gauthier, Lamphere et al. 1995; Swartz 1995; Luft 1996; 
Newhouse 1996; Alpha Center 1997 for further detail.) 
 
Risks associated with cream skimming 
Successful cream-skimming in New Zealand would lead to the following risks25: 
Crown risks 
·  Increased overall expenditure. 
 
This might arise if the approach being used in California to fund care for people 
shifting from Medicare Cost (traditional fee-for-service insurance) to Medicare Risk 
(managed care) were used in New Zealand.  Medicare Risk premiums are based on 
the fee-for-service DPO premiums: Risk plans receive 95 per cent of the fee-for-
service plans’ premiums.  Some Risk plans are obtaining extremely favourable mixes 
of members when compared with the risk profile of the Cost members.  As a result, 
Risk plans could earn large profits on the premiums they are being paid by 
                                            
25  It is assumed that government financing of health care remains and that every person is covered 
by at least one DPO.  In an unregulated, privately financed model, cream skimming would mean 
some people would be unable to obtain any insurance coverage at all, or would only be offered 
coverage at extremely high premiums. 
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Medicare26.  This would seem to imply that overall expenditure on Cost and Risk plan 
members will increase: as favourable risks sign up with Risk plans, the average risk in 
the Cost plans rises, leading to increases in Cost plan premiums and therefore further 
increases in Risk plan premiums. 
 
·  Pressure for additional expenditure. 
 
This may occur if providers or DPOs successfully cream-skim by offering additional 
services or higher quality care for some people than would otherwise occur27.  This 




·  Inequitable access to a broad range of services and quality care. 
 
Cream skimming raises equity concerns, as it reduces the choices of provider or DPO 
and coverage offered to some people.  It may also lead to poor care for some groups 
where poor quality care or reduced coverage are used as means of cream-skimming. 
 
Access to care and quality of care may also be adversely affected for some people if 
providers or DPOs with an unfavourable mix of risks are forced to reduce services or 
quality in order to remain within budget. 
 
Health sector risks 
·  Diminished incentives for technical efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
 
Cream skimming does this: a) by allowing DPOs to segment the market, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of individuals switching providers or DPOs because of cost; b) 
because cream-skimming is likely to be more profitable than promoting efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness28; and c) because good providers or DPOs may go out of business 
if they are unable to provide good quality care due to a poor mix of members. 
 
·  High level of profits for some providers or DPOs while others struggle. 
 
Providers or DPOs which successfully engage in cream-skimming may earn above-
normal profits, while others face considerable losses.  This is likely to engender 
                                            
26  In practice, Medicare rules prohibit HMOs from earning more profit on their Risk clients than their 
commercial clients.  If the Health Care Financing Authority (HCFA) estimates capitation 
payments will lead to excess profits, plans must reduce premiums, out-of-pocket expenses, offer 
additional benefits or return money to the HCFA.  Most decide to reduce premiums or offer 
additional benefits (General Accounting Office, 1995, p. 8). 
27  See footnote 26 above for reasons for why this is happening in California. 
 
28  As noted by the Alpha Center, ‘health plans offer their products knowing that the health or 
sickness of the people they sell to will have a greater impact on their annual per capita costs than 
any changes they can make to improve the efficiency of health care delivery’ (Alpha Center 1997, 
p. 5).  See also the points made above (page 18) about the profitable nature of cream-skimming. 12 
discontent amongst some providers and DPOs.  In addition, efficient, high quality 
DPOs may be driven out of the market. 
 
Likelihood and significance of risks 
Cream-skimming has the potential to be a serious problem in New Zealand if we move 
to payment systems which place providers and DPOs at greater financial risk, and 
maintain or further encourage competition between providers or devolved purchasers.  
The likely extent of cream-skimming cannot be judged at this point in time.  Although 
the New Zealand system may appear to be characterised by socially-responsible 
individuals and agencies, the financial incentives inherent in a more commercial and 
risky environment may change attitudes and behaviour.  In the United Kingdom, with 
the move to fundholding, little evidence of cream-skimming has been found: incentives 
for cream-skimming may well be muted, however, by the limited financial risks faced 
by providers.  On the other hand, cream-skimming appears common in the United 
States.  One gauge of the significance of the issue, however, is the attention that is 
being given to regulatory reforms in the United States to reduce its prevalence: this 
suggests that if cream-skimming were to become widespread, each of the risks 
discussed above is likely to be significant, both in a financial and political sense. 
 
3.2  Poor purchaser performance  
The New Zealand health care sector is characterised by a series of agency 
relationships.  For example, the HFA acts as an agent of the government (the 
principal) in purchasing health care services and in designing contracts to promote 
efficiency and to minimise Crown risk.  Any devolution of purchasing responsibility 
similarly involves the development of agency relationships. 
 
A key task of any principal – the Crown, the HFA, owners or consumers – is to ensure 
that agents strive to meet the objectives of the principal.  Poor performance by a 
purchaser will therefore mean that the principal’s objectives are not met. 
 
Key purchaser objectives include: 
 
·  to make purchasing decisions which promote technical and allocative efficiency 
(e.g., maximising health status for the money made available) and equity (e.g., to 
improve Mâori health status; to promote fair access to care); 
 
·  to purchase a mix of services appropriate to the population’s needs by assessing 
population needs and responding to those needs; 
 
·  to remain within budget and control costs; 
 
·  to contract in ways which promote technical efficiency and cost-effectiveness and 
which limit risk; and 
 
·  to contract in ways which are fair and transparent, and which minimise transaction 
costs. 13 
Risks associated with poor purchaser performance 
Thus, the risks associated with poor purchaser performance – relative to good 
performance – might include: 
Crown risks 
·  Higher overall expenditure for a given level of care or a lower level of care for a 
given level of expenditure29. 
 
·  Need to implement and enforce a regulatory function, including oversight of 
performance. 
 
·  Pressure to bail out or take-over purchasers which fail to perform. 
 
·  Pressure to provide additional operational funding to government-owned providers 
which suffer financial losses in the event of a purchaser failure (e.g., bankruptcy)30. 
 
·  Legal action against government-owned purchasers which fail to undertake 
contracting in fair ways. 
 
Consumer risks 
·  Higher levels of taxation for a given level of care; or lower access to services and 
reduced quality of care as a result of poor decision-making or contracting. 
 
·  Reduced equity of access if particular purchasers perform poorly relative to other 
purchasers. 
 
·  Increased private financial responsibility for care: this will also reduce equity of 
access as care is increasingly only available to those able to pay. 
 
·  Unresponsive purchasers. 
 
·  Health status fails to improve or worsens. 
 
 
                                            
29  As the services to be purchased in New Zealand are often unclear, the government is able to 
shift some of this risk onto consumers (e.g., reduced services, longer waits for health care). 
30  If for example a privately-owned purchaser were to run up substantial losses, the government 
may have to step in to finance government-owned providers which run the risk of large losses as 
a result. 14 
Health sector 
·  Inefficiencies in the delivery of publicly-financed health care, i.e. lower value for 
money than can be obtained by improved performance. 
 
·  Excessive profits or losses being made by providers where purchasers fail in their 
contracting role. 
 
·  Higher overall expenditure with third-party insurance arrangements which operate 
in the private insurance sector. 
 
Likelihood and significance of risks 
The likelihood of such risks are difficult to judge relative to the status quo.  For 
example, although New Zealand purchasers have failed to deliver on some issues 
(Ministry of Health 1999) it is much more difficult to establish if purchasers are failing 
to deliver optimal value-for-money. 
 
Any form of poor purchaser performance which results in the failure of a major 
purchaser or provider is likely to result in Crown action and potentially expenditure.  
Business failures in the private sector may impose largely private costs but 
governments may feel obliged to intervene even where the purchaser or provider is 
privately-owned.  This is because of the importance of health care to the population 
(and hence the politically sensitive nature of health care), the monopoly positions 
which purchasers and providers often have in New Zealand, and the fact that most 
health care expenditure in New Zealand comes from the government. 
 
Judging the individual significance of each these risks is also difficult. Any losses from 
poor performance in delivering value-for-money are difficult to estimate – from all 
perspectives.  The size of the health care market means that systematically poor 
performance will have a serious impact.  This, however, may be balanced out by 
having multiple agencies involved in the delivery of health care: failure on the part of a 
purchaser to perform may not necessarily be reflected at a provider level. 15 
3.3 Cost-shifting   
Cost-shifting occurs when costs are charged against a budget which a) differs from 
that intended or b) differs from that traditionally charged31.  The objective of cost-
shifting is to avoid cost-controlling budgetary restrictions and, sometimes, to find ways 
to increase overall spending.  It appears to be easier to achieve where there are open-
ended budgets to shift costs to.  Key budget boundaries in the current New Zealand 
health care system between which costs can be shifted are: 
 
·  financing boundaries – public financing, private insurance, user charges, out-of-
pocket payments and charitable donations; 
 
·  government budget boundaries – health, social welfare, ACC, and other 
government votes; 
 
·  within-HFA boundaries – personal health, disability support, public health, 
Pharmac; 
 
·  contractual boundaries –  between individual organisations (hospitals, IPAs) and 
between contracts within organisations (e.g., within hospitals); and 
 
·  budget boundaries within organisations (e.g., clinical budgets in hospitals; separate 
pharmaceutical budgets within  IPAs). 
 
Cost-shifting can be of two main forms.  First, it occurs when patient care is 
inappropriately charged against a particular budget (pure ‘cost-shifting’) or where the 
location or type of care is changed in order for care to be charged against a particular 
budget.  (This is sometimes called ‘patient-shifting’ (Donaldson and Gerard 1993).) 
Second, it is defined in some international literature as occurring when the costs of a 
particular episode of care, or the costs of insurance, are lower for some people and 
higher for others than is strictly accurate (perhaps known in New Zealand more 
commonly as ‘cross-subsidisation’). 
 
Examples of the first kind of cost-shifting in New Zealand might include: 
 
·  classifying non-accidents as accidents in order for care to be charged to ACC32; 
 
·  hospitals supplying prescriptions rather than medication in order to shift costs from 
hospital budgets to the pharmaceutical tariff; 
 
                                            
31  This definition implies that explicit policies which shift costs from, for example, government 
responsibility to private responsibility are just as much cost-shifting as when costs are 
inappropriately (e.g., against the spirit of particular legislation or contracts) charged against 
particular budgets.  Light calls the former ‘declassifying’ (Light 1998, p. 13). 
32  Reasons for this might be because of lower user charges for primary care or because there is 
subsidised care available through ACC but not through vote:Health (e.g., physiotherapy and 
acupuncture are not publicly-financed for non-accident related injuries). 
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·  GPs who face fixed fee-for-service payments or who are on capitated budgets 
referring patients to secondary care providers for care which could be undertaken 
by the GP; 
 
·  encouraging patients to obtain care privately in order to reduce waiting lists33; 
 
·  shortening lengths of stay in hospitals, which makes any costs of continued care a 
private responsibility; 
 
·  Pharmac policies which reduce the government subsidy on medication such that 
individual patients must pay an increased charge to continue using that 
medication; 
 
·  patients using hospital accident and emergency services rather than GP services 
in order to avoid GP user charges; 
 
Examples of the second kind of cost-shifting include: 
 
·  charging wealthier patients more for GP visits in order to pay for care for lower 
income or sicker patients; 
 
·  charging higher premiums for health insurance for wealthier consumers in order to 
reduce costs for lower income or sicker patients; and 
 
·  charging higher costs for some patient hospital care in order to cover the costs for 
patients who cannot pay or to cover losses from other services. 
 
Key risks associated with cost-shifting 
The key risks associated with cost-shifting are:  
Crown risk 
·  Increased government expenditure on votes other than vote:Health (e.g., ACC, 
justice, social welfare); some of which may be offset by reduced spending or extra 
services in health. 
 
·  Increased expenditure for publicly-owned purchaser and provider organisations 
where costs and patients are shifted to publicly-owned purchasers and providers. 
                                            
33  Whether or not this is strictly cost-shifting will depend on whether the individuals and the 
government believe the care should or should not be financed within the publicly financed health 
care sector.  As the services expected to be delivered to consumers are not clear, it is difficult to 
identify whether cost-shifting occurs when patients are encouraged to obtain private care.  For 
example, it could be argued that present moves to take individual patients off waiting lists and 
return them to the care of their GPs are a form of cost-shifting from government-financed health 
care to private responsibility; on the other hand, it could be viewed as formalising and making 




·  Increased private expenditure and resource use where purchasing authorities make 
decisions which shift responsibility for financing onto private budgets (e.g., reduced 
services leading to increasing waiting times leading to more private expenditure; 
early discharges from hospital leading to more time off work for people caring for 
those discharged early; higher user charges for patients). 
 
·  Increased shunting of patients between providers as providers attempt to shift 
costs. 
·  Increased private expenditure as wealthier patients are charged more for care 
(cross-subsidisation between higher and lower income patients). 
 
Health sector risk 
·  Higher overall expenditure, as claims in the private sector increase with more care 
provided privately at possibly higher cost. 
 
·  Reduced equity of access as those who cannot obtain publicly-funded care are 
unable to afford private care. 
 
·  Reduced cost-effectiveness.  For example, where GPs refer people to a hospital 
service in order to save costs on their own budget and where the hospital service is 
more resource-intensive than the GP service. 
 
·  Improved cost-effectiveness.  For example, if accident and emergency departments 
in public hospitals shift costs by refusing to see some people who might more cost-
effectively be seen by their GPs. 
 
·  Difficulties in planning and budgeting in areas where costs are commonly shifted to. 
 
·  Inappropriate market signals which might arise as a result of cross-subsidies34. 
 
Likelihood and significance of risks 
As far as the author is aware, there is no New Zealand research evidence on the 
extent of deliberate cost-shifting or its impact.  However, cost-shifting is widely 
believed to take place in the ways described above.  For the Crown, the effects of 
cost-shifting are sometimes likely to be positive: e.g., where the lack of specification of 
what the government-financed health care sector pays for makes it easier to shift 
costs from the Crown to individuals.  In other cases, the effects may be negative: e.g., 
the shifting of costs into the secondary care sector may increase overall costs. 
 
It is also difficult to assess whether the overall effects of cost-shifting on cost-
effectiveness are negative or positive.  For example, in the case of pharmaceutical 
policy, efficiency may be being enhanced if patients’ needs can still be adequately met 
with the remaining fully subsidised medicines or if drug companies cut their prices and 
become more efficient.  On the other hand, if costs are mostly shifted to patients, not 
                                            
34  Although such cross-subsidies may also enhance equity of access. 18 
only is equity affected, but if individuals choose to take out insurance to cover their 
increased costs, overall efficiency is likely to be negatively affected.  This is because 
New Zealand’s private health market operates largely on a third-party reimbursement 
system, which tends to be more expensive than more tightly controlled systems 
(Barnum, Kutzin et al. 1995).  In other cases, the incentives for individuals in terms of 
user charges reinforce cost-shifting towards care which is free for the consumer (e.g., 
hospital care) rather than to more cost-effective care (e.g., GP care). 
 
The second form of cost-shifting is unlikely to survive long in a competitive market: 
competition is likely to drive costs and premiums for particular types of care and for 
particular patient groups to a competitive level35.  
                                            
35  In recent years, the reduced levels of voluntary community rating in private health insurance in 
New Zealand is an example of how the market may drive out such cost-shifting (Consumers' 
Institute 1999).  In the United States, policies to reduce costs have also made it harder to cost-
shift in the form of cross-subsidisation of poor consumers by wealthier consumers (or the 
uninsured by the insured) (Managed Health Care Improvement Task Force 1998, p. 190).  As a 
result, equity is likely to have worsened as some people now find it even harder to obtain care. 19 
3.4  Risks and devolved purchasing in New Zealand  
Table 3.1 summarises the risks in the devolved purchasing arrangements likely to 
develop in New Zealand in the next few years.  The table is based on the discussion 
above (sections 3.1-3.3). 
Table 3.1 
Summary of risks in devolved purchasing arrangements in New Zealand  
 





·  Not an issue at HFA level 
- as there is no 
competition, cream-
skimming in the form of 
refusing coverage cannot 
occur. 
· Increased use of 
capitation in competitive 
provider markets raises 
possibility of cream-
skimming (e.g., general 
practitioners, DPOs). 
· Likely proportion of 
providers engaging in 
cream-skimming and the 
population affected is 
unknown, difficult to 
measure. 
· Where cream-skimming 
does occur on a large 
scale, the risks appear to 
be serious. 
· Poor performance by 
purchaser may or may not 
translate into specific risks. 
· Where poor performance 
does translate into specific 
risks, systematic poor 
performance has significant 
consequences for health 
care in New Zealand. 
· Potential cost-shifting 
between providers on 
separate contracts. 









· As above. 
· Where carve-outs are 
paid on a capitation 
basis, cream-skimming is 
an unlikely risk because 
it is those in most need of 
care who are likely to 
have their needs met by 
the carve-out purchasers. 
· As above. 
· Potential for significant 
under-servicing risk for some 
consumers in carve-outs. 
· As above. 
· Definition of Carve-Out 
/HFA boundary becomes 
very important. 
· Cost-shifting from carve-
outs back to HFA may 




· As there is no 
competition, cream-
skimming in the form of 
refusing coverage cannot 
occur. 
· Significant risks if purchasers 
perform poorly. 
· Risks may be reduced 
compared to Monopoly HFA 
as there are more 
purchasers. 
· Risks may be greater 
compared to Monopoly HFA 
if purchasing skills are more 
thinly spread. 
· Comparisons between 
purchasers are possible – 
raises performance 
measurement issues. 
· Integration may reduce 
cost-shifting within 
budgets/organisations 
compared to status quo. 20 
Table 3.1 (cont.) 
Summary of risks in devolved purchasing arrangements in New Zealand  
 









· Potential, significant 
risks at DPO level. 
 
· Significant risks if purchasers 
perform poorly. 
· Risks may be reduced 
compared to Monopoly HFA as 
there are more purchasers. 
· Risks may be greater 
compared to Monopoly HFA if 
purchasing skills more thinly 
spread. 
· Comparisons between 
purchasers are possible – 
raises performance 
measurement issues. 
· Definition of DPO/HFA 
boundary becomes 
very important. 
· Cost-shifting from 
DPOs back to HFA 





· Potential, significant 
risks. 
· Significant risks if purchasers 
perform poorly. 
· Risks may be reduced 
compared to Monopoly HFA as 
there are more purchasers. 
· Risks may be greater 
compared to Monopoly HFA if 
purchasing skills are more 
thinly spread. 
· Comparisons between 
purchasers are possible – 
raises performance 
measurement issues. 







· Potential, significant 
risks. 
· Significant risks if purchasers 
perform poorly. 
· Risks may be reduced 
compared to Monopoly HFA as 
there are more purchasers. 
· Risks may be greater 
compared to Monopoly HFA if 
purchasing skills are more 
thinly spread. 
· Comparisons between 
purchasers are possible – 
raises performance 
measurement issues. 
· Integration may reduce 
cost-shifting within 
budgets/organisations. 21 
4  MANAGEMENT OF RISKS IN DEVOLVED PURCHASE ARRANGEMENTS 
4.1  Managing the risks associated with cream-skimming36 
Key approaches to reducing opportunities for cream-skimming include: 
 
A. Encouraging large risk pools. 
B. Compensating for risk. 
C. Limiting risk. 
D. Defining service entitlements (i.e. standard packages of benefits). 
E. Regulating the insurance or provider market (including enrolment regulations).  
 
This report discusses each of these approaches, but focuses in particular on 
approaches D and E.  
 
A  Encouraging large risk pools 
A first approach to minimising the risks of cream-skimming is to encourage large risk 
pools.  This allows risk to be spread across a greater number of people, and hence to 
reduce the effects that a few high cost patients have on overall financial risk.  This 
should assist in making providers and DPOs indifferent to the utilisation and costs 
which might be associated with particular patients. 
 
Encouraging large risk pools is particularly important where purchasers are 
responsible for comprehensive coverage.  In New Zealand, any policy approach which 
aimed to encourage large risk pools may also limit competition and local 
responsiveness.  (For further discussion on this, see the sections below (4.2D) on 
purchaser competition in New Zealand, which also includes estimates of the likely 
required size of risk pools for comprehensive and more limited service coverage.) 
 
However, United States experience suggests that even large risk pools are insufficient 
tools for preventing cream-skimming: there remains a significant financial gain to be 
made from successful cream-skimming where DPOs are competing for consumers. 
                                            
36  A key option for managing cream-skimming is to limit competition between purchasers.  The 
discussion in this section relates to markets where there is competition between purchasers. 22 
B  Compensating for risk 
The main approaches to compensating for a higher or lower than average risk are: 
 
·  risk-rating capitated premiums.  A number of tools have been developed to 
undertake such risk rating.  These include socio-demographic models (e.g., the 
Adjusted Average Per Capita Cost model used in Medicare in the United States, 
which adjusts for age, sex, welfare status, institutional status; the population-based 
funding formula used in New Zealand); prior-use models; self-reported health 
status models; and disease/diagnosis models (e.g., Ambulatory Care Groups; 
Diagnostic Cost Groups; Chronic Disease Scores) (Alpha Center 1997; Bowen and 
Sigoloff 1998).  Disease/diagnosis models are argued to provide more accurate 
estimates of likely cost. Risk assessment and adjustment may take place 
retrospectively, prospectively or concurrently, at pre-determined intervals. 
 
·  using a fee-for-service payment mechanism which includes levels of payments 
adjusted for complexity (as in the DRG approach used in secondary care)37 or 
moving to blended payment systems which combine elements of capitation and 
fee-for-service (Newhouse, Beeuwkes Buntin et al. 1997)38. 
 
These approaches are not discussed in this paper in any depth; those who are 
interested are referred to the references supplied here and material from the Treasury 
workshop held on October 14-15 1998 (Bowen and Sigoloff 1998). 
                                            
37  A disadvantage of this approach is that it compensates plans directly for what they do, with 
payment levels based on average existing costs, i.e. Incorporating with new payment levels any 
existing inefficiencies.  Ambulatory Care Group and Diagnostic Cost Group approaches also 
incorporate current service use information within them, for use in adjusting for higher levels of 
‘risk’ (i.e. poorer health status). 
 
38  The more technical literature on incentives in procurement suggests that a mix of payment 
systems is an efficient means of promoting quality in service delivery (Laffont and Tirole 1993).  
Hence, such an approach would not only reduce incentives for cream-skimming, but also under-
servicing (Newhouse, Beeuwkes Buntin et al. 1997). 23 
C Limiting  risk 
The following approaches can be used to limit risk, and hence to reduce the incentives 
to cream-skim: 
 
·  Establishing separate risk pools (including carve-outs).  For example, individuals 
with particular conditions (e.g., disabilities) or requiring particular care (e.g., kidney 
dialysis, organ transplants) may be covered by a separate financing arrangement.  
DPOs or providers may get paid on a fee-for-service basis to provide such care, or 
such care may be paid for by an alternative agency (e.g., the HFA or the Ministry of 
Health in New Zealand).  van Barneveld, van Vliet and van de Ven have proposed a 
similar approach for the Netherlands, where plans would predetermine a small 
fraction of members whose costs would be pooled and reimbursed separately (van 
Barneveld, van Vliet et al. 1996).  These approaches have the advantage of limiting 
the financial risk that plans or providers may take on if they register particular 
individuals.  Hence, incentives to cream-skim may be reduced.  Without clear 
boundaries, however, cost-shifting becomes a risk, while alternative systems must 
also be established to fund and administer separate schemes. 
 
·  Limiting financial risk39.  In this case, a financial limit may be placed on the risk an 
individual provider or DPO is responsible for in regards to particular patients.  For 
example, the United Kingdom general practice fundholding scheme limited risk to 
£5,000 initially: the District Health Authority became responsible for care costing 
beyond this amount.  This approach may, however, fail to reduce incentives to 
cream-skim for patients likely to cost a lot, but less than the financial limit.  Cost-
shifting may be an issue if the limit is set such that it provides few incentives for 
considering the costs and cost-effectiveness of care. 
 
·  Establishing separate clinics.  This final approach allows those unable to obtain 
good care to choose a separate clinic to provide care.  For example, in the United 
States those without insurance coverage can obtain emergency care from state-
financed and state-owned hospitals: however the care tends to be too little, too late.  
It is possible to imagine that specialist clinics might be established for those with 
particular conditions to ensure quality care is provided (e.g., for mental health or 
alcohol and addiction services).  The care may be paid for separately (as above) or 
costs sought from an individual DPO or provider.  Separate payments will reduce 
the incentives to cream-skim.  However, cost-shifting could become a significant 
problem; a separate system is needed to administer the arrangements; those 
accessing care in this way may feel stigmatised by the need to access such care; 
and access to care may be viewed as inequitable if quality of care differs from care 
available to others. 
 
D  Defining service entitlements 
Service specification – in the form of a standard package (or standard packages) of 
benefits – is an important tool for reducing opportunities for cream-skimming.  Service 
specification prevents plans or providers from specifying or offering services in ways 
which encourage particular groups to enrol or disenrol, or which discourage particular 
                                            
39  Sometimes known as an outlier or reinsurance scheme.  24 
groups from enrolling.  Hence, wherever there is competition between plans or 
providers where benefit design can influence risk selection, service specification is an 
important tool for reducing at least one avenue for cream-skimming40. 
 
Service specification at a broad level is common in many health care systems41, and 
a standard package of benefits is largely viewed as an essential element of proposals 
which promote competition between purchasers (see for example Enthoven and 
Kronick 1989; Pauly, Danzon et al. 1992; The White House Domestic Policy Council 
1993; Enthoven 1994; White 1995). 
 
Service specification is not common in countries like New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom42.  The reasons for this may be that coverage is intended to be fairly 
comprehensive; that expenditure determines service availability rather than service 
specification determining expenditure; and that government ownership of key 
providers (e.g. hospitals) promotes accountability in place of service specification.   
Although New Zealand has developed a set of service obligations in the past few 
years (Health Funding Authority 1998; Shipley undated), these obligations do not 
guarantee an entitlement to care: purchasers have limited budgets and must make 
choices between services set out in service obligations (Cumming 1994). 
 
Approaches to specifying services 
Services can be defined in a number of ways.  The main approaches and their 
advantages and disadvantages are set out in Table 4.143. 
No specification 
A first approach is to have no specification at all.  For example, New Zealanders may 
have a broad understanding of the services not covered by the publicly financed 
health care system (e.g. most adult dental care, optometrist services, most cosmetic 
services), but little clarity about the services which are actually provided, the 
circumstances under which specific services are or are not available (e.g. kidney 
                                            
40  Other reasons for service specification are set out in Appendix E. 
 
41  European countries often specify broadly the services to be made available under social 
insurance schemes (see Appendix F for the Netherlands example).  Canadian provinces each 
specify service coverage (Health Canada 1997).  In some countries, service specification takes 
the form of fee schedules.  For example, Australia’s Medicare system has a Benefits Schedule, 
as does Germany’s main social insurance system.  Many countries also have specified 
pharmaceuticals lists which act as a form of service specification.  See also Glaser (1991); 
Lenaghan (1997) for examples of service specification.  
42  New Zealand has some aspects of service specification, e.g. the pharmaceutical tariff; fee-for-
service payment schedules in primary care. 
 
43  The material here focuses on the specification of services. It is also possible to specify access 
requirements (e.g., travel times, user charge maximums, waiting times) and standards for quality 
of care (including for example access to medically qualified doctors rather than simply nursing 
staff and access to specialist care rather than generalist care alone).  Such further specification 
would improve accountability and comparability of plans, but would increase the costs of 
specification and remove some aspects of access and quality of care as aspects of care on which 
plans could compete.  Politically, however, governments may find it extremely difficult not to 
include such aspects of care in specified coverage. 25 
dialysis, heart transplants), and the time they might wait for care.  Most decisions 
about who gets what care when are, with this approach, taken by medical 
professionals. 
 
This approach does not require the administrative costs which might be incurred 
through service specification.  It also allows plans or providers to decide on relative 
priorities at service and patient levels and allows flexibility in the choice of care 











·  Low administrative costs. 
· Providers or DPOs determine 
priorities and services. 
· Consumer flexibility in choice of care. 
· Difficult to determine capitation amounts 
which are related to coverage 
expectations. 
· Lack of accountability in terms of what is 
covered and whether individual 
consumers will receive care. 
· Likely differences in access to and the 
type of care available in different regions, 
localities, DPOs and providers. 
· Consumers find it difficult to compare 
DPOs. 
· Offers the ability for providers and DPOs 
to under-service those consumers whom 
they wish to discourage from joining or 





· Low administrative costs. 
· Providers or DPOs determine 
priorities and services. 
· Consumer flexibility in choice of care 
– though limited to particular 
providers. 
· Limits service delivery to particular 
providers: this may reduce cost-
effectiveness. 
· Difficult to determine capitation amounts 
which are related to coverage 
expectations. 
· Lack of accountability in terms of what is 
covered and whether individual 
consumers will receive care. 
· Differences in access to and the type of 
care available in different regions, 
localities, DPOs and providers. 
· Consumers find it difficult to compare 
DPOs. 
· Offers the ability for providers and DPOs 
to under-service those consumers whom 
they wish to discourage from joining or 






· Establishes broad range of services 
covered. 
· Allows for better estimation of 
capitation amounts (taking into 
consideration coverage). 
· Offers opportunities to consider 
breadth of service coverage (e.g., 
what is in and what is out). 
 
· Lack of accountability for providing care to 
individual patients in particular 
circumstances and in relation to modalities 
of treatment. 
· Consumers may still find it difficult to 
compare DPOs if they perceive there to be 
differences in care actually offered. 
· Offers the ability for DPOs to under-
service those consumers whom plans 
wish to discourage from joining or 
                                            
44  There is the potential for one or more plans to be devised. Care would need to be taken that 
different plan structures do not encourage differences in health status.  The more plans, the 
greater the administrative costs – both in designing plans and in ensuring consumers receive 
only the care they are entitled to under the plan they have chosen.  In addition, in each case, 
providers or plans may or may not be allowed to offer services in addition to those specified and 
to offer better quality of care than that set out in regulation.  This would provide incentives to 
improve coverage, but may be to the detriment of equity goals and may be used to cream-skim. 
 
45  Represents the present situation in New Zealand. 27 
encourage to leave. 
· Politicisation of decision-making process 
and political risks in specifying coverage. 
· Some administration costs in defining 
services, monitoring compliance by plans, 
and establishing review procedures. 
· Limits choice by individuals to decide on 
coverage which best suits their needs. 28 
Table 4.1 (cont.) 










· Promotes clarity of entitlement for 
consumers. 
· Promotes accountability at a detailed 
level. 
· Allows for detailed estimation of 
capitation amounts. 
· Facilitates detailed comparisons 
between competing plans. 
· Offers opportunities to consider 
effectiveness and efficiency in 
designing the core – i.e. allows a much 
greater focus on the health benefits 
associated with particular services, 
reducing excessive use of 
technologies, and taking into account 
wider societal costs. 
· Analysis of effectiveness and efficiency 
undertaken only once – at a national 
level. 
· Promotes equity of access for equal 
need. 
· Administratively complex. 
· Politicisation of decision-making process 
and political risks in specifying coverage. 
· Reduces choice and flexibility at patient 
level. 
· May not be fully feasible given 
information gaps. 
· Limits choice by individuals to decide on 
coverage which best suits their needs. 




· Allows consumers to choose packages 
which best meet their needs (health 
care and affordability). 
· Allows specification in ways which may 
promote cream skimming – likely to be 
more profitable than improving 
efficiency. 
· High administrative costs as each DPO 
specifies own package. 
· Consumers may find it difficult to 
compare DPOs – may reduce incentives 
for efficiency if -in the absence of good 
comparative information – consumers 
use price or coverage as a guide for 
choosing between plans. 
· Competition between DPOs may lead to 
excessive use of new, unproven 
technologies if consumers choose plans 








· Flexibility for individual providers and 
consumers/patients. 
· Leaves final determination up to a 
regulatory or legislative body  
· May involve costly litigation. 29 
However, in a budget-constrained system which cannot always be comprehensive and 
with long waiting times, a lack of specification makes it difficult to determine budgets 
and capitation amounts for plans or providers.  This is because it is unclear exactly 
which services should be made available and when they ought to be provided.  The 
lack of clarity can lead to arguments about whether the funding is adequate or whether 
the DPO or provider is failing to deliver adequate care.  Hence, this approach can also 
make it difficult to hold plans or providers to account. 
 
Having no specification of services leaves decisions about service priorities and the 
care which individuals are offered in the hands of professionals or managers.  This 
may provide flexibility, but it may also mean that community values about priorities are 
not adequately considered. 
 
In a competitive system with multiple plans or providers paid on a capitation basis, a 
lack of specification makes it very difficult for consumers to compare plans and it 
allows plans and providers to offer services in ways which promote cream-
skimming46. 
 
Publicly specified in terms of providers 
In many health care systems, it is common to define services publicly, usually in law or 
regulation.  In addition, it is also common to define the types of providers from whom 
care is available rather than the specific services which are available.  For example, 
specification may be in terms of ‘physician services’ or ‘hospital services’ (see for 
example, Glaser 1991; Health Canada 1997; Lenaghan 1997). 
 
This approach has the advantage of low administrative costs for governments: costs 
are limited to specifying – in law – groups of providers from whom covered care can 
be obtained, and to covering any administrative and legal costs which arise in 
monitoring, auditing or challenging providers and plans who appear to be not 
complying.  Individual patients may also incur costs in seeking compliance. 
 
In addition to the disadvantages under the no specification approach (see the section 
on ‘no specification’, above), this method of specification limits service delivery to 
particular providers.  This may reduce cost-effectiveness if alternative providers who 
can provide care equally or more effectively but at lower cost are excluded from 
coverage47. 
 
Publicly specified in general terms 
A third approach has public specification (in the form of legislation or regulations), but 
with services specified in general terms.  For example, coverage may include 
‘maternity services’, ‘dental services’, ‘diagnostic services’, ‘medical and surgical 
services including referral services’ and ‘preventive services’.  This approach is close 
                                            
46  In practice, in an unregulated private market, competitive plans define their own packages of 
benefits. 
47  For example, if nurses can provide more cost-effective care than doctors for some conditions; if 
dental therapists can provide check-ups and clean teeth more cost-effectively than dentists. 
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to that used in New Zealand in the Service Coverage document (Minister of Health 
1998). 
 
This approach: establishes the broad range of services covered; allows for better 
estimation of capitation amounts; and offers governments the opportunity to consider 
the breadth of service coverage48.  If there is compulsory coverage, this approach 
also ensures that everyone is covered for a broad set of services: there can be no 
free-riders. 
 
One disadvantage with this approach (as with the above two approaches) is that it 
leaves decisions about the modalities of care (e.g., specialist vs generalist care) in the 
hands of plans and providers: this may generate public concern at inadequate care 
which might be offered by some plans or providers.  It also leaves decisions about the 
actual services made available to specific patients in the hands of plans and providers 
(e.g., is post-natal home care available within the maternity service?; are heart 
transplants available?; which patients can obtain kidney dialysis services?).  Not only 
might this lead to under-servicing in any health care system, but in a competitive, 
capitation model: consumers may still find it difficult to compare plans; and it provides 
a means of cream-skimming (through selection of specific services to encourage or 
discourage particular groups from joining and through the ability to under-service). 
 
In addition, the approach requires some administration in defining broadly the services 
to be covered.  This approach is likely to result in politicisation of decision-making49.  
Consumers’ choices of the package which best suits their financial and health needs 
will be limited by this approach. 
                                            
48  For example, the Netherlands government has tried in recent years to remove physiotherapy 
services and in vitro fertilisation services from coverage of the Health Insurance Act (Mulder 
1995). Dental care was also proposed to be removed but the government had to reinstate it 
(personal communication, Nicholas Mays). 
 
49  In the Netherlands example given above, the government has found it very difficult to remove 
some services due to strong provider and public resistance (Mulder 1995). 31 
Publicly specified in detail 
With this method, public specification in legislation or regulations continues, but the 
services are specified in some detail.  This might include: the modalities of care which 
are available (e.g. medical and surgical services delivered in a hospital by specialists); 
the specific services which are available (e.g., pre-natal care, labour care and post-
natal care within a maternity service; immunisation and cervical cancer screening 
within a preventive care service); the number of visits or length of care (e.g., six pre-
natal sessions; post-natal care for two weeks after the birth of a baby); 
condition/treatment pairs (e.g., Xenical for defined levels of obesity but not for those 
who are just ‘over weight’); clinical guidelines (e.g., a series of steps to try before a 
patient is offered expensive hypertension medication) or priority criteria (e.g., for 
elective surgery.  See for example (Hadorn and Holmes 1997; Hadorn and Holmes 
1997)). 
 
Such detailed specification promotes good clarity of entitlement for consumers and 
accountability of plans and providers.  With detailed utilisation information, it will allow 
for improved estimation of capitation payment amounts.  Within a competitive 
environment, this approach facilitates consumer comparison of plans because the 
detailed service specification will reassure consumers that all plans must offer the 
same care (i.e., a cheaper DPO is not one which is offering narrower coverage).  As 
the service specification process is undertaken publicly only once, administration costs 
are reduced compared with a private approach (see below).  In addition, the process 
of specifying services offers opportunities to consider at a detailed level the 
effectiveness of services and the mix of services which promotes allocative 
efficiency50.  Equity is promoted to some extent because every individual is entitled to 
the same set of services51. 
 
This approach is administratively complex. It requires a process for considering 
services and for specifying them at a detailed level; for updating the list; and requires 
monitoring, audit and complaints mechanisms if the specification is to have any force.  
This means the approach may be very costly, particularly if practice guidelines are 
developed as part of the service specification52.  Designing a specific set of services 
will involve politicisation of a decision-making process; and it may reduce individual 
                                            
50  For example, a practice guidelines approach allows consideration of the circumstances under 
which particular services are offered to individual patients; and the overall process enables 
society to consider the trade-offs between particular services such as having a new preventive 
service or more heart transplants. 
 
51  Promoting equity of access would also require specifying the details for accessing care, e.g. 
travel time to specific services, waiting times. 
52  Consider for example that the National Health Committee has developed a number of practice 
guidelines in New Zealand, each of which involved a number of clinicians and others.  Off-the-
shelf guidelines from overseas might cut the costs in New Zealand; however, such guidelines 
might not be used if clinicians do not have ownership of them.  New Zealand has the advantage 
of being relatively small so that almost all clinicians might be involved in designing guidelines in 
their specialty areas; on the other hand, the costs of guidelines cannot be spread over a large 
population. 
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and consumer choice of particular services53.  The approach may not always be 
feasible: a lack of evidence on effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and public values, for 
example, is likely to obstruct attempts to define all services in detail and to be sure 
that those services covered are those which promote allocative efficiency (from a 
societal perspective).  If only one standard package of benefits is allowed, patients will 
also be unable to purchase the packages of care which best suit their financial and 
health needs.  Finally, the greater the detail in the service specification, the more 
patients may view the services as entitlements.  From a government perspective, this 
may lead to difficulties in restraining utilisation and costs or to tension between the 
capitation amounts and the services which are part of the package (for example, in the 
form of budget blowouts).  From a consumer/patient perspective, the more knowledge 
they have about their eligibility to care, the more certainty they have over access to 




With private specification, individual plans or providers establish a set of services for 
which their customers/patients are covered.  The services can be specified in terms of 
provider groups; at a general level, or at a detailed level. 
 
A key advantage of this approach is that it enables consumers to choose packages 
which best meet their needs.  However, in a competitive model it allows for 
specification in ways which promote cream-skimming; and consumers will find it very 
difficult to compare plans.  Incentives for efficiency will therefore be severely 
compromised. 
 
This approach will also involve large administrative costs if each provider or DPO 
designs their own package, and it may lead to excessive use of new, unproven 
technologies if consumers choose packages on the basis of availability of new 
technologies rather than effectiveness or cost-effectiveness54.  A private approach will 
also make it harder to promote any equity goals as individuals may be covered by 
completely different packages.  Individuals may also choose limited packages, hoping 
to free-ride by obtaining charity or other care they are not covered for in the event they 
need it. 
Principles specified 
A final option is to specify a set of principles which should apply in considering the 
services which are available.  For example, legislation may argue that plans and 
providers must offer ‘medically necessary’ services.  This begs the question as to what 
is medically necessary: the evidence on variations in practice suggests that this is not 
always an objective approach.  Often, plans in other countries do not have to cover 
‘experimental’ services: these too are usually not defined in any meaningful way55. 
                                            
53  For example, a patient who does not qualify for care may desperately want care, and may benefit 
significantly from such care. 
54  Constrained financing may reduce the extent to which this might happen. 
 
55  As Belk (1991) notes: ‘health insurance contracts often exclude coverage for experimental 
treatments.  No accepted definition of experimental treatment exists, however, and insurance 33 
 
The advantage of this approach is that it allows flexibility for individual plans, providers 
and consumers/patients.  However, the approach fails to provide accountability and it 
may leave the final determination of what should be provided up to a regulatory or 
legislative body.  This incurs administrative and legal costs as well as a great deal of 
uncertainty for patients (particularly for life-threatening conditions); financial barriers to 
legal advice may limit access for some people; and it may lead to the increased use of 
particular services in the health care system. 
 
 E  Regulating the insurance or provider market 
Other regulations which are discussed in relation to cream-skimming are summarised 
in Table 4.2, along with their advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Many proposals for health reform along competitive lines state that at the very least 
plans should be required to: 
 
·  cover all pre-existing conditions or at least limit the time period during which pre-
existing conditions are excluded from coverage (e.g., to say three years).  This 
promotes universal coverage of all consumers, ensures that choice is retained for 
all those with pre-existing conditions, and aims to prevent exclusion of pre-existing 
conditions as a means of cream-skimming.  However, if health insurance coverage 
is not compulsory, if plans offer different coverage options, or if consumers can opt 
in and out of plans often, the regulation to force coverage of all pre-existing 
conditions may allow greater adverse selection on the part of patients.  This may 
include ‘hit and run’ opportunities i.e. where a patient signs up with a particular DPO 
in order to obtain a particular service and then opts out of that DPO for (probably) a 
cheaper DPO.  This disadvantage can be eliminated by standardising packages of 
coverage and by limiting opportunities to opt in and out of plans (e.g., every one or 
two years as planned in New Zealand (Upton 1991); once every year plus during an 
annual open season as is planned in Medicare from 2001 (General Accounting 
Office 1998, p. 4).); 
 
·  take on all those who apply for care to be covered by any particular DPO (known as 
open enrolment).  This regulation aims to ensure that plans or providers cannot 
refuse any individual coverage, thus reducing opportunities for cream-skimming; 
 
·  guarantee that all individuals may remain with a DPO even if their utilisation or 
costs rise or their health status deteriorates (known as guaranteed renewal).  This 
regulation aims to ensure that plans or providers cannot force individuals to leave a 
DPO56; 
 
                                                                                                                                          
contracts rarely define the term.  Although experimental treatment exclusions are necessary and 
desirable, insurers may easily manipulate undefined exclusions to exclude treatments on 
inappropriate bases such as cost’.  At the very least, Belk argues that insurers should be forced 
to ‘enunciate in insurance contracts the processes and criteria used to assess and characterize 
experimental treatments’ (Belk 1991, p. 809). 
56  Often, however, this regulation will be meaningless if plans or providers can raise premiums to 
encourage an individual to go elsewhere. 
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·  community rate premiums or limit premium variations within groups (e.g., age-
gender groups).  This regulation aims to reduce the imposition of high premiums for 
some risks (which may leave some people without affordable coverage or with 
limited choices); and presumably to ensure that guaranteed renewal regulations are 
not undermined by the ability to set high premiums.  The approach also allows 
redistribution from low risk to high risk individuals.  On the other hand, such 
regulations provide an incentive to cream-skim because the DPO or provider 
cannot charge a risk-rated premium57; 
 
·  monitor and publicise rates of disenrolment, consumer complaints, and consumer 
satisfaction58.  Such regulations aim to indicate practices which may signal cream-
skimming (e.g. if it is largely those with particular conditions or likely higher risk who 
are disenrolling) and provide information in order to assist consumers in making 
choices between providers or plans.  Such information allows consumers to make 
choices which will promote quality of care and efficiency by allowing consumers the 
opportunity not to choose plans which are not viewed as offering a good service; 
and 
 
·  monitor and publicise quality of care.  This allows consumers access to information 
about the actual care which is delivered, something which is not always readily 
available reliably via word-of-mouth.  Once again, it promotes quality of care and 
efficiency by allowing consumers the opportunity not to choose plans which are not 
viewed as offering a good service. 
 
With the last two types of regulation, systems are required which standardise 
definitions and reporting frameworks in order for meaningful comparisons to be made 
between plans and providers.  Sufficient numbers are needed for statistical 
robustness: this may be a problem in New Zealand with such a small population and a 
relatively small number of services delivered in each service category.  This issue is 
made worse by the likely desire of consumers to consider performance of plans or 
providers in their localities or in relation to specific medical conditions.  An audit and 
dissemination agency is also likely to be required to oversee the development of 
measures and to interpret them.  Thus, significant administration costs are likely to be 
required to accompany such regulations.  A key issue for further consideration, 
however, is the ease with which such measures are meaningful and whether they can 
be interpreted sensibly59. (See the section below on purchaser performance for 
further discussion on issues relating to measures of quality of care.) 
                                            
57  This issue is not relevant if the government is financing the premiums fully. 
 
58  See Williams, Coyle et al. (1998) for a discussion on how service users evaluate services.  The 
authors conclude that expressions of ‘satisfaction’ on one particular satisfaction survey hid a 
variety of reported negative experiences. 
59  For example, in a 1998 report the United States GAO notes that ‘the data indicate that competing 
plans vary widely in their ability to retain members but do not reveal why.  Disenrollment rates 
that are high relative to rates at competing plans could, for example, be caused by plans’ poor 
marketing practices, less-generous benefits, higher beneficiary out-of-pocket costs, or inferior 
services’ (General Accounting Office 1998, p. 2).  They noted for example that disenrollment may 
have tended to be higher in areas where competition is strong or where beneficiaries are unused 
to managed care.  The report noted that HCFA ‘is interested in making disenrollment information 35 
 
Table 4.2 
Regulations to reduce cream-skimming 
 




·  Promotes coverage for 
individuals for all illnesses. 
· If coverage is not compulsory, encourages adverse 
selection (including ‘hit and run’ opportunities). 
Open enrolment  · Aims to ensure that all 
those.applying are accepted. 
· Stabilises the market by having 
enrolment periods when people 
can switch plans (every one or 
two years). 
· Reduces the ability for plans to refuse coverage in 
cases of adverse selection and ‘hit and 
run’.opportunism, thereby increasing the cost of 
coverage for plans. 
· Reduces choice to the enrolment period. 
Guaranteed 
renewal 
· Aims to ensure all those who 
wish to stay with a DPO are 
offered continued coverage and 
to prevent plans taking coverage 
away from people. 
· Reduces the ability for plans to select out consumers 
who are high cost, thereby increasing the cost of 
coverage for plans. 
Community 




· Reduces imposition of high 
premiums for some risks, which 
would leave some people 
without affordable coverage or 
increase government subsidies 
required to ensure coverage. 
· Provides incentives for cream-skimming (compared to a 
model where premiums are based on individual risk). 
Monitoring and 
publicising 
quality of care 
· Provides information on quality 
of care. 
· Requires standardised format for comparative reporting, 
sufficient numbers for statistical robustness. 




· Provides information on 
disenrolments. 
·  Requires standardised format for comparative reporting, 
sufficient numbers for statistical robustness. 






·  Provides information on 
consumer complaints and 
satisfaction. 
·  Requires standardised format for comparative reporting, 
sufficient numbers for statistical robustness. 
· May require audit or collection/dissemination agency. 
Each of the 
above 
·  Reduces abilities to cream-skim 
· Promotes choice for all 
consumers. 
·  Requires regulatory structure – including audit function, 
complaints mechanisms, sanctions (publicity, fines, 
removal of license to offer care). 
 
Conclusions 
One group of approaches to reducing incentives to cream-skim is to encourage large 
risk pools; compensate for risk; or limit risk.  The first of these requires further 
consideration, given New Zealand’s small market and the likely trade-offs between 
large risk pools, competition and local responsiveness.  The second, in particular, is 
unlikely to be sufficient to reduce incentives for cream-skimming. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
more meaningful by developing a disenrollment survey to determine why beneficiaries leave 
HMOs’ (General Accounting Office 1998, p. 9). 
 
60  The costs associated with each of these recommendations are not assessed here.  Some of 
these regulations will lead to costs for plans higher than would otherwise occur.  For example, it 
is reported that significant premium increases have followed regulations for guaranteed renewal 
(along with a three-month pre-existing condition exclusion clause and following removal of a high 
risk pool) in Washington; and also in Massachusetts (Managed Health Care Improvement Task 
Force 1998, p. 56).  These represent the costs associated with ensuring universal coverage. 36 
Service specification – in the form of a standard package (or standard packages) of 
benefits – is an important tool for reducing opportunities for cream-skimming.  Service 
specification prevents plans or providers from specifying or offering services in ways 
which encourage particular groups to enrol or disenrol, or which discourage particular 
groups from enrolling.  Hence, wherever there is competition between plans or 
providers where benefit design can influence risk selection, service specification is an 
important tool for reducing at least one avenue for cream-skimming.  Even where risks 
have been reduced by large risk pools, compensating for risk or limiting risk, service 
specification is a powerful tool for promoting accountability. 
 
Services can be defined in a number of ways.  The key trade-offs between the 
approaches are between tighter and looser definitions.  Tighter definitions will restrict 
the extent to which providers and DPOs can use service specification (and delivery) to 
cream-skim, and promote tight accountability, ensure equity of access to a similar set 
of services, and facilitate consideration of effectiveness and allocative efficiency.   
However, with tighter the definitions, there is more administrative complexity and 
higher administrative costs, and the less individuals and providers have choice in 
terms of the services actually able to be delivered.  The fewer the number of 
packages, the less administrative complexity: this applies in relation to both public 
specifications (e.g. by the government) and private specifications (i.e. the more 
individual providers or DPOs are involved in specifying their own sets of services, the 
greater the costs involved).  Fewer packages also reduces consumer flexibility to 
choose the coverage which best suits their needs. 
 
In addition to service specification, many proposals for health reform along competitive 
lines have regulations to promote consumer choice.  Without them, plans and 
providers can engage in cream-skimming and will leave significant numbers of 
vulnerable people without choice.  However, systems are required which standardise 
definitions and reporting frameworks in order for meaningful comparisons to be made 
between plans and providers. 
 
All the above regulatory approaches will reduce incentives to cream-skim and will 
promote choice for all consumers.  The extent to which this occurs will of course 
depend on the actual regulations and the ways in which they are administered.  Costs 
will be incurred by the government in order to establish regulations, audit compliance, 
provide complaints mechanisms, prosecute miscreants and impose sanctions.  In 
practice a combination of policies is likely to be desirable: a level playing field between 
plans and providers will be created by such regulations and consumers will feel more 
confident about the system, while providers would be encouraged to promote efficient 
care rather than to cream-skim. 37 
4.2  Managing the risks of poor purchaser performance 
The key approaches to managing these risks are: 
 
A.  Monitoring and benchmarking purchaser performance (using health outcomes, 
health care outcomes, health outputs or health inputs61). 
B. Using sanctions and rewards to provide incentives to purchasers to improve their 
performance. 
C. Promoting competition for the market at periodic intervals (franchising). 
D.  Promoting competition between purchasers and allowing consumer choice of 
purchaser. 
E. Investing in purchaser expertise and knowledge (developing ‘smart’ purchasing). 
 
A  Monitoring and benchmarking purchaser performance 
The most common approach to managing the risks of poor purchaser performance is 
to establish a set of accountability arrangements.  New Zealand has experience of this 
approach: the performance of specific tasks is monitored to ensure the ‘work’ of 
purchasers is undertaken (e.g., spending additional resources for mental health; 
developing a prioritisation framework); the level of inputs or outputs expected to be 
made available is monitored, and so on.  Where possible, comparisons have been 
made between different purchasers: this offers a benchmark against which to assess 
an individual purchaser’s performance.  In all cases, monitoring requires clear goals 
and objectives to be set, and because there are any number of goals or objectives 
which might be chosen, those goals should reflect the priorities of the sector. 
 
Health outcomes 
There are significant problems which arise in attempting to monitor purchaser 
performance by using health outcome measures, as purchasers may not always be 
able to influence factors which contribute to these outcomes.  Broad health outcomes 
– such as mortality and health-related quality of life – will be affected by economic and 
social developments outside the health sector and this makes it difficult to 
demonstrate the separate contributions which health care interventions – and 
therefore the role of purchasers and providers – have on health status (Cumming and 
Scott 1998). 
 
Health care outcomes 
The opportunities for holding purchasers accountable for health care outcomes appear 
more promising (examples of health care outcomes include improvement in mobility 
following a hip replacement operation, improvement in eyesight following a cataract 
                                            
61  A health outcome is defined as an improvement in health status or maintenance of health status 
which would otherwise deteriorate. Measures of health outcome usually include mortality, 
morbidity and quality of life (including self-evaluation of health status by individuals).  A distinction 
is made between health (an outcome) and health care outputs and processes.  A process is a 
particular type of service, for example a physiotherapist treatment, while an output is an episode 
of treatment, for example the number of people admitted with rheumatoid arthritis in a year (Hall, 
Sheill et al. 1993). 38 
operation).  A significant amount of work is underway to develop health care outcome 
indicators to monitor the performance of providers (Bowling 1991; Benson 1992; 
Wilkin, Hallam et al. 1992; Jenkinson 1994; Boyce, McNeil et al. 1997) and these 
same indicators could be used to monitor the performance of purchasers62. 
 
However, there are also problems in using such measures to monitor either provider 
or purchaser performance.  First, it is difficult to determine the contribution that care 
makes relative to no intervention at all.  Second, an accurate assessment of health 
care outcomes relies on adequate adjustment for differences in health status.  Some 
adjustments – age and gender – are relatively straightforward.  Usually proxy 
measures are used to adjust for different levels of need, e.g. socio-economic status 
indicators, although the development and use of such tools are in their infancy.   
Stronger adjustments using case complexity, severity and co-morbidities are, 
however, increasingly argued for: these require reasonably detailed patient-based 
information systems.  Without such adjustments, the relative importance of case mix 
and health care is difficult to judge.  Unfortunately, administrative data sets often do 
not contain sufficient information for adequate health status adjustment63.  Third, as 
health care outcome measures are usually disease-specific – and as New Zealand 
has a very wide range of services covered by the health vote (including disability 
support services) – it can be very difficult to build up an overall picture of a provider’s 
or DPO’s performance. 
 
There can also be prolonged delays in the data being released and problems with a 
small number of cases – with resultant statistical limitations, especially once particular 
diagnoses are considered individually (Iezzoni and Greenberg 1994).  In the United 
States there is also considerable concern about the costs associated with initiatives to 
adjust for differences in health status (Iezzoni and Greenberg 1994). 
 
Health care outputs, processes and inputs 
Given the problems noted above, monitoring the performance of purchasers might be 
more appropriate at the output and process level.  As with health care outcomes, 
adjustments are still needed, however, at the registered population level to compare 
the level of outputs delivered to those registered with different providers or DPOs.  
Such adjustments are made to identify different likely levels of need which might 
explain differences in, for example, utilisation of particular services. 
 
The monitoring of levels of outputs is easier the more comprehensive is the care 
within an organisation’s sphere of responsibility.  With fragmented providers, for 
example, comparing levels of outputs (and health care outcomes) requires an 
understanding of the context in which care takes place: a hospital which admits 
patients who are dying will have different rates of output (and different rates of 
                                            
62  Using such indicators at the purchaser level gets around some of the problems of using 
indicators for monitoring the performance of non-integrated providers, where the performance of 
one provider may be affected by the circumstances in which the care takes place (Brown, 
McCartney et al. 1995). 
 
63  This raises the question of who collects the data.  For example, clinicians would have to hand out 
questionnaires to consumers, ensure they are filled in accurately and are returned; the data then 
needs to be analysed and interpreted carefully. 39 
mortality) than one where patients are cared for at home or in a hospice.  With a 
comprehensive purchasing agent, however, such problems are minimised. 
 
Another alternative is to monitor inputs, although this, at least in terms of capital and 
labour inputs, has been out of fashion for some time (Trebilcock 1995).  In 
New Zealand, inputs are still used to monitor performance in relation to community 
mental health services (Performance Management Unit 1998), while the Health and 
Disability Commissioner used input measures as part of her inquiry into care at 
Canterbury Health’s Emergency Department (Health and Disability Commissioner 
1998). 
 
Recent work on practice guidelines – many of which specify patient characteristics or 
symptoms which are identified as leading to specific outcomes – suggests that holding 
providers accountable for the steps they undertake in deciding what care to offer to 
service users, or to whom they deliver services, is important in promoting 
effectiveness, and therefore allocative efficiency.  The increasing interest in practice 
guidelines suggests a role for a new approach to accountability and monitoring of 
provider performance in the form of audit to ensure compliance with guidelines 
(Sheldon and Borowitz 1993).  It is possible to imagine holding devolved purchasers 
accountable at this level of detail, in order to assess performance in promoting 
effectiveness. 
 
Furthermore, with measures of outputs, processes and inputs, some agency needs to 
take responsibility for ensuring those outputs, processes and inputs purchased have 
been shown to, or are believed to, contribute to desirable health outcomes. 
 
A key issue in holding purchasers accountable for outcomes, outputs, processes or 
inputs relates to the sheer number of potential outcomes, outputs, processes or inputs 
which are produced in the health sector.  This problem is worsened when it is 
recognised that different groups – e.g., health professionals, service users, carers, 
families or society – may view outcomes in different ways.  Specifying a large number 
of measures in order to ensure all services are being provided or to track through 
changes in service delivery over time may prove expensive and time-consuming.  On 
the other hand, specifying a limited number of measures may encourage purchasers 
to focus their attention only on those measures, to the detriment of other measures 
and services, and conceal changes in the distribution of resources which may be 
viewed by society as undesirable. 
 
HEDIS64 
At a purchaser level, the most well known performance monitoring approach is that of 
the United States National Committee for Quality Assurance Health Plan Employer 
Data and Information Set (HEDIS).  HEDIS ‘is a set of standardised performance 
measures designed to ensure that purchasers and consumers have the information 
they need to reliably compare the performance of managed health care plans’ 
(National Committee for Quality Assurance 1997).  HEDIS has one key advantage 
                                            
64  Light also notes the existence of the so-called Primary Care Assessment Survey (PCAS), for use 
in monitoring primary care quality and service, noting it is an inexpensive and patient-based 
approach to monitoring care processes. 40 
over approaches based on provider-focused administrative data sets: it is based on 
population measures rather than encounters between physicians and service users; in 
other words, the measures go beyond those who selectively choose to visit a 
physician (Hanchak 1996). (See Appendix I for the 1999 HEDIS measures.) 
 
HEDIS is a relatively recent innovation. Hanchak (1996) notes a number of serious 
limitations, including problems with the data sets and collection methods and 
continued differences of opinion over the adjustment factors for risk and for different 
demographic factors such as socio-economic status (Hanchak 1996).  (See also 
Borfitz (1995).) Kenkel (1996) notes that after some ‘five years and millions of dollars 
were spent…a pilot report card project in 1994 …revealed the inability of most health 
care organizations to collect and record patient information accurately’. 
 
Another issue in relation to measurement tools such as HEDIS – which apply also to 
comparisons of mortality and morbidity – are that the individual scores ‘seesaw up and 
down depending on the polling techniques used.  Even the season in which a survey 
is conducted may skew results’ (Kenkel 1996). 
 
Such analysis suggests it is very difficult to be fully certain that differences in health or 
health care outcomes are attributable to the care offered by purchasers or providers.  
This is particularly the case in terms of outcomes indicated by many performance 
measurement systems, which cannot be relied upon on their own to provide good 
information on the relationships between outputs and outcomes.  A broader evaluative 
approach is often likely to be necessary to tease out underlying factors (Iezzoni and 
Greenberg 1994; Brown, McCartney et al. 1995): investigation rather than castigation 
being the more appropriate goal. 
 
Conclusions 
Much of the literature in this area is moving towards a view that the on-going analysis 
of data using administrative data bases is expensive.  Such measurement tools 
require numerous quality control measures in terms of definitions and data coding, 
while also needing much greater information on patient and provider or DPO 
characteristics than is currently collected in New Zealand.  It is not yet clear that the 
benefits from such measurement tools are worth the expense involved.  Furthermore, 
the need for further investigation limits the use of such tools as measures of 
accountability in the short-term. 
 
It appears better to identify and focus on particular priority areas, covering a range of 
different attributes of DPO performance, and to identify if there are meaningful 
outcomes measures which can be used in contracts with purchasers and providers65.  
Desired outcomes should be within the control of purchasers, they must be meaningful 
and not able to be gamed, and they must reflect sector priorities. 
 
                                            
65  The first step is to identify outcome measures which are appropriate and meaningful (e.g., 
percent smokers in a population); a second step is to gather information from purchasers on 
current outcomes levels; a third step is to set a target which is meaningful and achievable and 
which, if it requires additional resources, is a priority. 41 
In the absence of outcome measures, continued monitoring of outputs is required.  
Priority outputs should be monitored, and developed into a reporting framework such 
as HEDIS.  Once again, however, adjustments must be made for differences in health 
status or health need in different communities.  Measures must not be able to be 
gamed and they must reflect sector priorities. 
 
Monitoring of performance against practice guidelines (i.e. audit) may also be an 
appropriate step to take in New Zealand.  Provided that appropriate care is generally 
agreed and based on whatever evidence exists, this approach may allow for the faster 
identification of problems.  Adopting this approach will however be seen as reducing 
doctor autonomy and intruding into the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
Finally, we can continue to monitor performance against particular tasks which 
purchasers are expected to undertake, such as minimising their own costs, consulting 
widely with providers and the public, undertaking contract negotiations in good faith, 
developing and implementing guidelines and so on. 
 
B  Rewards and sanctions 
There are a number of ways in which employees and firms can be motivated to 
perform. In addition to the profit incentive (see below), the following methods can be 
used to motivate people and organisations: 
 
·  rewarding achievement; 
 
·  recognising good performance; 
 
·  providing new challenges; 
 
·  providing an interesting job; 
 
·  giving responsibility to employees; 
 
·  providing advancement (promotion); and 
 
·  rewarding using salaries and benefits (Osborne and Plastrik 1997, p.147); 
 
Tools for performance management include: 
 
·  performance awards – e.g., non-financial recognition; 
 
·  ‘psychic’ pay – e.g., paid time off, new equipment, study leave, research funding; 
 
·  bonuses – to individuals or teams; 
 
·  gain sharing – gives a guaranteed portion of financial savings as long as specified 
targets are met; 
 
·  shared savings – gain sharing for organisations, or teams; 
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·  performance pay – links pay to performance; 
 
·  performance contracts and agreements – gives the opportunity to get rid of non-
performing managers or organisations; 
 
·  efficiency dividends – reducing agencies’ budgets by a small amount each year, 
while maintaining output levels; and 
 
·  performance budgeting – outputs and outcomes specified along with a budget 
(Osborne and Plastrik 1997, p.146). 
 
All of these approaches might be used in non-competitive markets, e.g., in the case of 
the HFA, DPOs or hospitals.  In all situations, however, key performance expectations 
must be established, they must be realistic and information is required to measure 
performance against those expectations.  Hence the issues raised in the section on 
benchmarking performance need to be considered at the same time as rewards and 
sanctions66. 
 
Much of the attention in recent years in health care has focused on financial rewards 
and sanctions.  Budget-holding in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, for example, 
involves the setting of a budget and offers providers the ability to use savings for new 
services. 
 
There is a reasonable amount of evidence which suggests that health care agencies 
do respond to financial incentives – although the same literature also notes that ‘doing 
a good job’ and ‘recognition by one’s peers’ are also powerful incentives (see the 
material reviewed in Cumming 1996). 
 
Research into individual provider behaviour does suggest responsiveness to changing 
financial incentives.  For example, Mooney reports on changes in moving from a 
capitation to a mixed capitation/fee-for-service payment system in Copenhagen: 
doctors provided many more services in their own surgeries and reduced referrals and 
hospital admissions, in response to receiving fee-for-service payments for specific 
conditions (Mooney 1994).  The key issue here is: are the changes efficient? Given 
our limited knowledge of the relative efficiency of providing services in hospitals 
compared to doctors’ surgeries, this is unclear.  This is a key problem in health policy: 
we need to be clear about what we are trying to achieve and to be sure that the 
incentives support those goals. 
 
Research on GP fund-holding in the United Kingdom suggests: that fundholders 
reduced the rate of growth in prescribing rates in the early stages of fundholding; 
mixed evidence in relation to changes in rates of referrals to hospitals and emergency 
care; and a rise in the number of clinics provided in GP practices (Goodwin 1998).  
Other studies have found more muted responsiveness to financial incentives.  Whynes 
                                            
66  Once performance information systems begin to be used for financial rewards, or to award 
contracts to particular providers or plans, they must be robust enough to withstand legal 
challenge. 
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and Baines cite evidence of equivocal results, and argue that GPs, for example, have 
limited ability to directly respond to income incentives (Whynes and Baines 1998). 
 
In relation to hospitals, United States evidence suggests that payment methods – such 
as the prospective payment system (PPS, using diagnostic related groups or DRGs) – 
can lead to reduced costs when compared with traditional payment methods (such as 
reimbursement of actual costs).  However the evidence on quality of care is less 
comprehensive, and suggests that in some cases, quality of care has worsened.   
Furthermore, there is also evidence of undesirable effects – for example, cost-shifting 
to budgets not included in caps; and DRG-creep, where the case complexity of the 
service mix provided increases as coders choose the most expensive code against 
which to charge care67. 
 
Financial incentives have clearly made a difference in the United States insurance 
market.  HMOs are widely recognised as reducing costs, although the separate impact 
of financial incentives from practice style are hard to identify.  Furthermore, such gains 
may well have been easier to make in the bloated United States system.  The worst 
fears of  the impact of HMOs on quality of care have perhaps not been realised: there 
are HMOs which provide better, the same or worse care than indemnity plans 
(Robinson and Steiner 1998).  There is, however, a concern that poor care may be 
more likely for those who are chronically ill, low income enrollees in worse health, 
impaired or frail social HMO enrollees and Medicare home health patients, many with 
chronic conditions and diseases (Managed Health Care Improvement Task Force 
1998, p. 104). 
 
Conclusions 
Any method of rewarding or sanctioning providers or DPOs provides both positive and 
negative incentives.  The key steps are to determine the priority goals and objectives 
for providers or DPOs, to identify meaningful measures or indicators, to negotiate 
rewards and sanctions in the event that goals and objectives are or are not met, and 
to monitor carefully any potentially undesirable effects (e.g., on classification, health 
care outcomes, or in relation to cost-shifting).  Some baseline monitoring of service 
outputs or processes may be required to ensure that providers or DPOs do not skimp 
elsewhere.  However, although these approaches seem to be easily implemented they 
are in fact complex and require careful thought and implementation. 
 
C  Competition for the market: franchising 
Franchise bidding takes financial incentives one step further: by rewarding purchasers 
with the opportunity to take an entire market.  Thus, the ability to earn extra revenue 
and the threat of loss of business may provide powerful incentives to minimise costs 
and to provide quality care. 
 
                                            
67  As the DRG system is based on current resource use and average cost, the extent to which it 
promotes efficiency is questionable – an approach based on identifying better practice may be a 
more appropriate starting point (Donaldson and Gerard 1991; Donaldson and Magnussen 1992). 
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Williamson, in his work on the economic institutions of capitalism, noted that 
uncertainty and the complexity of health care services may mean that franchising in 
health care is difficult (Williamson 1985).  In spite of an exhaustive literature search, I 
was unable to find much evidence about franchising in the health literature. 
 
One example of franchising in health care is however the Arizona experience.  In 
1982, Arizona was the first state in the United States to get approval to develop and 
implement a mandatory statewide Medicaid managed care system.  Prior to this, 
health care for low-income people was provided and funded by county governments, 
with care provided by county hospitals and clinics or through contracted providers.  
The managed care programme, Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System 
(AHCCCS), began with acute medical care services, based around prepaid capitated 
financing of private health plans68. 
 
The programme initially had a number of problems: Jacobson (1992) suggested that 
making utilisation information publicly available would allow an increasing number of 
participants into the franchise bidding process and would perhaps assist in reducing 
the potential for insolvencies.  According to the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
(1995), the programme has gradually improved its administrative performance, bidding 
had become very competitive and the approach has grown to encompass a wide 
range of services (including long term care for people with disabilities)69,70.  It is also 
estimated to have made significant savings.  The programme does, however, involve 
higher administration costs compared to other states, although these costs in the 
Arizona case ‘more than pay for themselves in net program savings’ (General 
Accounting Office 1995, p. 2). 
 
Although the Arizona experience appears to suggest franchising via a bidding 
approach can be successful, it is not clear how relevant this experience is in the 
New Zealand environment.  The Arizona population was 3.75 million in 1990, about 
the same population as New Zealand has now.  However, details of the previous 
health payment system – with which the savings from the AHCCCS approach are 
compared – are not clear.  Further, the Medicaid market is only a part of the entire 
market in which health plans operate: hence loss of the Medicaid market may not 
                                            
68  Although all Medicaid beneficiaries may specify which available plan they will join, only about 56 
per cent actively pick a plan.  The rest are assigned by AHCCCS (General Accounting Office 
1995). 
 
69  In the bidding process, more weight is given to access and quality factors than to capitation rates 
(i.e. the price bid); plans are required to meet certain standards for primary care coverage and 
financial and operational performance is routinely monitored.  The bidding process considers: the 
extent of health plan’s provider network, including number, type, geographic location of 
physicians; member and provider services, quality management and administrative tasks; and 
financial ability to meet contract terms.  A minimum allowable capitation rate is also established, 
prohibiting low bids that might force health plans to curtail services and adversely affect the 
quality of care provided.  At the time of the 1995 GAO report, a new quality management system 
was to be implemented. 
 
70  Contracts stipulate the type and location of providers in each county, with minimum provider-
enrollee ratios.  The State also requires that plans make transportation available where 
necessary.  The State limits the number of contracts awarded in each county: to increase the 
chances of missing out and therefore increasing the incentives to submit low bids. 45 
necessarily imply that a firm loses all its market share.  This may mean that entry is 
relatively easy and exit from the market not catastrophic: in the New Zealand situation 
if the whole population were covered by this arrangement, entry and exit may not be 
as easy and hence competition much more limited.  It is interesting that the approach 
allows consumers to choose between plans, but that only a slight majority of the 
population chooses to make a choice.  This may indicate the strength of an approach 
relying on a bidding process run by a regulatory body in addition to consumer choice. 
 
D Purchaser  competition 
Market-based reforms in health care begin with an assumption that competition 
amongst providers and/or amongst purchasers will provide incentives for good 
performance. In the market for providers, where consumers buy services directly and 
purchasers buy services on behalf of consumers, competition is argued to provide 
price information so that comparisons can be made between alternative providers.  
Those providers offering quality care at a good price will be offered additional work, 
and will thrive.  This process is argued also to offer incentives for reducing costs and 
encouraging cost-effectiveness and good quality care. 
 
Similarly, in the market for health plans, consumers are argued to make choices 
based on price and perceived quality of care offered by a health DPO.  Those plans 
which offer good quality care at a reasonable price will expand their market share and 
profitability and all plans will have incentives to reduce costs and encourage cost-
effective and good quality care. 
 
The most developed proposals for competition between purchasers are those 
designed in the United States.  Many of these proposals envisage a significant role for 
some agencies in managing the market in order for it to operate in ways which 
promote allocative and technical efficiency and equity. 
 
The key question for consideration here is: to what extent will competition between 
purchasers reduce the risks of poor purchaser performance, without placing 
significantly greater risks on the sector?  The following sections consider evidence on 
the effects of competition in health care to assist in answering this question.   
Unfortunately, in answering this question for New Zealand, the key problem is that 
much of the experience of the effects of competition between providers and 
purchasers comes from the United States, which is moving towards competitive 
models from a very different environment to that which exists in New Zealand.  Thus, 
any benefits of competition in the United States are usually compared to the previous 
United States system: this does not supply us with good information about how 
purchaser competition might compare with the status quo in New Zealand.  This is 
particularly the case when we are sure that further moves to devolve purchasing will 
lead to higher management costs in New Zealand.  Thus there needs to be significant 
quality or efficiency gains to offset these costs. 46 
Competition at the provider level 
In many countries, the use of competition as an incentive in socially-organised health 
care is relatively new, particularly beyond primary care services.  The United States 
has the most extensive experience of competition, but much of this evidence comes 
from provider markets71. 
 
Studies in the 1980s of the effects of competition between hospitals focused on 
traditional competition in the United States hospital markets.  This involved hospitals 
competing for physicians who would undertake to admit their patients to a particular 
hospital, guaranteeing hospitals a number of patient admissions.  Such competition 
was based largely on amenities and technology.  Price competition played little role in 
such a market as a result of the third-party payment system.  The effects of 
competition between hospitals in such circumstances would depend on the relative 
bargaining position of hospitals and physicians.  The more hospitals, the higher 
expenditures may be in order to attract physicians; the more physicians, the lower 
expenditure as hospitals need not compete as much to attract physicians and their 
patients (Zwanziger and Melnick 1996).  Many cross-sectional studies did indeed find 
evidence of higher expenditures in areas with more hospitals (for a review see 
Cumming n.d.).  In addition, there was evidence of increased duplication of equipment 
and specialties in competitive markets as compared to non-competitive markets 
(Bruce and Jonsson 1996). 
 
In the late 1980s, in the United States, the introduction of selective contracting and 
prospective payment72 altered incentives in the hospital industry.  Once again, the 
effects in theory depend on the relative bargaining position of three parties: 
purchasing authorities, physicians and hospitals.  In this case, the greater the number 
of hospitals the more credible are threats to shift contracts between hospitals; the 
greater the competition between insurers, the less dependent are hospitals on any 
one particular insurer and the better the hospital’s bargaining position; the greater the 
competition between physicians and the less ‘bonding’ between hospitals and 
physicians, the greater the ability for hospitals to reduce expenditure without fear of 
losing physician loyalty.  In addition, insurers must consider the effects on consumers 
of changing contracts; who in turn will take into consideration ‘switching costs’, i.e. the 
costs of changing insurers in order to remain with a particular physician and the costs 
of changing physicians in order to remain with a particular insurer (Zwanziger and 
Melnick 1996). 
 
Thus, provider competition in the United States – in the presence of selective 
contracting and a massive oversupply of beds – is reaping benefits in the form of cost 
reductions.  There is also evidence of competition improving performance at the 
hospital level where GP fundholders in the United Kingdom have threatened to move 
                                            
71  Providers in the United States have traditionally not operated within a cash-constrained 
environment. 
 
72  Selective contracting is where a purchaser is able to select particular providers to contract with to 
provide care.  The opposite approach – universal contracting – occurs where a purchaser must 
contract with ‘all willing providers’.  In the United States, prior to about 1983, universal contracting 
was the norm.  Prospective reimbursement occurs when providers are paid in advance for care to 
be provided.  The DRG system is an example of a prospective reimbursement system. 47 
contracts elsewhere.  This pressure may have been successful as a result of the 
attractiveness of marginal income available through cost per case contracts (Le 
Grand, Mays et al. 1998). 
 
Provider competition in New Zealand  
It is unclear if the experiences of the United States and the United Kingdom can be 
replicated in New Zealand, particularly when considering hospital markets.  Greater 
competition in New Zealand amongst hospitals in the presence of selective contracting 
may provide incentives for improved performance in the longer term, but increased 
competition in the form of more hospitals may lead to higher average prices: if 
occupancy rates fall; where expensive equipment is duplicated in particular centres; 
and if specialists’ earnings are evened out over the private and public sectors. 
 
Evidence on economies of scale in New Zealand suggests that significant gains could 
be reaped by down-sizing larger hospitals and merging smaller hospitals (Devlin and 
O’Dea, 1998), suggesting that in rural areas, competition between hospitals is unlikely 
to be efficient.  The implications for competition of down-sizing larger hospitals are 
unclear – given uncertainties over the effects of duplication and lower occupancy 
rates.  In any event, the results may not apply to particular services, especially where 
the relationship between outputs and outcomes may be strong.  Competition in New 
Zealand is thus more likely to be efficient amongst primary and community care 
providers; growth in the availability of secondary care beds in the private sector may, 
however, signal that some competition at the margins is possible in elective care also 
(see Appendix D), particularly if there is significant spare capacity in the private sector. 
 
The effects of competition in provision of care are relevant when considering the 
potential effects of introducing competition at the purchaser level.  With a limited 
number of hospitals providing secondary and tertiary services, combined with a limited 
supply of specialists, some hospitals will have monopoly power in negotiations with 
purchasers; while specialists will have monopoly power in negotiations with hospitals: 
competing purchasers may therefore find it more difficult than a monopsony purchaser 
to restrain costs. 
 
Competition between health plans – what is the evidence? 
A number of studies have examined differences in utilisation, expenditure and quality 
of care between traditional indemnity insurance plans and HMOs (for reviews see 
Miller and Luft 1994; Luft 1996; Robinson and Steiner 1998).  These studies clearly 
show, in comparison with traditional plans: HMOs have lower utilisation rates for 
intensive services, lower costs and no worse health outcomes (except in mental 
health); fewer HMO enrollees are satisfied with the quality of care and patient-
physician interactions; and HMO enrollees have greater satisfaction with costs. 
 
Of more interest in this context is the effect of managed care competition on traditional 
indemnity insurance activities and costs73. Miller and Luft in 1994 noted there had 
                                            
73  Some commentators note that HMO activities have spread to traditional indemnity insurance. 
Robinson and Steiner for example cite reference to a new type of organisation ‘managed 
indemnity insurance’ (Robinson and Steiner 1998, p. 18). 48 
been no studies on the impact of managed care plans on national or regional area 
health care expenditures and inconsistent results concerning effects on hospital 
expenditures.  One study concluded a 10 per cent increase in HMO market 
penetration reduced hospital costs per admission by 9.4 per cent, and was greatest in 
areas with substantial market competition.  A more recent study has found that high 
managed care enrolment is now associated with: lower growth in hospital spending; in 
some years, lower growth in total spending including physician and drug spending;  
and even reduced diffusion of medical technologies (Cutler and Sheiner n.d.).  In 
another study, there was evidence of a relationship between systemwide HMO market 
share and declines in Medicare fee-for-service expenditures (Baker and 
Shankarkumar n.d. ). 
 
In the United Kingdom, a number of studies have researched the effects of health 
authority purchasers and budget-holders on hospital and specialist behaviour.   
Overall, the results suggest that purchasers have found it more difficult than budget-
holders to switch expenditure between services or providers, and that providers have 
been more responsive to the demands of budget-holders than to non-budget-holders 
(Le Grand, Mays et al. 1997)74.  However, the results appear to be related to the 
degree of competition for elective care which exists between closely located hospitals, 
which suggests that such gains may be more difficult to achieve in New Zealand.  In 
addition, the transaction costs associated with budget-holding have been higher than 
those associated with health authority purchasing, and the potential for worsening 
inequities in access to care greater under budget-holding than under health authority 
purchasing (Le Grand, Mays et al. 1997).  This suggests that devolving purchasing is 
likely to result in higher transaction costs and that concerns may arise over the impact 
on equity goals. 
 
However, the effects of competition between HMOs compared to no competition 
remain unclear, as do the implications of the combination of competing HMOs and a 
number of competing hospitals compared, for example, to a situation of bilateral 
monopoly.  These are the issues which are relevant in New Zealand.  
 
How many competing health plans could New Zealand sustain? 
New Zealand may find it hard to promote competition between comprehensive health 
care plans because of the small size of the population and its distribution.   
Competition between plans would be more likely to succeed if limited to common 
primary and community care services (such competition currently exists anyway), and 
perhaps some secondary care. 
 
Clearly, the extent of choice that consumers face will depend on the form of health 
care plans, as well as on the regulatory structure implemented.  Key drivers are: 
whether individual providers are able to work or contract with more than one DPO; 
how access is defined in regulation; and the comprehensiveness of service coverage 
required by plans. 
                                            
74  The authors note however that ‘while budgetary control appears to be desirable for achieving 
changes in the desired direction, it is clearly not sufficient on its own….It seemed that…it was 
only the innovative practices within fundholding which transformed patient care’ (Le Grand, Mays 
et al. 1997, p. 60). 49 
 
If providers can only contract with one DPO, and access is defined in regulation such 
that each DPO must provide access for example in rural towns, the extent of 
competition between plans in some parts of New Zealand may be limited, along the 
lines of the extent of provider competition that currently exists75.  Allowing providers to 
contract with more than one DPO – at least for some specialties and in smaller towns 
– is a precursor to encouraging competition between plans in New Zealand.  Under 
such circumstances, those in smaller towns may have a choice of DPO, but (as exists 
now) little choice of provider (unless they are prepared to travel)76.  Yet the more 
plans each provider has a contract with, the greater transaction costs are likely to be 
and the more limited is each DPO’s effect on provider behaviour77.  Furthermore, 
potential improvements in choice at the purchaser level may not occur if plans choose 
not to market in smaller towns, and if they fear that they will not be compensated 
adequately for any higher costs if the population is thought to be more at risk of poor 
health (e.g., lower income or Mâori communities) or for care which is more expensive 
to provide in rural areas than on average (e.g., if it costs more to contract with 
providers in rural areas). 
 
Just how many plans might a country like New Zealand be likely to be able to 
sustain?.  This is firstly a function of the comprehensiveness of the coverage.  In their 
United States study, Kronick et al used the ratio of physicians to enrollees in large 
staff-model HMOs to estimate the population needed to support health organisations 
with various ranges of specialty services.  They assumed adequate competition would 
require at least three plans78.  They found, assuming United States levels of 
spending: 
 
·  a health care services market with at least 1.2 million could support three fully 
independent plans (i.e., where each DPO owns its own hospitals and all staff are 
employed by only one DPO); 
 
·  a population of at least 360,000 could support three plans which independently 
provided most acute hospital services, but they would have to share hospital 
facilities and contract for tertiary services; and 
 
·  a population of 180,000 could support three plans which provided primary care and 
many basic specialty services, but which shared inpatient cardiology and urology 
services and engaged in substantial sharing of inpatient facilities with other plans 
(Kronick, Goodman et al. 1993). 
                                            
75  At the extreme, only one plan is possible for the full range of services currently provided in 
New Zealand (ie. including liver transplants where there is only one provider). 
 
76  Clearly, the regulations here too may have implications for competition between plans. If plans 
must contract with GPs for each town, rather than nurses for example, then competition may be 
more limited. 
 
77  For further discussion on this, see Appendix D. 
78  Kronick et al also noted that each plan would also be seeking opportunities to grow, which may 
affect the calculations. 
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Thus, in the United States, competition of the first kind would be possible for 42 per 
cent of the population; of the second kind, 63 per cent; and of the third kind, 71 per 
cent. 
 
On the basis of the approach used by Kronick et al, only the Auckland region79 
(including around 27 per cent of the population) could sustain competition of the first 
and second kinds; even then people living in South Auckland would face significant 
travel times to, for example, the North Shore.  Christchurch and Wellington fall just 
below the 360,000 population mark, so may also be able to sustain competition of the 
second kind (increasing coverage to 45.6 per cent of the population).  Populations 
between 140,000 to 180,000 might also allow competition for Hamilton-Cambridge-Te 
Awamutu (adding a further 4.4 per cent of the population).  Reducing the level to 
100,000 also adds in Napier-Hastings and Dunedin (a further 6 per cent).  At most, 
New Zealand could sustain competition of the third kind (i.e. three competing plans 
providing primary care and basic specialty services) for 56 per cent of the 
population80.  (Contact the author for the data from which this information was drawn.) 
 
In their report, Le Grand et al reported the following illustrative population sizes for 
purchasers, on the basis of risk management and expertise of purchasers: 
 
Type of service  Examples Population  size 
Rare  services   Organ transplantation, neurosciences, 





Emergency care.  50,000-250,000** 
Common   Elective treatments and routine tests and 
investigations, palliative care, services for 





Community health services.  3,000-10,000 
                                            
79  The data are reported on a main urban area basis. Data are from the 1996 Census.  Auckland 
encompasses Northern, Western, Central and Southern Auckland main urban areas.  More 
detailed analysis would generate more accurate figures.  Consideration should also be given to 
other differences between the United States and New Zealand which may affect these figures, 
e.g. the level of spending and spare capacity in the United States compared to New Zealand. 
 
80  This analysis assumes that quality care requires the same mixes of physicians as in staff-model 
HMOs and the ratio of 2 beds per thousand population, where the population under 65 years of 
age uses 350 hospital days per year per thousand enrollees and the population over 65 years of 
age uses 2340 beds per thousand population (13 per cent of the population).  Hospital 
occupancy is 85 per cent.  The analysis assumed a family practitioner ratio of 1 family practitioner 
to 2000 population, or 50 per 100,000 population.  In New Zealand, at a former area health board 
level, there were between 72 and 112 general practitioners per 100,000 population, with an 
average of 87 (New Zealand Medical Council n.d.) in 1997.  However, the populations in the 
HMOs whose data were used for this analysis may be younger and possibly healthier than the 
general population.  Thus, Kronick et al argued that smaller health markets could support 
managed competition with a higher proportion of elderly patients (although they were not 
particularly clear as to why this was the case; presumably however it is because older people use 
more services). 51 
Source: Le Grand et al (1997). 
*    The authors note in the text that such services may require between 500,000 and 2 million 
people to spread risk across such services. 
**     The authors note in the text that such services may require between 50,000 and 500,000 people 
to spread risk across such services. 
 
On the basis of these crude estimates, and extrapolating them to a situation where 
three such plans are required to promote competition, populations of around 30,000-
150,000 could have competition between three plans, but each would only responsible 
for delivering the more common services.  With 30,000 population, all main urban 
areas could sustain competition between three plans (2,510,400 people or 69% of the 
population); with 150,000, at most 56 per cent of the population live in areas which 
might sustain such competition. 
 
Hence, competition between plans in New Zealand appears unlikely to be feasible if 
plans must cover all services.  It would appear to be better to promote more limited 
coverage81: even then, however, a good proportion of the population would find their 
choices limited. 
 
The role of consumers in purchaser competition 
The little research which has been undertaken in relation to consumerism82 in 
choosing between providers choice suggests a distinct lack of consumerist behaviour, 
including limited seeking of health information, exercising of independent judgement in 
accepting advice, or cost-seeking behaviours (see the references cited in Barnett and 
Kearns 1996).  Possible reasons include: the sporadic nature of care; that urgent 
treatment usually precludes the possibility of shopping around; the passive patient role 
from which many patients seem unwilling to move away, perhaps due to the 
asymmetry of information between doctor and patient and the high degree of faith and 
trust in physicians; the availability of a range of alternative providers (Barnett and 
Kearns 1996); perhaps that the highest users of care are young children and the 
elderly, many of whom find it difficult to travel long distances for care; and that 
personal relationships and continuity of care are important qualities of health care 
services83. 
 
                                            
81  Many New Zealanders currently are able to choose their GP from a range of competing GPs.  
However, competition between plans may well reduce the choices that consumers have for GPs 
if plans introduce selective contracting. 
 
82  For the purposes of this paper, a consumer is someone who purchases or uses a good or 
service, regardless of whether direct payments are involved.  A consumerist is ‘a person who 
purchases a good or service and is actively assertive, critical and prepared to shop around for the 
best deal’, cited in Barnett (1996, p. 1055).  Note, however, that the nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship, for example, makes the nature of consumerism in health care somewhat special 
(Evans 1984). 
 
83  Thanks to Nick Mays for making these last two points. The importance of continuity of care is 
outlined by Managed Health Care Improvement Task Force (1998, p. 20): ‘studies have shown 
that patients staying with the same physician for long periods are less likely to be hospitalized, 
more likely to have lower costs, and more likely to be satisfied’. 
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In New Zealand, Barnett and Kearns similarly found little evidence of consumerist 
behaviour in their study of Auckland private accident and medical clinics.  Accessibility 
(proximity) and availability (opening hours) were the most important factors in 
choosing to attend such clinics; with very few (3.1 per cent of respondents) mentioning 
price (Barnett and Kearns 1996).  Barnett and Kearns thus conclude: ‘it appears that 
few patients, especially those with lower incomes, actually shop around for a GP even 
when they have the freedom to do so’ (Barnett and Kearns 1996, p.1072)84. 
 
Perhaps of more concern is the conclusion Barnett and Kearns draw that unlike the 
‘discount doctors’ surgeries’, which characterised the early corporate intrusion into 
primary health care, more recent entrants into the market have played down the cost 
of their operations because of the negative connotations associated with lower cost 
care’ (Barnett and Kearns 1996, p. 1072).  This refers to the early foray by corporate 
medicine in the Auckland market; a failure in the sense that a number of such clinics 
did not survive: one did not last beyond five weeks!  The reasons cited for this include: 
a perception of ‘Kentucky Fried Medicine’, along with doctor-management conflicts 
and high turnover; the siting of clinics in affluent areas where cheaper care was not 
wanted because of the perception it would not be quality care; and the limited size of 
catchment areas in lower income areas where consumers do not have access to good 
transport (once again, see the references cited in Barnett and Kearns 1996). 
 
Thus, there is a concern that consumers may view a lower priced provider or health 
DPO as evidence of poor quality, thereby reducing the potential effects of consumer 
choice on improving efficiency.  If consumers choose providers or plans on the basis 
of facilities, for example, then competition may well lead to higher costs overall. 
 
Consumer information in purchaser competition 
If consumers are to make choices based on efficiency they must have access to 
information on more than just the price of coverage.  Efficiency not only means 
efficiency in production (providing outputs at least resource use); but also cost-
effectiveness (providing outcomes at least cost); and quality of care (including 
appropriateness, cultural acceptability, facilities available, courtesy, etc)85.  Cost-
effectiveness in the delivery of particular health care outcomes86 is not usually 
obvious, nor is such information reliably gained by word of mouth.  Information must 
be provided as to the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative plans.  Poor information 
is likely to lead to consumers using proxy measures of cost-effectiveness and quality 
of care, and this may include settling for a higher-priced DPO.  Such use of proxy 
signals may thwart incentives for efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
 
                                            
84  A requirement for patients to register with one GP or practice may further inhibit shopping around 
for care. 
85  It is assumed here that efficiency is defined with respect to a particular societal view: individual 
consumers may not agree with societal views on an efficient mix of services, however. 
 
86  Examples of cost-effectiveness may include: nurses being available to deliver immunisation 
services rather than doctors; GPs being available to provide services for people with on-going 
mental health needs rather than more expensive psychiatrists. 
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As Luft notes, however, aggregate performance of a DPO may be of little assistance 
to consumers: they are likely to want to know about the performance of a DPO in their 
own locality.  Reporting at this level, however, raises problems associated with small 
sample sizes (Luft 1996). 
 
Luft also notes that innovation may occur at the provider rather than the purchaser 
level, and that plans may find it impossible to channel consumers towards such 
providers because the consumers sign up with the DPO not providers (Luft 1996)87.  
Thus, the integration of purchaser and provider may make it harder to reward 
innovative providers than with the purchaser-provider split model, unless consumers 
are offered financial incentives to choose particular providers within any of the 
integrated models. 
 
In terms of health plans, choosing one health DPO over another has implications not 
only for coverage of health care (the benefits DPO), but also dimensions of health 
care provision, i.e. quality and location of providers. 
 
Reinhardt also notes that consumer choice implies the ‘full disclosure of credible 
information’ about the various products, and that the information ‘to be made 
available…ought to be retrieved and structured by someone economically unrelated to 
the various health plans or networks competing with one another’ and that when 
information is supplied by the competitors themselves ‘it should be subject to rigorous 
external audit’ (Reinhardt, 1997 p. 45, emphasis in original)88. 
 
About managed competition in the United States, Reinhardt states: 
  In theory, the new American health system was to afford employees a well-
informed  choice among several competing private health plans…..In practice, 
…the typical American was thrust blind-folded into a raw, commercial free-for-all 
among the would-be private regulators…With very few exceptions - most notably 
in California - the typical American today knows no more about the quality of the 
health-care regulation likely to be performed by competing health plans than do 
British individuals about the health-care regulation likely to be performed by 
competing GP-fundholders.  It is the reason why Americans now beg the federal 
and state governments for increased government-regulation of the private health-
care regulators.  In so doing, they are reacting angrily to an alleged ‘consumer-
choice’ revolution that put the cart (competition) before the horse (disclosure of the 
pertinent information) (Reinhardt, 1997, p. 58, emphasis in original). 
 
Reinhardt also queries the extent to which individuals can be enlisted to promote 
effective quality89 and cost competition between health plans90, or whether the 
                                            
87  Unless providers are associated with only one plan. 
 
88  Such information should include: clinical outcomes, immunisation rates etc, patients’ satisfaction, 
geographic location, background of physicians, information on clinical experts employed by the 
plans (Reinhardt, 1997, p. 45). 
89  Ie, beyond consumer satisfaction alone. 
 
90  Not all Americans have a choice of plan: 48.2% of United States employees nationally have a 
choice of plan through their own employment (the figure is 54.5% in California) (Managed Health 
Care Improvement Task Force 1998, p. 37). 54 
establishment of professional purchasers – as in the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand – might not be a more effective means of challenging the performance of 
providers (Reinhardt, 1997, p. 63)91.  The relative advantages and disadvantages of 
each approach deserves further consideration – and piloting – in New Zealand. 
 
As the section on cream-skimming discussed, it is likely that the incentives on 
purchasers or health plans to perform will very much depend on the extent to which 
cream-skimming is profitable and how well health plans can segment the market.   
Success at this may leave some consumers with very few choices in relation to 
coverage, and may result in consumers choosing packages of care based on 
coverage rather than price. 
 
A key issue in designing managed competition relates to the role of financial 
incentives for consumers in choosing between health plans.  An early version of 
managed competition envisaged competition only in relation to quality of care.  In 
other versions of managed competition, however, consumers would pay some of the 
cost of coverage: for example, only the cheapest DPO might be fully subsidised, with 
consumers paying additional amounts for the same coverage offered by the more 
expensive plans.  This is argued to provide a financial incentive to choose carefully; 
but might also be seen as compromising ‘social solidarity’ objectives depending on the 
extent to which choice becomes affected by ability to pay (Reinhardt 1997). 
 
An issue which is not covered to this point is, however, that of the responsiveness of 
organisations to changing tastes and technologies.  In spite of the considerable 
importance that might be attached to this concept of efficiency, the literature does not 
make much of it in the context of competition.  Of considerable interest is the extent to 
which competing health plans and providers respond more quickly to market signals 
than in a non-competitive environment; and whether or not such responsiveness is 
compatible with any health maximisation or cost-containment goals. 
 
A final point is also the extent to which consumer responsiveness is improved by 
competition.  Clearly, some insurers in United States markets are viewed as 
responsive to some needs: however, the same responsiveness may be viewed less 
positively if used to cream-skim and to sell ineffective and allocatively inefficient 
services.  The Managed Care Improvement Task Force in California noted that 
consumers who have a choice of plan are more likely to be satisfied with their plan 
than consumers with no choice (Managed Health Care Improvement Task Force 
1998, p. 205).  This needs to be balanced against the limits on choice due to a) 
restricted use of providers and b) the effects of increasing levels of ‘management’ of 
individual care.  In addition, the more vulnerable populations are unlikely to be 
beneficiaries of increased choice (Managed Health Care Improvement Task Force 
1998, p. 128). 
 
                                            
91  It is likely, however, that arguments will be made about the extent to which purchasers can 
adequately represent consumer views in purchasing health care, and about how to promote good 
purchaser performance. 55 
E.  Investment in purchaser expertise and knowledge 
As a final point, Light raises the issue of how to promote effective commissioning. 
Using evidence from the United States, he argues that: 
 
·  commissioning organisations need to be large and strong – requiring marketplace 
clout to take on inefficiencies and a large population base across which (i) to 
configure clinical services in cost-effective ways, (ii) to bear risk, (iii) to support a 
highly skilled team to undertake contracting, (iv) to spread administrative and 
transaction costs, (v) to avoid inequalities and service fragmentation and (vi) to 
advance prevention and health gain aggressively; 
 
·  commissioning teams need to be smart, well trained and technically supported; 
 
·  re-engineering clinical care for cost-effectiveness takes time and money; and 
requires more attention to be paid to the diffusion of successful and cost-effective 
new ways of doing things; and 
 
·  commissioning through primary care has serious drawbacks, because they do not 
have: sufficient clout; technical skills and infrastructure; time and training; and the 
ability to address inequities and wasteful practices in primary care itself (Light 
1998). 
 
These issues need further serious consideration in the New Zealand context if we are 
serious about ensuring good purchaser performance.  In particular, more attention 
needs to be paid to developing the purchasing skills of both professionals and 
managers.  There is no guarantee that good purchasing will develop of its own accord. 
 
Conclusions 
Managing the risks of poor purchaser performance is complicated by the information 
problems which plague the health and disability sector.  The move in 1998 to a single 
purchaser makes it difficult to benchmark purchaser performance in New Zealand 
(even though one strong purchaser may be better than having a number of weaker 
purchasers), while the lack of a clear counterfactual – what would have happened if 
there were a ‘better’ purchaser – makes assessment of a purchaser’s performance 
difficult.  The current purchaser performance framework monitors particular tasks 
which the HFA is expected to complete, and monitors changes in the levels of outputs 
over time. 
 
Each of the first four approaches set out here for managing purchaser performance – 
monitoring and benchmarking performance; using sanctions and rewards; franchising; 
and competition between purchasers – requires identification of priority goals and the 
collection and interpretation of indicators.  A significant investment is required to 
establish indicators, and to adjust them adequately for different levels of health status.  
A focus on health care outputs and processes is more likely to be feasible in both the 
short and long terms.  An approach based on practice and other guidelines offers 
advantages in using evidence on effectiveness and best practice, but requires auditing 
at an individual practitioner or institutional level. 
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Having identified key performance goals and indicators which are tightly defined and 
audited, performance rewards and sanctions can also be designed to ensure that 
purchasers focus on these goals.  Care needs to be taken that purchasers do not 
neglect activities in services which are not monitored, however.  The literature 
suggests that financial incentives can have an important effect on behaviour, but the 
existence of a myriad of health sector goals can make it hard to ensure that all goals 
are met with the same set of incentives. 
 
Increasing the number of purchasers may reduce the risks of poor purchaser 
performance if a single purchaser is systematically performing poorly, but smaller 
purchasers may not have the same level of expertise or power over providers in order 
to challenge provision. 
 
Competition for the market provides an alternative approach to managing purchasing 
risks.  At present, this would seem an unlikely scenario, given the limited expertise in 
purchasing in New Zealand. Even in the longer term, the small size of the New 
Zealand market may limit opportunities for franchising to primary care 
purchaser/providers.  The costs involved in managing a franchise process may not be 
worth the gains which might be made. 
 
Full-scale purchaser competition in New Zealand – between plans offering 
comprehensive services – appears an unlikely scenario, given our small and widely 
dispersed population.  Competition between plans may well improve incentives for 
better performance, but competition requires much better information to be collected 
and to be made available at a local level.  It is not clear if the risks associated with 
such competition would be worth the potential gains involved (see Appendix D), even 
if cream-skimming and cost-shifting risks can be minimised.  Further analytical work, 
drawing on the international literature, comparing the potential benefits of a national 
purchaser with competition between purchasers is needed urgently to inform this 
debate. 
 57 
4.3  Managing the risks associated with cost-shifting 
Key approaches to managing the risks associated with cost-shifting include: 
 
A.  Integrating budget responsibility. 
B.  Clarifying boundaries between budgets. 
C.  Developing practice and referral guidelines. 
D.  Private ownership of purchasers and providers. 
 
A  Integrating budget responsibility 
In New Zealand, the move in 1993 to integrate primary, secondary and disability 
support funding for health care was in part due to concerns about cost shifting92.  
Theoretically, this integration of budget responsibility might encourage the purchaser 
to ensure that inefficient cost-shifting (within the budget) does not occur.  Whether this 
happens will depend on a) the incentives on the purchaser to provide the best value 
for money and b) the purchaser’s specification and monitoring of contracts (and use of 
the techniques set out below). 
 
It could be argued that introducing competition at the purchaser level will provide 
greater incentives to ensure that inefficient cost-shifting does not occur within the 
purchaser’s budget, and such incentives will be further enhanced if financial incentives 
at the provider level to support this (e.g., via ownership pressure, bonuses).  So, for 
example, a fully integrated purchaser-provider, with staff on salaries with bonus 
incentives or as part-owners, competing against other similar organisations, might 
have incentives to minimise cost-shifting within the organisation.  Staff-model HMOs in 
the United States and budget-holding arrangements in New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom, for example, are based on this approach93.  
 
What is less clear is how individuals within organisations react if, for example, 
separate budgets and budget responsibility within an organisation are established.  
Even within an organisation which holds a budget across a wide range of services, as 
soon as a key incentive is to remain within a budget, cost-shifting may become both 
an internal and external management problem. 
 
However, even if integration did reduce cost-shifting within a DPO or organisation, 
there is potential for cost-shifting outside the DPO or organisation.  Furthermore, the 
integration of budgets is unlikely to occur at the higher levels of the system: i.e. 
between personal health, disability support and public health; between government 
votes; and between public and private financing. 
 
                                            
92  Originally, ACC health care was also to be integrated into the RHAs’ budgets, but this never 
occurred. 
 
93  There is some United Kingdom evidence on the potential of fund-holding to alter the pattern of 
service use across previous budget boundaries (personal communication, Nicholas Mays). 58 
B  Clarifying boundaries between budgets 
One way of reducing the potential for cost-shifting is to clarify boundaries between 
budgets.  This requires clear definitions of what is publicly financed vs privately 
financed; between personal health, public health and disability support; and between 
contractual responsibilities94. 
 
In a number of other countries, the boundary between what is publicly financed and 
what is privately financed is clearer than in New Zealand95.  But countries like New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and Spain do not clearly specify the services which are 
to be covered by their national health insurance systems.  They are not entitlement-
based systems but they do attempt to be comprehensive.  The general level of 
specification of contracts between purchasers and providers and between the 
government and its citizens, combined with a lack of guarantee for access and with 
budget caps, means that cost-shifting between budgets can occur easily.  Hence, an 
important way in which cost-shifting may be discouraged is to better define the 
boundaries associated with publicly financed health care.  Although this can partly be 
achieved by ensuring people or services are only covered by one set of arrangements 
(e.g., those over a certain income can go private if they wish), it also requires better 
boundaries between core coverage and supplementary insurance.  This is discussed 
in more depth in the section above on service specification (also see the discussion 
below on practice guidelines). 
 
Similar issues may arise if alternative risk pools are established.  For example, GP 
responsibility for care for an individual patient may be capped at a particular amount.  
Clearly, this is a fairly clear boundary, which can be audited96.  Risk pools established 
in other ways may not have such clear boundaries.  These may be based around 
particular diseases (e.g., renal care, AIDS)97; past use of services; or there may be 
completely separately funded providers who offer care in particular areas (e.g., to 
those living in low income areas).  All are problematic: the first and second offer 
                                            
94  Reducing cost-shifting between government votes would probably require complete budget 
integration, or allocation of responsibility for flow-on costs to each sector.  For example, if health 
fails to keep a person with a psychiatric problem out of trouble and the individual ends up in 
prison, the costs could be charged against the health budget. 
 
95  For example, in Germany and the Netherlands, those insured are covered fully by either the 
private or the public system.  They cannot straddle both insurance systems, except for 
supplementary coverage for amenities.  Only those below a certain income level must belong to 
the social insurance system; those above can choose the private system, but they then cannot 
return to the social insurance system.  In Canada, an individual could choose to stay outside the 
public system, but he or she would then be responsible for paying for all their own care.  Private 
insurance for services covered under the national health insurance system is prohibited.  In the 
United States Medicare system, the definition of coverage is such that the boundary between 
Medicare and Medigap insurance is clear: the latter covers things such as: co-payments for 
particular services; foreign care; care in the home; preventive care services such as cholesterol 
and diabetes screening and prescription drugs. 
96  This approach may require a definition of appropriate care however to ensure that the care 
offered is not frivolous nor outside a concept of core. 
 
97  As in the United States: renal care is funded through Medicare for all United States citizens. 
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incentives to diagnose more cases and to offer more services; the third requires a 
boundary to prevent plans or providers from neglecting certain areas in the knowledge 
that care will be made available by someone else. 
 
Cost-shifting in relation to user charges is also a potentially large problem in 
New  Zealand.  Pharmac may simply be shifting costs onto individuals with its 
reference price scheme, although if patients’ needs can still be adequately met with 
the remaining fully subsidised medicine or if drug companies cut their prices and 
become more efficient, Pharmac policies are indeed improving overall efficiency.  With 
a move to capitation payments for GP care for those with community services cards, 
general practitioners who feel they are earning insufficient revenue to cover costs 
have the ability to shift costs to those continuing to pay fee-for-service charges: these 
charges are limited only by competition, the effects of which are uncertain in 
New Zealand.  Furthermore, attempts to shift care out of hospitals and into GP offices 
may also increase cost-shifting to those paying user charges. 
 
Cost-shifting to those paying user charges might be reduced by: 
 
·  regulating all user charges by putting a zero or maximum amount that can be 
charged per visit or episode of care.  For example, in the United States, HMO 
legislation limits user fees for care and it is illegal for physicians and patients to 
contract privately for the provision of services already covered by Medicare.   
Physicians and hospitals must accept Medicare’s scheduled fees for these 
services.  This approach would have the additional advantage of maintaining 
affordability of care.  GPs in New Zealand have shown great reluctance for these 
charges to be eliminated or regulated, however, and the approach of eliminating 
user fees would in all likelihood result in higher expenditure for the government, at 
least in the short term98; and 
 
·  putting in place incentives not to charge user fees.  For example, in Australia, 
general practitioners are encouraged not to charge patients additional fees.   
Doctors can accept the 85% Medicare reimbursement of the schedule fee as full 
payment.  Alternatively, the doctor can charge the patient a fee: however, the 
amount above the government’s fee cannot be privately insured against 
(Donaldson and Gerard 1993). 
 
C  Developing practice and referral guidelines 
In many circumstances, it may be possible to develop practice or referral guidelines 
which set out the responsibilities of different providers in caring for patients with 
particular conditions.  This approach may not only reduce inappropriate cost shifting, 
but may also enhance quality of care and reduce under-servicing.  In developing the 
lead maternity carer approach in New Zealand, a set of protocols was attached to 
provider contracts setting out the circumstances under which patients were to be 
transferred to specialists.  Thus an attempt was being made to clarify the boundaries 
between providers.  To my knowledge, no research has been undertaken to determine 
the effects of these guidelines, but the approach appears to offer some promise.   
                                            
98  In the longer term, if good care is provided in the primary care sector, hospital admission rates 
may fall as a result of such a policy.  60 
Shared care plans developed between hospital services and GPs in caring for people 
with ongoing mental illness provide another example: if the plans are developed based 
on agreed parameters, and can be monitored, the opportunities for cost-shifting could 
be reduced.  The approach relies on good communication between providers as well 
as goodwill in following the guidelines through in practice, and in negotiating around 
any difficulties which occur.  Financial incentives might accompany such guidelines if 
necessary, and may be accompanied by an audit process to ensure they are being 
followed. 
 
D  Private ownership of purchasers and providers 
In New Zealand, many hospitals are currently owned and operated by the 
government.  Within the current environment, public hospitals have residual risk 
passed on to them: they argue they must treat most of those coming through their 
doors (especially urgent cases), but they do not get paid for service levels above 
those contracted for.  The government bears this financial risk, in the form of deficits.  
Potentially, this financial risk could increase if competing providers and DPOs are able 
to cost-shift to public hospitals. 
 
A similar situation may arise at purchaser level: where the government-owned HFA is 
in competition with privately-owned DPOs, and where particular care were left to the 
responsibility of the HFA or as a result of cream-skimming. 
 
Thus, if the approaches laid out above are not successful at preventing cost-shifting, 
the government may be tempted to argue for privatisation in order to shift residual risk 
to the private sector (at a price, of course).  Yet governments play a significant role in 
health care in all developed countries.  Even in the United States, nearly 50 per cent 
of health care is funded by government agencies.  Furthermore, governments play key 
roles in regulating health care: for example, by requiring hospitals to provide care to all 
urgent cases or regulating the growth of expenditure or premiums.  These key 
government roles suggest that even if all purchasers and providers are privately 
owned, governments may find it difficult not to become involved where purchasers or 
providers are in trouble. 
 
Conclusions 
Integration of budgets may reduce incentives to cost-shift within organisational 
budgets, and this may especially be an effective approach to managing cost-shifting 
where financial incentives also support cost containment within the overall 
organisational budget.  Yet there appears to be no available evidence to support this. 
 
In any case, cost-shifting outside of the organisational budgets will remain a problem.  
The key approaches to managing cost-shifting appear to be to design contract 
boundaries in ways which discourage cost-shifting.  Regulatory or contract 
approaches may well be the simplest approaches, whereby contract boundaries or 
referral guidelines could be used to monitor cost-shifting. 61 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The discussion in the previous chapters has focused on the key risks associated with 
general moves to devolve purchasing in New Zealand.  In this section, a summary 
table (Table 5.1) is provided of the key risks that might arise in each of the devolved 
purchasing arrangements which may develop in New Zealand.  Conclusions are then 
drawn about each of the risks discussed above, both in general and in the context of 
the information summarised in Table 5.1. 
 
5.1 Cream-skimming 
Moves to capitate primary care providers or place them at increased financial risk, 
along with moves to promote competition between primary care providers and DPOs, 
will provide incentives to cream-skim.  The likely extent of such cream-skimming is 
unknown, but if it does occur systematically it has the potential to increase overall 
expenditure, encourage pressure for additional expenditure, lead to inequities in 
access and quality of care, provide diminished incentives for technical efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness, and lead to differences in profitability for DPOs. 
 
Cream-skimming is not an issue in regional monopoly DPO models, and may not be a 
problem with carve-out purchasers, but it is likely to become an issue within the 
monopoly HFA model (as primary care providers are moved onto capitated or other 
risk contracts), and particularly with models which offer consumer choice between 
DPOs. 
 
Methods to control cream-skimming include encouraging larger risk pools; 
compensating for risk; limiting risk; defining service entitlements and regulating the 
purchaser or provider market.  This paper has focused particularly on defining 
entitlements and regulating the insurer or provider market. 62 
 
Table 5.1 
Summary of risks and management options 
by devolved purchasing arrangements 
 
  Cream-skimming Management 
Options 










·However, increased use 
of capitation to pay 
providers may see 
providers engaging in 
cream-skimming, – see 
risks below under Choice 





·See below, Choice 
of DPO – Individual 
model 
Crown risk 
·Higher overall expenditure and 
pressure for increased government-
funded health resources 
·Pressure to bail out purchasers or 
providers 
·Potential legal action 
 
Consumer risk 
·Poor access to care 
·Poor quality care 
·Higher taxation 
·Higher private expenditure 
·Poor access to care for those 
unable to afford private care 
·Lower health status than would 
otherwise be the case 
·Under-servicing of some consumers 
where costs greater than fee paid 
 
Health sector 
·Poor value for money 
·Excessive profits or losses where 
contracting is poor 
·Higher overall expenditure 
·Likely to generate ongoing policy 
disputes about monolithic purchaser 










·Monitoring of purchaser by Crown 
·Use of performance sanctions and 
rewards  
·Franchising 
·Competition between purchasers 
·Smart purchasing 
 
All raise performance measurement 
and information  issues 
 
Competition between purchasers raises 




·Greater expenditure in other votes 
(e.g., ACC, justice, DSW) 
·Greater expenditure for crown-owned 




·Greater private expenditure if access 
to publicly-funded services is  reduced 
(must go private)  
·Lower access to care if access to 
publicly-funded services is reduced 
(and cannot afford to go private) 
·Greater shunting of consumers 
between providers 
·Greater private expenditure in the form 
of  user charges 
 
 
Health sector risk 
·Higher overall expenditure as claims in 
the private sector increase with more 
care provided privately at possibly 
higher cost  
·Reduced equity of access as those 
who cannot obtain publicly-funded 
care are unable to afford private care 
·Reduced or improved cost-
effectiveness where the type of care 
provided is driven by budget 
constraints rather than need or cost-
effectiveness 
·Difficulties in planning and budgeting 
in areas where costs are commonly 
shifted to 
Inappropriate market signals which 
might arise as a result of cross-
subsidies (although such cross-
subsidies may also enhance equity of 
access). 
Crown risk 
·HFA directed to consider impact of 
purchasing on other votes and to 
report on such risks 
·HFA directed to specify contracts 
tightly and to monitor service delivery 
in order to prevent cost-shifting 
 
Consumer risk 
·Crown specify maximum user charges 
(politically difficult in relation to GPs) 
·Crown specify and monitor access to 
services (service specification issues - 
see text), including protocols for 
referral 
 
Health sector risk 
·Encourage integration of budgets 
across substitutable sets of services 
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consumer profile is likely 
to be riskier on average 
than the HFA profile 
 
·Carve-out purchasers 
may try to engage in 
cream-skimming of the 
most serious cases with 
a flat capitation rate – 
this would seem unlikely 
however if it is clear 
which patients are to be 
cared for by which carve-
outs 
 
Hence risks may include: 
Crown risk 
·Higher expenditure or 
reduced other services 
where most serious 
cases become 
responsibility of HFA 
 
Consumer risk 
·Must fall back on HFA – 
may lead to differences 
in care between those in 
HFA and those in carve-
out care 
·HFA clearly specify 
those covered by 
the carved-out 
contracts 
·Monitoring of risk 
profile of carve-out 
purchasers 
·Limit financial risk 
associated with 





sanctions (see text) 
·As above, but 
 
·Overall risk may be reduced if some 
purchasers perform well while 
others do not 
·Ability to make comparisons 
between carved-out purchasers in 
different parts of the country, subject 
to performance monitoring issues 
(see text) 
·Devolved purchaser performance 
becomes responsibility of HFA 
 
·Issues as above for Monopoly HFA 
 
·As above: in particular, carve-outs 
may try to shift costs elsewhere 
 














·Not applicable  ·As Monopoly HFA  ·Purchaser performance can be 
compared with other regional 
monopoly purchasers 
 
·Issues as above, Monopoly HFA 
·Integration may reduce cost-shifting; 
otherwise, as above, Monopoly HFA 
 
Consumer risk 
Purchasers  may refuse to care for the 
sickest consumers from another region 
- this is unlikely 
·Clear specification of 
purchaser responsibility 






·As below, Choice of 
DPO - Individual model 
·As below, Choice of 
DPO - Individual 
model 
·As Monopoly HFA, perhaps limited 
by consumer choice which may force 
improved performance 
·Purchaser performance can be 
compared with other regional 
monopoly purchasers 
 
·Issues as above, Monopoly HFA 
·Cost-shifting from ICOs to HFA may 
be a problem - see above, Monopoly 
HFA 
·As above, Monopoly 
HFA 64 






to compensate DPOs 
with riskier profiles 




·Some consumers left 
with limited or no choice 
of DPO and of coverage 
·Poor quality of care for 
some consumers as a 
means of cream-
skimming 
Poor quality of care for 
some consumers  
 
Health sector risks 







skim, reducing individual 
opportunities in the 
economy (e.g., if 
employers try to avoid 
those likely to make 
more claims) 
·HFA clearly specify 
those covered by 
the carved-out 
contracts 
·Monitoring of risk 
profile of carve-out 
purchasers 
·Limit financial risk 
associated with 









·Poor value for money 
·Higher overall expenditure 
·Pressure for increased government-
funded health resources 
·Pressure to bail out purchaser if it 
runs up deficits 
·Pressure to provide additional 
capital operational funding to crown-
owned providers which suffer 
financial losses in the event of a 
purchaser failure. 
·Legal action against government-
owned purchasers which fail to 
undertake contracting in fair ways or 
which bail out of contracts 
 
Consumer risk 
·Poor value for money 
·Poor access to care 
·Poor quality care 
·Higher private expenditure 
·Poor access to care for those 
unable to afford private care 
·Lower health status than would 
otherwise be the case 
·Under-servicing of some consumers 
where costs greater than fee paid 
·Agency may limit choice of DPOs 
·Consumers unable to make choices 
based on quality or price due to lack 
of information 




·Poor value for money 
·Higher levels of private provision 
·Greater inequity of access to care 
·Greater inequalities in accessing 
quality care 
·Excessive profits or losses where 
contracting is poor  
·Purchaser performance can be 
compared with other regional 
monopoly purchasers 
 
·Issues as above, Monopoly HFA 
·Integration may reduce cost-shifting; 
otherwise, as above, Monopoly HFA 
 





·As above, but agency 
cannot cream-skim. 




·As above, Choice of DPO - Agency 
model 
·Integration may reduce cost-shifting; 




As above, Monopoly HFA 65 
Defining service entitlements is a crucial step in removing an important mechanism for 
cream-skimming.  It also promotes accountability.  However, it has disadvantages in 
reducing choice (especially if there is one DPO only), it may reduce incentives for 
innovation and is likely to carry a significant cost in administration.  It is unclear how 
detailed service entitlements would be possible within a system which also aims to 
reduce increased spending pressures by capping budget.  However, without 
reasonably detailed service entitlements, consumers carry significant risk in relation to 
both cream-skimming and under-servicing (while providers make profits from the care 
not provided adequately, and pressure for additional spending builds). 
 
Additional regulation is also required to remove opportunities for cream-skimming and 
to promote universal coverage (e.g., rules which require organisations to accept all 
those who wish to join).  Such regulation again incurs administrative costs, but is 
essential for setting out ‘the rules of the game’. 
 
In New Zealand, David Plank has argued that standardising quality of care takes away 
an important goal of reforming health care: using competition to improve quality of care 
(Plank n.d.).  (The same may be said of standardising packages of care.)  If good 
information on quality of care is able to be collected and publicised, and plans are not 
successful at segmenting the market, competition may provide incentives for 
improving quality of care.  The difficulties in measuring quality of care, however, and 
the potential for quality to be interpreted in terms of facilities and access to new 
technologies raises alarm bells, however.  Any move towards competition is likely to 
require improved specification of standards of care and the setting of a minimum 
standard of care, at the very least to promote greater accountability and to try to 
minimise under-servicing.  Without these, government attempts to shift financial risk 
onto providers and DPOs may simply find that risk passed on to consumers in the form 
of reduced services or under-servicing. 
 
5.2  Poor purchaser performance 
Poor purchaser performance involves more ethereal risks: in a single, monopoly 
purchaser situation, risks are difficult to detect, and are more difficult to identify and 
quantify.  However, the risks potentially include higher levels of expenditure and lower 
level of access for the money spent, and excessive profits or losses being made by 
provider groups99. 
 
Poor purchaser performance may be a significant risk with one purchaser: this is 
however likely to be balanced by the potential clout and experience which one large 
purchaser can bring to New Zealand’s health care sector.  All other models run the 
risk of diluting this clout.  On the other hand, the other models may lead to reduced 
risks of poor purchaser performance if for some reason poor performance was 
systematic within the HFA. 
 
                                            
99  The first risk also has implications for privately financed health care – which in New Zealand has 
implications for overall efficiency and equity.  However, poor purchaser performance may not be 
reflected in these risks in practice given the large number and range of providers operating in 
New Zealand. 
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Managing these risks involves monitoring and benchmarking performance; using 
rewards and sanctions; promoting franchising and promoting competition between 
DPOs.  In all cases, information problems will bedevil attempts to promote good 
purchaser performance.  Monitoring performance on the basis of outputs, processes 
and perhaps inputs appears a more feasible approach at present than monitoring on 
the basis of outcomes: even then, however, there is likely to be a significant 
investment in information required to monitor performance because of requirements to 
adjust for health status. 
 
Empirical evidence internationally shows that rewards and sanctions can change 
behaviour in the health sector.  However, perhaps the real problem is in deciding what 
we are trying to achieve and what constitutes efficient behaviour which should be 
encouraged.  Furthermore, any set of rewards and sanctions is also likely to involve 
perverse incentives which must be monitored. 
 
Franchising may well offer improved incentives for performance, but its effectiveness 
in a market like New Zealand’s is unproven.  Information issues will again be important 
in determining which DPO managers are ‘best’ at promoting sector goals.  Until we are 
sure that there is a reasonable skill base on which to draw, franchising is unlikely to 
work in New Zealand. 
 
Competition between plans may further improve purchaser performance.  However, 
this approach is untested, and brings with it problems of cream-skimming and 
potentially significant increases in transaction costs.  A key issue in New Zealand is 
the extent to which competition is feasible.  The more comprehensive coverage is, the 
fewer the plans capable of managing risk; if providers are to be able to contract with 
only one DPO, there is extremely limited scope for competition. 
 
Finally, consideration needs to be given to approaches which maximise our chances 
of developing ‘smart’ purchasers, and to the trade-offs with other goals (such as local 
responsiveness) that this may entail.  Whatever happens, however, further 
development of purchasing skills is an important issue for New Zealand. 
 
5.3 Cost-shifting 
The key risks associated with cost-shifting are also potentially numerous.  They 
include: increased government expenditure on votes other than vote: health; 
increased expenditure for publicly-owned purchaser and provider organisations where 
costs and patients are shifted to publicly-owned purchasers and providers; increased 
private expenditure and resource use where purchasers make decisions which shift 
responsibility for financing onto private budgets; increased shunting of patients; higher 
overall expenditure, as claims in the private sector increase with more care provided 
privately at possibly higher cost; reduced equity of access as those who cannot obtain 
publicly-funded care are unable to afford private care; difficulties in planning and 
budgeting in areas where costs are commonly shifted to; and inappropriate market 
signals which might arise as a result of cross-subsidies100. 
 
                                            
100  Although such cross-subsidies may also enhance equity of access. 67 
Cost-shifting is likely to be a key issue in the current New Zealand environment.   
Without clarity about the services available to taxpayers and the services expected to 
be delivered by providers, it is extremely difficult to detect.  In devolved purchasing 
arrangements, incentives for cost-shifting may be reduced if organisations integrate: 
however, once incentives are designed – even within organisations – to remain within 
budget, cost-shifting may remain an issue.  Where devolved purchasing involves new 
boundaries (for example, service-specific carve-outs, partially integrated DPOs, or 
from moves to limit financial risk in order to restrain cream-skimming), new means of 
cost-shifting may be developed.  New Zealanders may well have particular concerns 
where governments continue to shift costs to individuals, where GP care which 
replaces hospital care results in more user charges, and where poorly performing local 
purchasers are unable to deliver care which results in increased private responsibility 
(e.g. for elective surgery). 
 
The model of devolved purchasing which involves integrated budgets and no 
boundaries between contracts (e.g., regional monopoly purchasers; fully integrated 
DPO models) may not suffer from as much cost-shifting as the present model (with so 
many fragmented providers), the carve-out model and any approach which divides 
responsibility up for different types of care (e.g., the partially integrated DPO model; 
models which limit risk).  There will be important trade-offs made between approaches 
which aim to limit risk in order to prevent cream-skimming and incentives for cost-
shifting. 
 
Whatever happens at the DPO or provider level, cost-shifting can also be an issue 
between publicly-financed and privately-financed care.  The present government’s 
intention is to clarify these boundaries in relation to hospital elective care, but as yet 
no moves appear to have been made to identify the extent of cost-shifting or to put in 
place policies to prevent cost-shifting via changes in the primary-secondary care 
interface. 
 
Beyond integration, the key approaches to managing cost-shifting are to clarify 
boundaries between budgets, or to develop practice and referral guidelines. 
Monitoring of these boundaries and guidelines will also be required. 
 
5.4  An optimal solution to managing these risks? 
There is no one set of optimal solutions to managing each of these risks.  Rather, 
there is a set of trade-offs between the management options.  For example, 
 
·  Management options for cream-skimming: Encouraging large risk pools reduces 
the potential number of competitors for benchmarking and purchaser competition 
but may strengthen purchasers by enabling them to develop expertise.  Limiting 
risk provides opportunities for cost-shifting.  Defining service entitlements also 
reduces opportunities for under-servicing. 
 
·  Management options for poor purchaser performance: Benchmarking performance 
may provide information to detect under-servicing leading to cream-skimming.  A 
desire to develop smart purchasing may however reduce opportunities for 
purchaser competition. 
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·  Management options for cost-shifting: Integrating budget responsibility may also 
lead to the encouragement of large risk pools and hence to reduced potential for 
benchmarking and purchaser competition.  Developing practice and referral 
guidelines should also assist in reducing opportunities for under-servicing and 
hence also for cream-skimming. 
 
A key question, however, for further consideration is whether or not to promote 
devolved purchasing rather than a relying on a single purchaser.  The disadvantages 
of devolved purchasing include the key risks identified here: in particular (where there 
is no competition between purchasers) the risks associated with poor purchaser 
performance.  Further analysis is also needed in relation to the respective system-
wide advantages and disadvantages of i) the present situation (a single purchaser), ii) 
devolved (non-competing) purchasing and iii) devolved purchasing and purchaser 
competition. 
 
The mechanisms for dealing with poor purchaser performance relating to developing 
better information systems do not change across these options: although the greater 
the number of purchasers, the harder it may be to have confidence in the statistical 
significance of performance analyses.  With purchaser competition, the more pressing 
issues are those related to cream-skimming.  In thinking about the advantages and 
disadvantages of purchaser competition, the analysis here suggests there will be high 
regulatory costs associated with purchaser competition and large potential effects in 
relation to equity of access.  This paper in particular has focused on the regulatory 
framework which may be required to ensure an efficient and equitable approach to 
both devolved purchasing and purchaser competition: this framework now must be 
considered in the context of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of further 
moves to devolved purchasing and purchaser competition. 69 
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APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Adverse selection  Where individuals choose a devolved purchasing 
organisations or provider on the basis of the services 
provided, and some plans or providers end up with a 
registered population with higher health needs than on 
average.  With a standard, unadjusted capitation 
formulae, such plans or providers will find it difficult to 
provide good care within the budget made available. 
 
Capitation  Where individual providers or organisations are paid 
an amount per person registered with them, for 
providing care over a period of time (a month, a year).  
A flat capitation rate is one where the amount paid per 
person is the same for each and every person 
registered (e.g., $200 per person per year). 
 
Cost-shifting  Where costs are charged against a budget which a) 




     (Risk-selection)  Where plans or providers actively engage in practices 
which lead to a registered population which has lower 
health needs on average, in order to reduce 
expenditures.  They may do this by encouraging 
healthy people to join, and discouraging those with 
poorer health from joining. 
 
Devolved purchasing  Any purchasing strategy or policy which allocates 
responsibility for purchasing groups of services (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals, secondary care services, community 
services) to non-government organisations other than 
the Health Funding Authority (HFA).  Organisations 
other than the HFA then become responsible for 
negotiating contracts with other providers and fund 
such services from budgets allocated to them. 78 
 
         
Efficiency101  Technical efficiency is obtained when effective services 
are provided at least resource cost, i.e. using the 
minimum amount of resources necessary. 
 
  Cost-effectiveness is obtained when resources are 
concentrated on effective services, provided at least 
cost, that offer the best payoff in terms of health. 
  
Enrolment  Where individuals enrol with a particular DPO or 
provider, whose role it is to organise the care of those 
who are enrolled. 
 
Equity   Providing fairer access to care and improving the 
health of the most disadvantaged. 
 
Health Funding Authority 
           (HFA)  The principal funder of health and disability support 
services in New Zealand.  The HFA is a crown agency, 
and receives its funding from the Government. 
   
Health Maintenance  
           Organisations (HMOs)  United States health organisations, which receive 
capitation funding from employers and individuals to 
insure and arrange the delivery of health care to 
individual members. 
 
Health Care Outcome  A change in the health of an individual or population 
attributable to a particular health service, e.g. reduction 




Health Outcome  A change in the broader health of an individual or 
population, e.g. increase in average life expectancy, 
reduction in vaccine-preventable disease, reduction in 
cancer rates. 
 
Independent Practitioner  
          Associations (IPAs)  Umbrella organisations representing groups of GPs 
who negotiate budgets and contracts with the HFA on 
behalf of those GPs. 
 
Integrated care  See managed care. 
 
                                            
101 See Culyer (1991) for further detail. 79 
Managed care  A term used to describe a range of practices and 
organisations, usually ‘any system of health service 
payment or delivery arrangement where the health 
DPO attempts to control or coordinate use of health 
services by its enrolled members in order to contain 
health expenditures, improve quality or both’ 
(Physician Payment Review Commission 1996 cited 
in Managed Health Care Improvement Task Force 
1998). 
 
Monopsony  Where a single purchasing authority is responsible for 
purchasing. 
 
Risk-rating  Where flat capitation rates are adjusted for 
differences in the health status of populations or 
individuals.  For example, payments for older people 
may be 1.5 times payments for all other people, as a 
result of having a higher ‘risk’ of needing health care. 
 
Risk-selection  See cream-skimming. 80 
 
APPENDIX B 
INTEGRATED CARE  
 
There are a range of definitions of integrated care, as well as a range of techniques 
which might be encompassed by integrated care organisations and a range of 
organisational forms of integrated care.  This section briefly considers the different 
techniques and organisational forms of managed care. Key techniques are set out in 
Table B.1; key organisational forms in Table B.2. 81 
Table B.1 
Techniques of Integrated Care 
 
Technique  Explanation of technique 
Financial incentives 
Organisational level 
Payment through pre-paid capitation (i.e., in 
advance, monthly or annually uniform fee per 




·  Designed to provide an incentive to avoid unnecessary use 
of services. 
·  Defined budget may make it easier to plan for an efficient 
use of services. 
Provider level 
Range of financial incentives to encourage cost-
effective use of resources 
 
·  capitation 
·  discounting with volume guarantees 
·  deny payments for services which don’t 
meet pre-specified appropriateness 
standards 




·  penalties 
 
·  withholds 
 
·  financial risk-sharing through ownership 
- individual risk 
 
- ancillary risk 
 
 






·  Incentive to economise on use of resources 
 
·  E.g., where no clinical benefit or where care could be 
provided in a lower cost setting 
·  Designed to influence referral behaviour. Commonly paid to 
primary care doctors who keep referral rates low, ideally by 
eliminating unnecessary referrals 
 
·  Applied to doctors with a high number of inappropriate 
referrals 
 
·  Percentage of doctor’s payment is retained against a 
potential deficit in the referral fund 
 
·  Calculated on the basis of each individual doctor’s 
performance 
 
·  Assumed when payment for outpatient tests drawn from 
funds which would otherwise be part of the doctor’s income 
 
·  Where a specialist opts to share in the organisation’s risk-
bonus structure 






















·  peer review 
·  These approaches form the crux of integrated care 
·  Attempt to reduce unnecessary care by scrutinising use of 
services, with a focus on individual cases 
 
·  Requires permission to seek treatment, usually for specified 
categories of care 
 
·  Dominant form in the USA 
·  Assessment of progress against care plans 
·  Typically used to monitor/limit hospital length of stay and to 
control use of ancillary services 
 
·  Audit of individual patient claims and charts 
·  Sometimes there is only feedback; other times financial 
penalties 
 
·  Sometimes required to confirm that specific treatment e.g. 
surgery is medically indicated and that alternative 
approaches are not available which would be more cost-
effective 
 
·  Used as part of the above approaches to ensure credibility 
with physicians 
·  Peer review panels make decisions about what constitutes 
effective and appropriate care 82 
 
Technique  Explanation of technique 
Medical or practice profiling  ·  ‘Statistical analysis and monitoring of data…to gain 
information about the appropriateness of care’ (Cave 1995) 
·  Reviews all a doctor’s cases over a specified period against 
a practice-based or standards-based norm 
·  Using such information, efforts are made to change 
clinicians’  behaviour 
·  Some organisations disseminate profiles to all their doctors, 
others to specific doctors whose behaviour requires 
modification 
·  Requires standardised data and case adjustment 
 
Disease management  ·  Involves the development of integrated packages of care 
across an entire spectrum of disease 
·  Applied particularly in the case of chronic illness 
·  Goal is to reduce the number of patients requiring serious or 
extended, costly, care 
·  Stages include: 
·  - assessment of  alternative interventions to identify and 
project relative resource costs 
·  - development of treatment guidelines and protocols 
·  - negotiation or risk-sharing and case management 
agreements between programme partners 
·  -engagement in strategies to modify clinical and patient 
behaviour, through educational interventions (cited in 
Robinson and Steiner 1998, pp. 22-23)) 
·  Requires information systems to identify people at risk, 
intervene with specific programmes and measure clinical 
and other outcomes 
Clinical guidelines  ·  Represent a consensus approach to the treatment of typical 
patients with a specific diagnosis 
·  May be developed by an integrated care organisation or by 
an outside agency 
·  Can be in the form of recommendations or detailed 
algorithms 
·  Frequently seen as a threat to clinical freedom and a 
‘bureaucrat’s tool which is unable to reflect the complexities 
of diseases and disabilities as experienced by individual 
patients’ (Robinson and Steiner 1998, p.23) 
·  Much attention devoted to clinician education in order to 
change behaviour 
Patient-focused techniques   
Gatekeeping  ·  Contrasts with direct access to specialists 
·  Shifted attention to primary care as an entry point to the 
health care system and often as the final point of treatment 
·  Generalist doctors – general practitioners, family doctors 
and internists – treat patients for as many services as 
possible and manage access to secondary and ancillary 
care 
Case management  ·  Resembles gate keeping as there is a single point of entry 
into the system, via a person who is responsible for co-
ordinating care 
·  However, case manager may not be a direct provider of 
care 
·  Begins with a formal assessment of social and medical 
needs 
Queuing and watchful waiting  ·  Techniques to slow the rate of resource use and to limit 
over-aggressive treatments (e.g., in case a condition is self-
limiting) 
Primary prevention  ·  Emphasis on primary prevention aims to promote better 
health and to prevent costly hospital admissions 
·  Benefits packages include comprehensive range of 
preventive services, e.g. cervical cancer smear tests, 83 
mammography, hypertension and cholesterol testing; 
immunisations; counseling for smoking, diet, stress and 
exercise 
Self-care  ·  Provision of educational materials and workshops for health 
promotion and first aid 
Source: summarised from Robinson and Steiner (1998). 84 
Table B.2 
Organisational Forms of Integrated Care102 
 
Organisational Form  Key characteristics 
Health Maintenance 
Organisation (HMO) 
·  A population defined by enrolment in the plan 
·  A contractual responsibility to deliver a defined range of services 
·  Prospective budget based on capitation payments to the plan 
·  HMO acts as a purchasing agent in negotiating terms of payments with doctors 
·  Restricted choice for patients between providers 
·  Financial risk shared with doctors 
·  Fixed annual or monthly payments to doctors 
·  Control over doctors’ practice and referral patterns 
Staff model HMO  ·  Full integration of insurance and service delivery 
·  HMO employs own doctors and pays them a salary – gives ability to employ 
doctors with particular practice styles 
·  May own hospitals or contract with them 
·  Usually doctors do not bear financial risk 
Pre-paid group practice 
HMO 
·  HMO has exclusive arrangement with one or more large capitated medical groups 
·  Insurance and service delivery separated but work closely together 
Network model HMO  ·  Insurance and service delivery separated 
·  Arms length relationship; does not contract exclusively with medical groups 
·  Each medical group treats only HMO enrollees 
Independent practice 
association (IPA) HMO  
·  One version:  
·  Insurer contracts directly with multiple solo or small-group practices 
·  Second version: 
·  Solo or small-group practices form a practice association which then contracts on 
a non-exclusive basis with an insurer. 
 
·  Degree of risk-sharing varies 
·  Degree of management control also varies 
Mixed model HMO  ·  Insurer makes different contractual arrangements with provider organisations and 
networks 
·  Arrangements may or may not be exclusive 
Preferred Provider 
Organisation (PPO) 
·  Insurance plans which offer lower premiums because they negotiated fee-for-
service discounts with particular doctors and hospitals in return for a guaranteed 
volume of work, within a utilisation-controlled environment 
·  Typically a third-party insurer; sometimes a large employer, government, broker 
or provider 
·  Usually doctors are solo or small group practice practitioners 
·  Enrollees continue to have choice of provider, but co-payments are usually higher 
for non-preferred providers 
Point of Service plan 
(POS) 
· Hybrid model, ranging from open-ended HMOs to PPOs with a gate-keeper 
function 
·  Essential feature is that when an enrollee needs service, this may be obtained 
from an out-of-network provider, in return for a substantial co-payment (e.g., use 
POS panel member, no co-payment; out-to-panel provider, 20 per cent co-
payment) 
·  Panel doctors usually paid on a capitation basis; out-of-panel doctors on a fee-for-
service basis 
Primary Care Case 
Management (PCCM) 
·  Medicaid managed care organisation 
·  Central feature is gate-keeping, i.e. referrals for services other than primary care 
·  All primary care provided by doctor of choice or where enrollee assigned to a 
specific doctor 
·  Aims to improve primary care, improve continuity of care, reduce unnecessary 
emergency room use 
                                            
102  Robinson and Steiner note that the HMO represents the ‘quintessential form of United States-
managed care’.  HMOs date back to the 1930s and 1940s, but their growth accelerated in the 
1970s and 1980s.  In recent years, it is the IPA form of HMO which has shown the most growth in 
HMO enrollees.  However, the choice of provider offered by PPOs has seen PPO arrangements 
encouraging the most rapid growth in enrollee numbers in the 1980s (Robinson and Steiner 
1998, pp. 9-12). 85 
·  Case managers strongly accountable 
·  Range of other characteristics 86 
 




·  Demonstration projects 
·  Involves ‘non-physician case co-ordinators’  
·  Combines social and health care, both acute and long term, into a single case-
managed delivery system 
·  Targeted at elderly Medicare beneficiaries (65 years or over) 
·  Aims for an integrated approach to older people’s health and social care to 
improve appropriateness of care and to reduce long-term care expenditure 
·  Co-ordinators assess needs and arrange for provision of services 
·  Salaried co-ordinators are subject to utilisation review but bear no financial risk 
·  Constrained by range of services included in SHMO package, but is 
comprehensive as includes: hospital, physician and home health services; chronic 
care benefits such as personal care, homemaker services; nursing home 
coverage; expanded benefits such as prescription drugs, eye glasses and dental 
care 
·  SHMO is able to limit the number of highly dependent new enrollees 
Programme of All-
Inclusive Care for the 
Elderly (PACE) 
·  PACE enrollees are all at risk of nursing-home placement 
·  Most are low income, 55 years or over 
·  Members are enrolled on a Medicaid capitation basis, with Medicare covered 
services billed on a fee-for-service basis 
·  Each site may negotiate Medicaid/Medicare capitation payments with providers 
·  Sites may develop benefit packages not allowed under existing programmes 
·  Full range of primary, acute and long-term services 
·  Multi-disciplinary case management and day case centres feature predominantly 
Vertically- integrated 
providers 
·  A new form of organisation 
·  Same group owns and manages services in primary, secondary, post-acute and 
sometimes long-term care sectors 
·  Such groups contract with insurers (usually fee-for-service) to offer services along 
full continuum of care 
·  Referrals generally made within the system 
·  Overall clinical practice is managed centrally 
·  Designed to promote delivery of care in the most cost-effective manner possible 
·  Use range of integrated care techniques, especially utilisation review 
Source: summarised from Robinson and Steiner (1998). 
 87 
APPENDIX C   
PURCHASER COMPETITION 
 
Purchaser competition – where DPOs compete with each other for members – is 
only rarely promoted without a significant regulatory framework around it to 
promote equity and efficiency.  Most commonly, purchaser competition is debated 
in the form of ‘managed competition’. 
 
The managed competition literature is largely focused on reform proposals for the 
United States, although other countries have adopted aspects of the model.  In the 
United States, the idea of encouraging competing pre-paid, capitated integrated 
networks of purchaser/providers was first put forward by Paul Ellwood in 1971 
(Ellwood, Anderson et al. 1971).  Among the first formal proposals were those 
suggested by Herman and Ann Somers in 1972 and 1973; their proposals 
included a top-down global budget and was entitled ‘regulated competition’.  The 
more well-known managed competition proposals were developed by Paul 
Ellwood and Alain Enthoven and a group known as the ‘Jackson Hole Group’.  
Members of the group have been meeting since the mid-1970s and have 
developed a comprehensive set of policy proposals for managed competition 
reform (Ellwood, Enthoven et al. 1992; Ellwood and Enthoven 1995).  Much of 
their work informed the Clinton plan (known formally as the President’s Health 
Security Plan), other United States Federal reform plans which were hotly debated 
in the early 1990s, and some United States health care reform at the State level. 
 
Managed competition 
‘Management’ (or regulation) of competition occurs in various ways in these 
proposals, but usually includes: 
 
·  the establishment of purchasing co-operatives.  Such co-operatives are 
designed to: allow the pooling of risk by taking on the responsibility for 
managing the market for health plans for individuals and people employed by 
small firms; achieve economies of scale; cut the administration burden for small 
firms by offering an informed purchaser who can act on behalf of small firms; 
offer choice of plans to consumers; and manage competition amongst plans.  
Their roles include: selecting health plans for consumers to choose between; 
providing information to consumers about, and monitoring the performance of, 
health plans; interpreting benefits contracts; and resolving complaints 
(Enthoven 1993); 
 
·  the encouragement of vertically integrated purchaser/providers (‘health plans’, 
i.e. DPOs), with providers employed by or contracted to health plans.  In some 
versions, each provider (especially primary care physicians) is only employed 
by or contracted to one health plan, in order that provider practice be influenced 
by only one plan103; 
                                            
103  Enthoven (1988) describes the following inefficiencies if an IPA model were used with each 
physician belonging to ten plans: ‘each doctor would have to deal with the utilisation controls and fee 88 
 
·  consumer choice of health plan, i.e. competition between health plans for 
consumers, which might also involve some form of consumer contribution 
towards premiums in order to encourage cost-conscious choice.  In most 
proposals, consumers would have the choice of switching plans only once every 
year; 
 
·  mechanisms to ensure that health plans take on all consumers who apply, to 
ensure that everyone is covered and that health plans don’t exclude consumers 
for e.g., pre-existing conditions (‘open enrolment’); 
 
·  standard packages of benefits.  Some versions would prohibit balance billing 
and supplementary insurance covering co-payments and additional services; 
 
·  financing arrangements in which individuals pay premiums which are 
community rated, i.e. which are the same within age-gender bands, or where 
variations in premiums are limited; 
 
·  pre-paid capitation payments to health plans in order to encourage efficiency in 
the use of resources; 
 
·  in some managed competition models, an expenditure cap would also be 
placed on total health expenditure.  There is however some controversy about 
how the cap would fit with managed competition proposals, which are designed 
in part to help determine an appropriate level of health expenditure.  However, 
some commentators believe that without an expenditure cap, limits on 
expenditure growth will not be guaranteed by managed competition alone; and 
 
·  strong relationships between plans and providers of health services.  In some 
cases, purchasers and providers may be integrated into the same organisation; 
in other cases, contractual arrangements link purchasers and providers.  These 
relationships are often assumed to include arrangements which share risk with 
providers (see Appendix B, Table B1.2 for examples of the organisational forms 
of integrated care organisations). 
 
(See for example Enthoven 1988; Enthoven 1988; Enthoven and Kronick 1989; 
Pauly, Danzon et al. 1991; Pauly, Danzon et al. 1992; Congressional Budget 
Office 1993; Enthoven 1993; Enthoven 1994; Ellwood and Enthoven 1995; 
Enthoven and Singer 1995; White 1995). 
 
These arrangements imply the development of health plans and the provision of 
information to consumers to help them choose between health plans.  Usually, 
they are also structured to ensure that all people are covered: hence the 
requirements for open enrolment. 
                                                                                                                                                
schedules of ten health plans, none of which would command his [sic] loyalty.  If one health plan 
persuaded a doctor to adopt a more efficient health practice, the benefits would be likely to be 
spread immediately over all ten plans, reducing the incentive of any plan to make the effort to pursue 
innovation at the provider level’. 89 
 
Premium payments under managed competition 
In addition, proposals usually note that in a competitive market with profit-
maximising insurers, consumers will be charged premiums based on individual 
and family risk.  Many proposals break the link between financing and payment to 
health plans at this point: either by collecting premiums via taxes or social 
insurance schemes and allocating them to plans via a separate process; or by 
requiring community rating of premiums (i.e. not based on risk).  These 
arrangements are designed to promote equity by improving affordability, but they 
have their own risks: chiefly the encouragement of cream-skimming.  If capitation 
payments to health plans are not adjusted for the risk associated with individual 
consumers, then plans have an incentive to exclude higher risk consumers from 
joining up (an ex ante approach); and incentives to actively encourage consumers 
found to be high risk to disenrol (an ex post approach). 
 
The policy response to these problems varies in proposals for managed 
competition, in large part relating to the relative weight that analysts place on 
market versus regulatory responses. 
 
Benefits of managed competition 
The perceived (theoretical) benefits from managed competition are usually stated 
in contrast to the existing United States health care arrangements.  Benefits for the 
United States are universal coverage, and enhanced incentives for promoting 
efficiency arising from the integrated nature of the health plans; the prospective 
payment system which would replace fee-for-service medicine; competition 
between plans; and the expenditure cap.  In the United States context, the reforms 
may lead to less choice (or provider), more limited access to providers, fewer 
services and slower access to new technologies, greater involvement of plans in 
provider practice and lower provider incomes (Congressional Budget Office 1993). 
 
There are, however, some uncertainties about the extent to which competition 
between competing health plans will promote innovation, improved efficiency and 
improved services and choice for consumers.  This will depend on the way in 
which the plans choose to compete and to contract with providers and the extent 
to which competition can develop for different population groups, including high 
risk groups and those in geographically isolated communities (Congressional 
Budget Office 1993; Plank n.d).  Furthermore, a key driver of improvements in 
care will be the choices that consumers make in relation to plans.  A lack of 
experience in choosing between plans and a lack of good information on plan 
performance may limit any potential benefits of competition.  90 
APPENDIX D   
PURCHASER COMPETITION IN NEW ZEALAND  
 
Characteristics of the existing New Zealand health care system 
The implications of devolved purchasing and purchaser competition must be 
considered in relation to the context in which such changes takes place.   
New  Zealand’s health care sector has some unique features which must be 
carefully considered in analysing the risks and benefits of such moves.  These 
features include: 
 
·  largely government financing of health and disability care, with an increasing 
proportion of expenditure financed privately.  For the purposes of this paper it is 
assumed that health care in New Zealand will continue to be financed via a 
mildly progressive tax system and that government spending will remain at 
around 75 per cent of total health care spending.  Thus, the issue of ensuring 
that all New Zealanders have access to health care becomes one of ensuring 
that all New Zealanders are registered with an DPO, that there is an DPO on 
which they can fall back or which is charged for unregistered consumers who 
need care104; 
 
·  historically, a health care system which is government financed and organised 
with the aim of maximising the welfare of society.  Consumer choice is largely 
limited to choice of primary care provider; whether to purchase private 
insurance; and whether to pay privately for care not covered by the publicly 
funded system (e.g., osteopathy, acupuncture, chiropractic).  Where moves are 
made to devolve purchasing responsibility which requires registration with only 
one primary care provider, this will involve New Zealanders in a new way of 
thinking about health care.  Similarly, in thinking about purchasing competition, 
New Zealanders are not used to an insurance-based model which offers 
choices in coverage or purchasing agent, while providers are only just 
becoming used to a contracting model; 
 
·  a small, geographically dispersed population.  This may offer limited 
opportunities for competition between DPOs.  There are likely to be trade-offs 
between the need for large plans to manage risk where there is comprehensive 
coverage (i.e., including secondary and tertiary care, long-term care), and a 
desire for competition, a range of DPOs to suit culturally diverse populations, 
                                            
104  It is possible for the system to move to a social insurance model, with premium payments rather than 
taxes.  These can be set at a set percentage of income or can be adjusted for risk (as is done with 
ACC).  It is also possible to remove the government from the financing role, with DPOs collecting 
premiums themselves.  These options would change the nature of financing of health care.  Key 
disadvantages would include issues of affordability the more premiums are determined based on 
risk, and rising transaction costs from each DPO having to collect its own premiums.  See (Upton 
1991) for a discussion on financing issues. 
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and networks in which individual practitioner decisions have more than just 
small consequences (Haas-Wlison and Gaynor 1998)105; 
 
·  a large number of providers, particularly in primary and community health and 
disability care.  These arrangements are often argued to result in duplication, 
gaps and a lack of continuity of care.  The implications of this for New Zealand 
are a) there are likely to be high transaction costs in encouraging DPOs to 
contract for a comprehensive set of services (for example, without further 
integration in management or ownership, DPOs (just like the RHAs and HFA) 
would have to contract with numerous providers; considerable amalgamation of 
largely independent providers is required to move to comprehensive DPOs if 
complex and costly contracting arrangements are to be avoided; and b) 
continued separation of providers offers opportunities for cost-shifting; 
 
·  a lack of horizontal integration of providers; an ability for some providers to 
charge patients unlimited fees in the form of user charges; and an availability of 
supplementary insurance coverage.  Each ‘boundary’ offers excellent 
opportunities for cost-shifting; 
 
·  a small number of secondary care providers, largely government-owned; there 
are very few tertiary providers (e.g., for organ transplants); and in some rural 
areas there may also only be few providers (e.g., GPs).  This also raises issues 
about the likely extent of competition, and suggests there may be high 
transaction costs where competing DPOs contract for comprehensive care 
(e.g., the more specialised hospitals will have to have contracts with a number 
of DPOs); 
 
·  significant user charges for some groups in the population for primary care.  
This raises issues relating to affordability of primary care, and may act to 
prevent improvements in cost-effectiveness because patients will resist 
attempts for more care to be delivered in primary care settings.  This boundary 
also provides opportunities for cost-shifting; 
 
·  good cost control over government-financed secondary and tertiary care; 
demand-driven primary care which leads to uncontrolled primary care 
expenditure106; 
 
·  beyond licensing requirements, a limited government regulatory framework for 
health care.  The lack of regulation in New Zealand health care may make it 
more difficult to introduce new regulations where they are seen as appropriate; 
                                            
105  Luft notes that since market reforms have been introduced in California, health maintenance 
organisations have been consolidating, such that in 1996 four large plans accounted for 66% of total 
enrolment (Luft 1996).  Haas Wilson and Gaynor note that it is predicted that within the next 5-10 
years there will be only three to seven health care networks in California (Haas-Wlison and Gaynor 
1998). 
106  The HFA is currently consulting on plans to shift GPs from fee-for-service to capitated contracts.  
Pharmac is also presently using market mechanisms to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure.  Both 
improve the government’s ability to contain its health care expenditure. 92 
 
·  poor information systems and a lack of integration between systems.  Although 
secondary care providers are used to providing detailed information on outputs, 
primary care providers appear to be somewhat reluctant to share such 
information; 
 
·  the inclusion of disability support services (DSS) in the New Zealand health 
care system.  This may have implications for risk pooling and the spreading of 
risk; and 
 
·  government ownership of key hospitals, with private ownership in primary care 
and disability support.  This distinction may offer opportunities for cost-shifting, 
while a public distaste for further private involvement in health care is likely to 
make further moves to integrate care politically unpopular. 
 
 
Implications for purchaser competition 
The studies reported in the main body of the paper suggest that the effects of 
competition between health care providers is heavily dependent on the market 
structure – the relative position of insurers, physicians and hospitals -, and 
approaches to contracting.  Given the right circumstances however – including a 
large number of competing hospitals, a good supply of physicians and selective 
contracting – competition can lead to reduced prices.  There is however limited 
evidence on the effects on quality of care, while the United States evidence is very 
likely to reflect a massive oversupply of beds, built up in earlier times when costs 
were simply reimbursed.  In relation to purchaser incentives, it appears that HMO 
competition has altered the approaches used by traditional insurers; however, the 
implications of competition between HMOs compared to no competition remain 
unclear, as do the implications of the combination of competing HMOs and a 
number of competing hospitals compared, for example, to a situation of bilateral 
monopoly. 
 
A key question for consideration in New Zealand is: how much competition 
between providers and purchasers might develop in New Zealand?  
 
Competition in New Zealand health care 
There are a number of characteristics that markets must fulfil to be called 
‘competitive’: freedom of entry and exit, perfect information about prices and 
quality; and a large number of firms and consumers.  Whether or not a market is 
‘competitive’ contrasts to whether or not a market is ‘contestable’, that is whether 
or not there are significant barriers to entry that prevent new providers entering the 
market. 
Provider competition 
New Zealand is a small country with a geographically dispersed population.  Thus, 
there is likely to be little competition for the most technologically advanced hospital 93 
services; in fact, the Tertiary Services Review has suggested that positive and 
strong relationships between outputs and outcomes warrant fewer hospitals 
providing such care (Ministry of Health 1995).  Thus, for liver transplants, for 
example, only one provider (Auckland Health Care) exists in New Zealand. 
 
The National Interim Provider Board considered in 1992 that competition in 24-
hour acute hospital care was limited, and may well stay that way given the need 
for ‘continuous provision of staffing, spare beds and equipment capacity to cope, 
at zero notice, with unpredictable needs’ (National Interim Provider Board 1992, p. 
56).  This situation remains so today. 
 
It would appear that the potential for competition for medical and surgical services 
is greater now than at the beginning of the 1990s.  Medium-sized private hospitals 
offering a range medical and surgical services appear to be available in: 
Whangarei; Auckland (Epsom, Glenfield); Hamilton; Tauranga; Rotorua; 
Matamata; New Plymouth; Napier; Palmerston North; Wanganui; Wellington 
(Newtown; Lower Hutt, Crofton Downs); Masterton; Blenheim; Christchurch; 
Dunedin; Invercargill107.  The level of service offered at each of these hospitals 
requires further research, however.  In addition, the Calan Group is currently 
building a state-of-the-art hospital in Ellerslie, in Auckland. 
 
In their 1997 paper, Ashton and Press examined the degree of market 
concentration in selected secondary care services: tonsillectomies or 
adenoidectomies; prostatectomies; hip replacements; knee replacements; cataract 
removal; angioplasties; and coronary artery bypass grafts.  They considered the 
geographic area from which each provider draws its patients and the extent of 
market concentration within those areas using the Hirschman-Herfindahl index.   
They found the seven markets to be reasonably concentrated, although none 
consisted of a monopoly provider, but noted that these results confirmed ‘the 
expectation that patient flows generally reflect residential patterns’ (Ashton and 
Press 1997, p.54). 
 
Ashton and Press concluded that potential efficiency gains from competition might 
be expected to be less under this concentrated market structure than under a 
more competitive structure.  They noted however the ability of the then four RHAs 
to wield monopsony power, which might constrain providers to some extent.  In a 
market with competition at the purchaser level as well however this ability would 
be weakened and we might expect more concentrated markets to have higher 
prices than less concentrated markets. 
 
                                            
107  Private hospitals offering medical and surgical care, listed in Ministry of Health (1998).  In addition, 
there are specialist clinics in Auckland for eye surgery, endoscopy; and special day surgery clinics at 
the North Shore, Whangarei, Tauranga, Rotorua, Hastings and Christchurch.  Southern Cross owns 
hospitals in Auckland (3), Hamilton, Tauranga, Rotorua, Napier, New Plymouth, Wanganui, 
Palmerston North, Wellington, Christchurch and Invercargill (Southern Cross Healthcare 1994).  The 
Ministry of Health report does not provide detail on the services provided beyond ‘surgical, medical’.  
It is not clear for example if some of these providers offer largely cosmetic surgery. 94 
As noted by Ashton and Press, increased participation of the private sector in 
health care markets in New Zealand could reduce concentration.  In making 
purchasing decisions, the RHAs were able to engage in competitive tendering for 
some secondary care services.  However, their experiences with such competition 
were mixed.  For example, prices sometimes rose as a result of competitive 
tendering, because CHE deficits continue to be subsidised by the government and 
CHEs sometimes sought to fully cost their services and add a further margin of 
around 5-10 per cent when tendering for additional contracts (Lovatt 1996).   
Private sector prices were often been uncompetitive (Wilson 1995; Ministry of 
Health undated).  There were also concerns over potential discontinuities in 
service delivery (Foster 1994; Lovatt 1996; Ministry of Health undated), difficulties 
in specifying the services RHAs wish to buy with sufficient precision (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 1996), and difficulties in defining the 
boundaries between contracts (Lovatt 1996). 
 
Secondary care markets might be argued to be likely to become more competitive 
only in the main centres.  The entrance of the Calan group into the Auckland 
market certainly suggests that barriers to entry may not be as great as might have 
been expected.  Yet the question remains as to the overall effect of such 
competition on prices in the sector.  Duplication of expensive equipment and 
falling average numbers of patients treated with such equipment can lead to rising 
prices per patient treated, and in the extreme cases, to falling quality as the 
expertise and experience is reduced in each centre as numbers treated fall. 
 
An additional factor is the extent to which more cost-effective ways of treating 
patients can develop as a result of competition between, for example, hospitals, 
GPs and other providers.  International trends here include the shift from inpatient 
to day-patient and out-patient care; the movement of elderly people into nursing 
homes; the movement of people with ongoing mental health needs into 
communities in many countries; using generalists rather than specialists to provide 
care for people with serious mental illnesses; and the increasing ability of 
professionals to undertake surgical operations in smaller clinics.  There is limited 
evidence that each of these trends is cost-effective, with much work to be done to 
evaluate such changes fully108.  Reinhardt for example argues that much of the 
perceived improvement in cost-effectiveness in the United States comes from not 
fully considering the differences between marginal and average costs and that 
‘many transfers to alternative sties often would not make sense at all if the were 
evaluated on the basis of truly incremental costs’ (Reinhardt 1997, p. 38, 
emphasis in original).  This suggests that hospitals will continue to bear the 
overhead costs, and will either try to recover them via higher prices, including 
across other services, or will incur ever increasing deficits until they are able to 
reduce the overhead costs themselves.  This analysis is, however, only applicable 
in the short-run.  In the longer term, as hospitals are able to close wards 
completely and quit buildings, it may well be more efficient to have care delivered 
in the community.  This may take a number of years to achieve. 
                                            
108  Some of these changes, for example the move in the United States to outpatient care rather than 
inpatient care, are the result of changes in payment methods and cost shifting to uncapped budgets. 95 
 
Perhaps a key issue in New Zealand is the supply of specialists. Work is currently 
underway to reduce barriers to the supply of specialists in New Zealand; this work 
will be crucial to expanding choice and competition.  However, it is not clear to me 
that we will ever be in a position of over-supply of specialists.  In the presence of 
selective contracting – either from primary care providers or purchasers – 
competition between specialists may well improve quality of care.  Whether or not 
it will reduce costs in the publicly funded health care sector may depend on 
changes in the salary levels of specialists.  Currently specialists earn much higher 
rates of income in the privately-funded sector than they do in the publicly-funded 
sector: any moves to a situation where they must work in one or other sectors will 
probably lead to higher costs in the publicly-funded sector109. 
 
New Zealand’s primary and community care markets110 may be much more 
competitive than our secondary care markets111.  For example, in most urban 
centres there is a choice of GP for diagnostic and primary treatment care.  There 
are a number of pharmacists and laboratories in most larger centres.  Women 
have a choice between midwives and GPs in many centres, although there is 
speculation that the choices are reducing in some parts of the country.  There is 
increasing interest in up-skilling GPs to provide care for patients previously cared 
for in hospitals: the move to a certificate for GPs for mental health is an example. 
 
However, many rural towns have little or no choice when it comes to even GP 
care.  GPs in such towns are increasingly being asked to up-skill in order to 
stabilise patients before patients are transported to the larger centres; but a 
number of rural towns arguably have tremendous difficulty in recruiting and 
retaining GPs.  Moves to allowing nurses to prescribe some medicines, for 
example, may improve access for some people to care, but with limits to be placed 
on prescribing, service gaps in some towns are likely to remain.  Telemedicine 
may improve access to some specialist care in the future, but the effects are still 
uncertain. 
 
                                            
109  Unless the supply of specialists increases dramatically. 
 
110  Care which is delivered in a community setting as opposed to a hospital. 
 
111  In some areas, however, there are workforce training issues to be considered before we can be 
confident that good quality services are delivered in the community.  Community mental health and 
Mâori providers are good examples. 96 
APPENDIX E 
  STANDARDISATION OF BENEFIT PACKAGES 
 
Additional reasons for standardising benefit packages include: 
 
·  to facilitate value-for-money comparisons and to focus comparison on price 
and quality (Enthoven 1993); 
 
·  to combat market segmentation – the division of the market into groups of 
subscribers who make choices based on what each plan covers (such as 
mental health or vision care) rather than on price (Enthoven 1993) – such 
segmentation would minimise those who change plans because of price; 
 
·  to reassure people that it is financially safe to switch plans for a lower price 
with the knowledge that the lower-priced plans did not realize savings by 
creating hidden gaps in coverage (Enthoven 1993); 
 
·  to remove the potential for biased risk selection to reduce the demand elasticity 
for health plans that enrol a favorable mix of risks (Enthoven 1993); 
 
·  to ensure all individuals have adequate and comprehensive coverage, to 
reduce free-riding by those who may feel they will get care even if they have 
not purchased insurance and to reduce the risks of people delaying care when 
they need it (Pauly, Danzon et al. 1992); 
 
·  to encourage the use of care that individuals would not choose on their own but 
that will benefit others with altruistic concerns (Pauly, Danzon et al. 1992); 
 
·  to facilitate movement between health care plans – a move to an alternative 
plan will not lead to dramatic changes in coverage; and 
 
·  to help contain health care costs by carefully considering the services to be 
covered (Ellwood, Enthoven et al. 1992). 97 
APPENDIX F 
SERVICE SPECIFICATION IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
The Netherlands health care system – a mix of a social insurance and private 
insurance – makes a distinction between normal medical expenses and 
exceptional expenses associated with long-term care or high-cost treatment.  The 
latter is governed by a compulsory national insurance scheme (the Exceptional 
Medical Expenses Act), which covers all those living in the Netherlands.  The 
former involves a variety of arrangements governed by the Health Insurance Act.  
Up to age 65, all those earning below a certain income (in 1995, around 
$NZ60,000) and those on social security benefits are compulsorily insured; those 
over 65 are also compulsorily insured provided they earn less than around 
$NZ31,000 (in 1995). 
 
In 1995, around 63% of the population is covered by the Health Insurance Act; 
schemes for civil servants cover around 5% of the population.  Around 32% of the 
population has private health insurance.  All schemes include occupational injury 
and disease. 
 
Source: (Ministry of Health 1995) (including an update as at 1 January 1996). 98 
Exceptional Medical Expenses Act – Entitlement to care 
·  Admission and stay in hospital (nursing care in other than psychiatric hospitals 
and wards, in the lowest class of accommodation, after the first 365 days; 
similarly, admissions to an ‘ordinary’ hospital from a psychiatric hospital or ward 
or teaching hospital or sanatorium for TB patients.  Also covers medical and 
obstetric examinations and treatment by a specialist; may include 
transplantation and organs and tissues.  ‘Admission is authorised wherever in-
patient treatment and care are reasonably indicated by the patient’s medical 
condition’. 
 
·  Nursing-home care and care in a home for the physically disabled (including 
accommodation, nursing care including 24 hour care, medical treatment under 
the supervision of a nursing home doctor, associated rehabilitation, 
physiotherapy, occupational therapy.  ‘Admission requires an authorisation from 
the insurer and must be accompanied by a statement of grounds from the 
attending physician’. 
 
·  Care of the disabled in Het Dorp in Arnhem (a special village for the disabled in 
Arnhem). 
 
·  Placement in a hostel for the physically disabled. 
 
·  Placement in a day centre for the physically disabled. 
 
·  Day care in a nursing home. 
 
·  Services of a home nursing organisation. 
 
·  Rehabilitation (over a year). 
 
·  Admission and stay in a psychiatric hospital or the psychiatric ward of a general 
or teaching hospital (tests, treatment including observation and counseling, 
associated and other care in a therapeutic environment. 
 
·  Services provided by a Regional Institute for Out-patient mental health care. 
 
·  Services provided by a regional organisation for sheltered accommodation. 
 
·  Non-clinical psychiatric care (a maximum of 90 sessions of individual 
psychotherapy lasting up to 45 minutes each). 
 
·  Psychiatric out-patient services (for up to two hours a day). 
 
·  Part-time psychiatric treatment (day or night centre for up to at least four 
consecutive hours). 
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·  Care of the blind and partially sighted (tests, treatment, counseling and full-time 
or out-patient admission to an institution with the aim of fostering and sustaining 
self-reliance). 
 
·  Care of the deaf and partially hearing. (In an establishment). 
 
·  Care of the mentally handicapped. 
 
·  Placement in a day centre for the mentally handicapped. 
 
·  Admission and stay in a hostel for the mentally handicapped. 
 
·  Testing for the hepatitis B virus in pregnant women. 
 
·  Testing for congenital metabolic disorders (PKU). 
 
·  Vaccinations (diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, polio, mumps, rubella, HiB, 
measles.) 100 
Health Insurance Act – Treatments and services 
(Generally free at point of use, with some charges for dental treatment, maternity 
care at home or in hospital, transport other than by ambulance.) 
 
·  Services of a genetic testing centre (including tests for hereditary defects, 
genetic counseling). 
 
·  Pharmaceutical services (medicines, serums, vaccines, blood and blood 
products, special dietary products and dressings). 
 
·  Aids and appliances (medical aids such as prostheses, spectacles etc). 
 
·  Rehabilitation (up to a year.) 
 
·  Medical and surgical treatment (by general practitioners, specialists, 
physiotherapy (including Mensendieck and Cesar physiotherapy, limited to a 
maximum of 9 treatments per complaint per calendar year with the exception of 
certain chronic conditions) and speech therapy). 
 
·  Obstetric care (normally provided by a midwife, may be provided by a general 
practitioner or specialist, if necessary in a clinic or hospital, when no midwife is 
available, or when medically indicated). 
 
·  Dental care (Since 1 January 1995, limited to children, preventive care for 
adults, plus specialist surgical treatment and in certain cases, the fitting of 
dental implants and related X-rays). 
 
·  Admission to and stay in a hospital (other than psychiatric hospital or ward). 
(Includes all medical, surgical and obstetric treatment required by the patient.  
Must be authorised by the health insurance fund with which the patient is 
registered, and is given wherever in-patient care is reasonably indicated by the 
individual’s medical condition or where there is no choice but to remain in 
hospital (e.g., pending admission to a nursing home).  Covered for up to 365 
days, thereafter under the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act.  Also includes 
certain types of tissue and organ transplantation, and reimbursement of the 
costs of obtaining suitable transplant material.) 
 
·  Transport. 
 
·  Maternity care. (Post-natal care and help given to mother and baby.  For as 
long as the maternity centre considers necessary for up to a maximum of ten 
days.) 
 
·  Haemodialysis. 
 
·  Services for patients with chronic recurring respiratory problems. 
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·  Services of a thrombosis prevention unit. 
 
·  Care of the deaf and partially hearing. (Except when in an establishment.) 
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APPENDIX G 
SERVICE SPECIFICATION IN UNITED STATES  
FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA HMO LEGISLATION 
 
Federal HMO legislation 
Health Maintenance Organisations in the United States are governed by both 
federal and state legislation.  Federal legislation requires HMOs to provide ‘without 
limitation as to time or cost other than those prescribed by or under this 
subchapter, basic and supplemental services to its members’ (Section 330e (b)). 
 
  Basic health services means: 
 
·  physician services (including consultant and referral services by a physician); 
 
·  inpatient and outpatient hospital services; 
 
·  medically necessary emergency hospital services; 
 
·  short-term (not to exceed twenty visits), outpatient evaluative and crisis 
intervention mental health services; 
 
·  medical treatment and referral services (including referral services to 
appropriate ancillary services) for the abuse of or addiction to alcohol and 
drugs; 
 
·  diagnostic laboratory and diagnostic and therapeutic radiologic services; 
 
·  home health services; and 
 
·  preventive health services (including (i) immunizations, (ii) well-child care from 
birth, (iii) periodic health evaluations for adults, (iv) voluntary family planning 
services, (v) infertility services, and (vi) children’s eye and ear examinations 
conducted to determine the need for vision and hearing correction). 
 
‘Such term does not include a health service which the Secretary, upon application 
of a health maintenance organization, determines is unusual and infrequently 
provided and not necessary for the protection of individual health.  The Secretary 
shall publish in the Federal Register each determination made by him under the 
preceding sentence.’ 
 
(Section 300e-1.Definitions (1).) 
 
Supplemental health services means: ‘any health service which is not included as 
a basic health service’ (Section 300e-1. Definitions (2).) 
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California HMO legislation 
California’s Health and Safety Code, Chapter 2.2 deals with health care service 
plans.  (Known as the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975.) A 
health care service plan is ‘any person who undertakes to arrange for the provision 
of health care services to subscribers or enrollees, or to pay for or reimburse any 
part of the cost for such services, in return for a prepaid or periodic charge paid by 
or on behalf of such subscribers or enrollees’. (Section 1345. Definitions (f).) 
 
Basic health services means: 
 
·  physician services, including consultation and referral; 
 
·  hospital inpatient services and ambulatory care services; 
 
·  diagnostic laboratory and diagnostic and therapeutic radiologic services; 
 
·  home health services; 
 
·  preventive health services; and 
 
·  emergency health care services, including ambulance services and out-of-area 
coverage. 
 
(Section 1345. Definitions (b).) 
 
Each plan must provide to subscribers and enrollees all of the basic health care 
services (although some plans may be exempt).  In addition, a series of additional 
services are also specified.  For example, Section 1367.2. relating to Alcoholism, 
chemical dependency or nicotine use states: 
 
‘On or after January 1, 1990, every health care service plan that covers hospital, 
medical, or surgical expenses on a group basis shall offer coverage for the 
treatment of alcoholism under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon 
between the group subscriber and the health care service plan’. 
 
Similar statements apply for: 
 
·  comprehensive preventive care of children; 
 
·  insurance coverage for those who are blind or partially blind; 
 
·  diabetic daycare self-management education programs; 
 
·  mastectomy coverage – including prosthetic devices or reconstructive surgery; 
 
·  mammography (if the policy covers mastectomy and reconstructive surgery); 
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·  prenatal diagnosis of genetic disorders of the fetus (if the policy covers 
maternity services); 
 
·  insurance coverage for those who have physical or mental illnesses; 
·  diethylstilbestrol; and 
 
·  direct reimbursement of medical transport providers. 
 
Note that Section 1373. (h) (1) allows plans to exclude professional mental health 
services, but if they are covered coverage should include care offered by a 
psychiatric health facility and that reasonable efforts should be made to offer 
members the services of licensed psychologists, but failure to do so shall not 
constitute a misdemeanor (Section 1373. (h) (5)). 
 
Section 1374.4. Maternity benefits also notes that no plan providing maternity 
benefits can contain exclusions, reduction or other limitations to coverage, 
deductible or coinsurance for involuntary complications of pregnancy, unless such 
provisions apply generally to all benefits paid under the plan. 
 
Sections 1373.14, 1374.7, 1374.10 also have provisions for coverage including 
long-term care facility services or home-based care, to not exclude those with 
significant destruction of brain tissue (including Alzheimer’s disease) and those 
with genetic disability traits. (Note: other similar requirements apply to plans other 
than HMOs.) 
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 APPENDIX H 
SERVICE SPECIFICATION IN UNITED STATES 
FEDERAL MEDIGAP LEGISLATION 
 
Medicare Supplement Contracts (California Health and Safety Code, S 
1358.18, pp. 126-129) 
 
(All contracts relate to Medicare-eligible coverage Parts A and B, and are in 
addition to the core package not in lieu of the core package.) 
 
Plan A (‘core’ package) 
Hospitalization from 61
st to 90
th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 




th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 








th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 








Skilled nursing facility care (actual billed charges up to coinsurance amount from 
the 21
st through to 100
th day) 
Medicare Part B deductible 
Specified medically necessary emergency care in a foreign country (80% of 
Medicare-eligible expenses, within first 60 days of each trip outside the United 




th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 








Skilled nursing facility care (actual billed charges up to coinsurance amount from 
the 21
st through to 100
th day) 
Specified medically necessary emergency care in a foreign country (80% of 
Medicare-eligible expenses, within first 60 days of each trip outside the United 




Specified at-home recovery benefit (at-home short-term assistance with activities 




th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 








Skilled nursing facility care (actual billed charges up to coinsurance amount from 
the 21
st through to 100
th day) 
Specified medically necessary emergency care in a foreign country (80% of 
Medicare-eligible expenses, within first 60 days of each trip outside the United 




Specified preventive medical care (an annual clinical preventive medical history 
and physical examination and patient education; fecal occult blood test or digital 
rectal examination or both; mammogram; dipstick urinalysis for hematuria, 
baceriuria and proteinuria; pure tone, air only, hearing screening test, administered 
or ordered by a physician; serum cholesterol screening every five years; thyroid 
function test; diabetes screening; influenza vaccine administered at any 
appropriate time during the year and tetanus and diphtheria booster every to 
years; any other tests or preventive measures determined appropriate by the 
attending physician; actual charges up to 100% of Medicare-approved amount for 




th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 








Skilled nursing facility care (actual billed charges up to coinsurance amount from 
the 21
st through to 100
th day) 
Medicare Part B deductible 
Specified medically necessary emergency care in a foreign country (80% of 
Medicare-eligible expenses, within first 60 days of each trip outside the United 








th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 




Medicare part A inpatient deductible 
 
plus  
Skilled nursing facility care (actual billed charges up to coinsurance amount from 
the 21
st through to 100
th day) 
80% of Medicare Part B Excess charges 
Specified medically necessary emergency care in a foreign country (80% of 
Medicare-eligible expenses, within first 60 days of each trip outside the United 
States ($250), subject to a deductible and lifetime maximum benefit of $50,000)  
Specified at-home recovery benefit (at-home short-term assistance with activities 




th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 








Skilled nursing facility care (actual billed charges up to coinsurance amount from 
the 21
st through to 100
th day) 
80% of Medicare Part B Excess charges 
Specified medically necessary emergency care in a foreign country (80% of 
Medicare-eligible expenses, within first 60 days of each trip outside the United 




Basic outpatient prescription drug benefit (50% of outpatient prescription drug 





th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 








Skilled nursing facility care (actual billed charges up to coinsurance amount from 
the 21
st through to 100
th day) 
100% of Medicare Part B Excess charges 
Specified medically necessary emergency care in a foreign country (80% of 
Medicare-eligible expenses, within first 60 days of each trip outside the United 




Basic outpatient prescription drug benefit (50% of outpatient prescription drug 
charges after a $25 calendar year deductible to a maximum of $1250 per enrollee 
per year) 
Specified at-home recovery benefit (at-home short-term assistance with activities 





th day (Medicare Part A) 
Medicare lifetime inpatient reserve day expenses (Medicare Part A) 
Upon exhaustion of the Medicare Part A inpatient coverage including lifetime 
reserve days, expenses up to a lifetime maximum of an additional 365 days 
Reasonable cost of the first three pints of blood (Medicare Parts A and B) 








Skilled nursing facility care (actual billed charges up to coinsurance amount from 
the 21
st through to 100
th day) 
100% of Medicare Part B Excess charges 
Specified medically necessary emergency care in a foreign country (80% of 
Medicare-eligible expenses, within first 60 days of each trip outside the United 




Extended prescription drug benefit (50% of outpatient prescription drug charges 
after a $250 deductible up to a maximum of $3000 per enrollee per year 
Specified preventive medical care  (an annual clinical preventive medical history 
and physical examination and patient education; fecal occult blood test or digital 
rectal examination or both; mammogram; dipstick urinalysis for hematuria, 
baceriuria and proteinuria; pure tone, air only, hearing screening test, administered 
or ordered by a physician; serum cholesterol screening every five years; thyroid 
function test; diabetes screening; influenza vaccine administered at any 
appropriate time during the year and tetanus and diphtheria booster every to 
years; any other tests or preventive measures determined appropriate by the 
attending physician; actual charges up to 100% of Medicare-approved amount for 
each service up to a maximum of $120 annually) 
 
Specified at-home recovery benefit (at-home short-term assistance with activities 






HEALTH EMPLOYER DATA INFORMATION SET (HEDIS) 
  
HEDIS
® 1999 Reporting Set Measures by Domain 
Domain  Description of changes  
EFFECTIVENESS OF CARE  
Childhood Immunization Status*   Minor modifications 
Adolescent Immunization Status*   Minor modifications 
Advising Smokers to Quit *  Minor modifications 
Flu Shots for Older Adults*   Minor modifications 
Breast Cancer Screening*   No changes 
Cervical Cancer Screening*   Minor modifications 
Prenatal Care in the First Trimester*   Minor modifications 
Low Birth-Weight Babies   No changes (not required) 
Check-Ups After Delivery*   Minor modifications 
Beta Blocker Treatment After a Heart Attack*   Minor modifications 
Cholesterol Management After Acute 
Cardiovascular Events  
New measure 
Eye Exams for People with Diabetes*  Minor modifications 
Comprehensive Diabetes Care   New measure (voluntary) 
Follow-Up After Hospitalization for Mental 
Illness*  
Minor modifications 
Antidepressant Medication Management   New measure 
The Health of Seniors   Specifications  in  HEDIS  ’99, 
Vol. 6 
ACCESS/AVAILABILITY OF CARE  
Adults' Access to Preventive/Ambulatory Health 
Services  
Minor modifications 
Children's Access to Primary Care Practitioners   Minor modifications 
Availability of Primary Care Providers   Measure retired 
Availability of Behavioral Health Care Providers   Measure retired 
Availability of Obstetrical and Prenatal Care 
Providers  
Measure retired 
Initiation of Prenatal Care   Minor modifications 
Low Birth-Weight Deliveries at Facilities for 
High-Risk Deliveries & Neonates  
No changes (not required) 
Annual Dental Visit   No changes 
Availability of Dentists   Measure retired 
Availability of Language Interpretation Services   No changes 112 
 
SATISFACTION WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF CARE  
HEDIS/CAHPS 2.0H* Survey(Adult Medicaid, 
Commercial)  
New survey instrument 
HEDIS/CAHPS 2.0H, Child (Medicaid, 
Commercial)  
New survey instrument 
HEDIS/CAHPS 2.0, Medicare  New survey instrument 
 HEALTH PLAN STABILITY  
Disenrollment   No changes 
Practitioner Turnover   No changes 
Years in Business/Total Membership   No changes 
Indicators of Financial Stability   Minor modifications 
USE OF SERVICES  
Frequency of Ongoing Prenatal Care   Language clarified 
Well-Child Visits in the First 15 Months of Life   Minor modifications 
Well-Child Visits in the Third, Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Year of Life  
Minor modifications 
Adolescent Well-Care Visits   Minor modifications 
Frequency of Selected Procedures   Minor modifications 
Inpatient Utilization--General Hospital/Acute 
Care  
Minor modifications 
Ambulatory Care   Minor modifications 
Inpatient Utilization--Non-Acute Care   No changes 
Discharge and Average Length of Stay-
Maternity Care  
No changes 
Cesarean Section Rate  No changes 
Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Rate (VBAC-Rate)  Language clarified 
Births and Average Length of Stay, Newborns   Minor modifications 
Mental Health Utilization--Inpatient Discharges 
and Average Length of Stay 
No changes 
Mental Health Utilization--Percentage of 
Members Receiving Inpatient, Day/Night Care 
and Ambulatory Services  
Minor modifications 
Readmission For Specified Mental Health 
Disorders  
Measure retired 
Chemical Dependency Utilization--Inpatient 
Discharges and Average Length of Stay 
No changes 
Chemical Dependency Utilization--Percentage 
of Members Receiving Inpatient, Day/Night 
Care and Ambulatory Services 
Minor modifications 
Readmission for Chemical Dependency   Measure retired 
Outpatient Drug Utilization   No changes 113 
 
COST OF CARE  
Rate Trends   No changes 
High-Occurrence/High-Cost DRGs   Language clarified 
HEALTH PLAN DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION  
Board Certification/Residency Completion   Minor modifications 
Practitioner Compensation   Minor modifications 
Arrangements with Public Health, Educational 
and Social Service Organizations 
No changes 
Total Enrollment   No changes 
Enrollment by Payer (Member Years/Months)   No changes 
Unduplicated Count of Medicaid Members.   No changes 
Cultural Diversity of Medicaid Membership   No changes. 
Weeks of Pregnancy at Time of Enrollment in 
the Health Plan  
No changes. 
* These measures and survey instruments are required for reporting in Accreditation '99. 
Where measures are not relevant for a given population, plans are not required to report 
that measure. 
  
 
Source: http://www.ncqa.org/pages/communications/news/h99meas.htm 
Accessed: 1/10/99 
 